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IFORE WORD AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
F o r ewor d  a nd  ac knowle dge me nt s
Like most of the Finns I know of, I also have developed a strong 
emotional and symbolic attachment to the Finnish welfare state 
since my childhood. Working intensively with my PhD project over 
the past five years, I have begun to appreciate how important a role 
this attachment has played from the very beginning. In addition 
to directing my research aims and interests related to right-wing 
populist advocacy, I have been motivated by strong sense that I am 
exploring a pertinent and ubiquitous facet of a Finnish self-under-
standing on national solidarity and collective identity. 
My own earliest distinct memory of taking pride in my home 
country dates back to January 1990, when I experienced this pride 
being humiliatingly challenged by the United States Border Pro-
tection in Miami Airport. Our family was coming home to Fort 
Lauderdale from Finland, where we had spent the Christmas hol-
idays with our relatives. Two officers took our family into a small 
room, where they posed my parents a seemingly unending series of 
questions that I could not decipher with my six-year-old’s command 
of English. The tones of voices and the setting made it obvious, 
though, that my parents were being questioned, that their answers 
were being challenged and that my parents were gradually growing 
nervous. 
Once inside the comfortable cushioning of the airport taxi, I 
asked my parents what the men wanted to know. (Later on, I found 
out that the officials were puzzled as to why we went to Finland just 
before our six-month visa expired, stayed there for two weeks, and 
came back with another six-month visa.) My parents saved me from 
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the institutional minutia, and told that the men wanted to make 
sure that we would not try to stay in the United States for good. 
First I was flabbergasted, but then just angry and indignant. Why 
on earth would we – coming from Finland of all places – want to 
escape to the United States? I had been told by everyone, including 
my grandfather, a veteran of the Winter War, that being born in 
Finland is comparable to winning the jackpot in a lottery, “because 
we’ve got everything so good here.” Considering that, from my 
point of view, every sane and logical person would rather be born in 
Finland than anywhere else, the behavior of the border control offi-
cials appeared totally idiotic. I quickly came to the conclusion that 
the only plausible reason they would want to ask the question for is 
that they were envious of us for hailing from the best place of the 
world to live in. To mitigate their sense of inferiority, they would 
seek to cast a shadow of doubt against a crystal clear fact, suggesting 
that perhaps not everybody would prefer Finland to United States.
 
***
I think this anecdote crystallizes how great many native Finns 
have grown, ever since childhood, to relate to their country of ori-
gin. This is – as I have come to believe during my five years of PhD 
research – to grow to relate to it essentially as a welfare nation, the 
exemplary individual among countries in terms of how well its pop-
ulation’s needs are met. This public perception of the Finns being 
united by the common purpose that can keep Finland a country 
where it is a privilege to live in has been gradually met with a grow-
ing sense of disillusionment in the wake of the economic crises of 
the early 1990s and the late 2000s. The narrative emphasizing the 
role of the Finnish welfare state as a source of national pride began 
to be undermined by a collective sense of its fragility in the face of 
range of abstract external and internal threats, such as globalization 
and the erosion of national solidarity.
One of the primary endeavors behind my PhD project has been 
to illustrate how this experienced fragility of the welfare state as 
the symbol of national pride has been harnessed by the neo-popu-
list advocates in the 2000s. In the heart of the right-wing populist 
championing for the welfare nationalism, there was a narrative of 
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looming disentitlement to the Finnish birthright that presents the 
Finns with the threat of losing their “fair share” in a nation state 
that used to be able to sort all kinds of things out for its citizens.
In the most abstract sense, there is nothing new or surprising in 
the fear of an uncertain future. This is particularly true after decades 
of relative prosperity that has framed the conception of normalcy 
and generated expectations of continuity for a whole generation of 
Finns in their childhood and adolescence. Nevertheless, for me it 
has been striking to witness the certainty with which the scapegoats 
for this uncertainty have commonly been identified by neo-populist 
advocates in Finland during the 2000s. Sometimes the scapegoats 
are seen in concrete groups of people, such as immigrants, national 
minorities, homosexuals or post-modern artists. At other times the 
blame is placed on reified abstractions, such as “multiculturalism” 
or the distanced elites in politics and the media. Regardless of who 
the scapegoats are, they are considered to be responsible for under-
mining what the “good old Finland” used to be, either in terms of 
culture, in terms of material redistribution of welfare or a peculiar 
mixture of both, as is the case in welfare nationalist public narra-
tives.
When I started this PhD project late in 2010, I focused on how 
the welfare state and immigration policy were debated on the high 
political arena. Already at that point I was intrigued by the saliency 
with which the neo-populist “immigration critical” political agenda 
was covered in the mainstream media. Writing this in September 
2015, it appears evident that this was only beginning; this sum-
mer hardly a day has passed without neo-populists featuring in the 
headlines. Such a strong ongoing media presence – from tabloid 
scandals to serious political journalism – underlines chameleonic 
character through which neo-populist advocates are reaching a wide 
range of potential constituencies. Even with four years passed since 
the electoral breakthrough of Perussuomalaiset in 2011, new man-
ifestations of neo-populist narratives continue to resonate among 
the online-based dot.net-generation, the precarious working class 
net-losers of globalization and the middle class taxpayers.
More recently, the neo-populist catch-all strategy has become 
more pronounced. While embracing realpolitik sensibilities in the 
government by abandoning their promise to oppose new bailout 
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loans for Greece, the Perussuomalaiset leadership has also shied 
away from renouncing the neo-Nazi sympathies and contacts among 
some of their MPs. By meeting public criticism from the subject 
positions of the underdog and the pariah both in the high politi-
cal grassroots level arenas, neo-populists are advancing on the very 
same trajectory I illustrate in this study. As the Finnish neo-popu-
lists continue moving further away from any concrete endeavors for 
realizing welfare nationalist policies – instead focusing on nurtur-
ing a victimized collective identity among an increasingly hetero-
geneous constituency – I realize that the results and the analytical 
narrative presented in this study could hardly have been published 
at a more critical juncture. 
***
I could not have finished this PhD project without the enduring 
support – analytical, emotional and material – from which a feel a 
sense of immense gratitude towards my parents and a great number 
of friends and colleagues. Even before writing the first draft of my 
doctoral research proposal in 2010, I was taken by the certainty 
with which people at the Centre for Research on Ethnic Relations 
and Nationalism (CEREN) wanted me to established and share an 
academic home at the Swedish School of Social Science. 
Writing, collaborating and brainstorming on a daily basis in EU-
ROSPHERE and Academy of Finland projects together with three 
CEREN junior researchers – Peter Holley, Karin Creutz and Mar-
jukka Weide – each encouraged me in an intimately personal style. 
Peter shared his precious time in reading any and all of my papers, 
always keen on helping me to develop my fledgling ideas into valu-
able discoveries, while Marjukka’s rigorous approach to doing sci-
ence reined some of my wildest ideas into methodologically feasible 
pursuits. Karin – typically entering my office in the wee hours like a 
hurricane – turned several “wasted days” into hectic sessions where 
literally half an article was written in one go. Each of them facil-
itated several life-changing transitions; from student to research-
er, from theory obsessed political scientist to empirical sociologist, 
from colleague to personal friend. 
I am grateful of the four year period from 2011 to 2015, during 
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which I was able to freely pursue my research funded by the Kone 
foundation. Leading CEREN before taking up the directorship at 
the Institute of Migration, Tuomas Martikainen’s door was always 
open for me to get advice and to be pushed forward in a gentle and 
determined way. I was also lucky to always have wonderful col-
leagues in neighboring offices for all imaginable purposes. Whether 
needed a respite from my chaotic research cave or advice in navi-
gating through the vast bureaucratic expanses, Heidi Aaltonen and 
Anna Storgårds were the people I could turn to from the very be-
ginning. For several years, Pasi Saukkonen from Cupore, sprinkled 
me with mature advice for advancing my research (some of which I 
actually followed) and Laszlo Vincze and Enikő Marton consistent-
ly cheered me up with their uniquely sunny disposition. 
With the first half of my work completed in 2013, and eager to 
adopt new methods and approaches to the rest of my work, I was 
fortunate enough to be introduced to the people in the Helsinki Re-
search Group for Political Sociology seminar, led by Risto Alapuro, 
Markku Lonkila, Eeva Luhtakallio and Tuomas Ylä-Anttila. To-
gether with other PhD students, particularly Veikko Eranti and 
Tuukka Ylä-Anttila, my writing was peppered with new, creative, 
crazy and fun approaches to political sociology, quickly convinc-
ing me that no academic constraints should prevent the completing 
this work in the true spirit of exploration. Planning, developing and 
teaching the course “Challenges of Citizenship in Diversifying So-
cieties” together with Marjukka Weide, I strived to instill the same 
spirit of having fun while researching into our students. I also wish 
to thank my students, especially Emma Kolu, for their critical and 
profound questions that led to several revisions in the way I address 
the theory and practice of multiculturalism.
During the dozens of international conferences and PhD semi-
nars I participated in, I particularly enjoyed meeting new junior and 
senior researchers. Especially in the ones organized by the European 
Sociological Association, the Nordic Political Science Association 
and the Welfare and Migration Research Network, I met way too 
many people who made a lasting impression for them to be exhaus-
tive listed. Even so, I feel I must mention at least Will Kymlicka, 
Veit Bader, Peter Kivisto, Suvi Keskinen, Ellen Annandale, Rob-
ert Fine, Karina Horsti, Saara Pellander, Cristian Norocel, Laura 
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Parkkinen, Mika Danetiu, Lucilla Salvia, Camilla Nordberg, Sanna 
Saksela-Bergholm and Mats Wickström as people whose encourag-
ing comments and critical feedback profoundly shaped my work. 
Joining the ranks of the Society for the Study of Ethnic Rela-
tions and International Migration and eventually assuming the po-
sition of vice-chairperson in 2014 also provided me with contacts to 
several interesting people. Working together with Lotta Haikkola, 
Merja Pentikäinen, Katja Vilkama and Miika Tervonen – all high-
ly motivated to develop new ways of communicating and applying 
their research on ethnic relations and migrancy to those outside 
academia – helped me to negotiate between the roles of researcher 
and public discussant.
Collecting a diverse range of research material from various fora 
was another trying task in which I was fortunate enough to be able 
to rely on help from Legislative Councellor Jorma Kantola at the 
Ministry of the Interior, Kaisa Hakkarainen at Helsingin Sanomat 
and Matias Turkkila on Hommaforum.
Finally, as my supervisor, Sirpa Wrede was undoubtedly the most 
important person in my PhD project. Consistently surprised in our 
meetings by Sirpa’s uncanny ability to somehow know what I was 
trying to express even before I did myself, I ended up rearranging all 
the pieces in this puzzle over and over again. Always encouraging, 
but rarely completely satisfied, she pushed me further and gave me 
room to develop my own voice so that my analysis of public narra-
tives followed a red thread around which I could weave the text into 
a real story and an analytical narrative in its own right. Whatever 
tasks I end up taking in the future, this is the skill I treasure the 
most from my days as doctoral candidate. 
Thank you everybody.
On a beautiful skydiving day in Utti on September 12th, 2015,
Niko Pyrhönen 
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1  Int roduc t ion: 
 
Neo-Populis t  Welfare  Nat ionalism  
and Exclusionar y Conceptualizat ion  
of  Solidar i t y  in  a  Welfare  State  Contex t
This dissertation explores the narratives that facilitated the emer-
gence, mainstreaming and consolidation of right-wing populist ad-
vocacy from the political fringes into everyday public debates in 
Finland in this millennium. The main argument advanced in this 
study is that right-wing populist political activism developed from 
the early 2000s onwards into a resonant, neo-populist collective 
identity. Accordingly, the dissertation argues that neo-populist ad-
vocates were able to secure the support of a wide range of potential 
constituencies through a political agenda that reinterprets the Nor-
dic tradition of universalistic welfare solidarity in exclusionary and 
nationalist terms. While narratives that build around concepts such 
as “the people” and “the nation” have been employed across a wide 
spectrum of contexts in nationalist mobilization during the 19th and 
20th centuries, several interesting and even unique elements differ-
entiate these public narratives of neo-populist advocacy in contem-
porary Finland from earlier manifestations of political nationalism. 
I have chosen to focus on what is termed here blue-and-white welfare 
nationalism as the central one of these flexible narratives employed 
by Finnish neo-populist advocates.
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The identification of the central narrative as blue-and-white wel-
fare nationalism is based on my interpretation of the early 2000s as 
a critical period in Finnish politics, during which political debates 
were commonly marked by fears linked explicitly to the expansion 
of the European Union to include countries with lower living stan-
dards, most notably the Baltic States. These rapid changes in Fin-
land’s institutional environment contributed to a growing sense of 
fear for the future of the welfare state in the globalized era across 
the Finnish party political spectrum (Nylund 2008). In the context 
of this heated political climate in which numerous societal actors, 
including trade unions, raised concerns about the massive influx of 
guest workers especially from Estonia, the populist “immigration 
critics” were able to downplay their earlier explicitly xenophobic 
ideological underpinnings, instead narrating their welfare national-
ist political activism as a part of the mainstream public debate. This 
skillful narrative reorientation allowed the neo-populists to position 
themselves as a key player in mundane political contestation con-
cerning the development of national social policy, while neverthe-
less emphasizing the arguably immigration-induced challenges the 
Finnish welfare state faces. The ubiquitous public support for the 
welfare state made it possible for the emergent neo-populism to face 
the public critique of racism with a wide range of justificatory nar-
ratives that commonly presented nationalist articulations in their 
political agenda as a benign sense of political responsibility and es-
sential for saving “our” welfare state (Billig 1995, 6). 
The analysis in this study proceeds from a close examination of 
the subject matter of the emergent neo-populist narratives as cultur-
al constructs. In order to capture the wider societal implications of 
the proliferation of these narratives – particularly concerning their 
ability to contribute to an exclusionary public understanding of the 
welfare state – I also analyze how these narratives are harnessed 
as instruments of neo-populist political mobilization and collective 
identity formation that fuels political action. Following Fligstein’s 
and McAdam’s (2012) research on the “theory of fields”, political 
mobilization is here conceptualized as meso-level strategic social 
action that requires social skill and collaborative meaning making. 
Accordingly, the study contextualizes the emergent field of political 
debate on immigration and the welfare state with regard to a his-
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torical development that goes beyond contemporary manifestations 
of neo-populist politics. In the post-WWII Finland, for instance, 
there had been a long tradition of venerating an idealized, universal-
ist conceptualization of civic solidarity through a public discourse 
that emphasized “the small nation’s success story” in transcending 
particularist interests and identities for the sake of creating “an ex-
ceptionally good country for anyone to live in” (Kettunen 2008, 
34–35).
The argument developed in this study further holds that from 
the early 2000s onwards, the emphasis on the welfare state devel-
oped into a central component in the right-wing populists’ mobi-
lization narratives. Studies from the other Nordic countries show 
that the recent narrations of Nordic welfare nationalism have often 
employed exclusionary and highly moralized conceptualizations of 
the nation, the people and national solidarity. Drawing from a com-
mon public understanding of the welfare state as national project, 
neo-populists have sought to legitimate their claim to restrict im-
migrants’ rights to welfare redistribution with the need to protect 
the welfare state and its autochthonous population from ‘outsiders’ 
in various ways. These neo-populist, welfare nationalist narratives 
typically seek to redraw the boundaries of national belonging in 
self-evidently nativist terms (see, for example, Suszycki 2011; Vad 
Jønsson et al. 2013). The literature on more long-standing right-
wing populist movements in other Western European countries has 
produced similar observations concerning the role of immigration 
in the nationalist justification for exclusionary political agenda 
(Banting and Kymlicka 2006; Crepaz 2008; Mudde 2007; Kivisto 
and Wahlbeck 2013). 
Despite the low levels of immigration and the idealized tradition 
of consensual decision-making in Finland during the early 2000s, 
immigration was rarely discussed as a multiculturalist challenge 
for the universalist welfare state to transcend. Research on populist 
mobilization in Finland illustrates how populist advocates sought 
to portray the presence of minorities and societal heterogenization 
through immigration as threats to the sense of national solidarity 
on which the welfare state was built (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 
2009a, 14–15). There are also indications that right-wing politicians 
from established parties commonly painted the picture of the im-
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migrant Other as representing the kind of diversity that threatens 
to erode the prided Finnish solidarity and the welfare state (Förbom 
2010, 10–12). 
From the point of view of this doctoral study, there are two par-
ticularly interesting, interlinked elements in the development of 
neo-populism in Finland. The first one is related to strategic so-
cial action that can be observed in how successfully neo-populist 
advocates mobilized in the online front of public debate from the 
early 2000s onwards (Hannula 2011, 50; Keskinen, Rastas and Tu-
ori 2009b, 8). The second one pertains to the subject matter of the 
mobilization narratives, specifically how neo-populists have been 
able to gradually narrate the welfare state itself as the key symbol 
of national identity to be protected against the immigrants’ alleged 
abuse of social welfare (Puuronen 2011, 224). The significant sym-
bolic role attached to the welfare state – not only in the neo-populist 
narratives, but also in the Finnish political culture writ large – is 
often considered to originate from the idealization of the “People’s 
home” model of universalist welfare that Nordic institutions sought 
to implement in the post-war period. This “Scandocentric” concep-
tualization of the welfare state, embedded in the pride in the superi-
ority of the “Nordic model” of organizing welfare (see, for example, 
Allardt 1981, 7; for critiques, see Alestalo 2010, 300; Kettunen and 
Petersen 2011, 16; Vad Jønsson et al. 2013), has been widespread 
among politicians and in the media (Heikkilä et al. 2002, 272). It 
is partly because of this role of the welfare state as a national sym-
bol that the neo-populist nationalism has been able to capitalize on 
the general disillusionment concerning the universalist capabilities 
of the welfare state in the aftermath of the economic crises of the 
1990s and the “euro crisis” of the late 2000s (Hannula 2011, 185–
190; Förbom 2010, 12–13, 127–131). 
Despite the ample literature on European right-wing populism, 
to the date there exists no in-depth study of how neo-populist ac-
tors, such as the Finnish Perussuomalaiset1 party, operationalize the 
1  In this dissertation I refer to the parties with their original names, rather than trans-
lating them. The main reason for this is to avoid ambiguity related to the English trans-
lation of Perussuomalaiset. During the period covered in this chapter, Perussuomalaiset 
used the translation “True Finns,” but as of August 2011 started referring to themsel-
ves as “The Finns” in international contexts. Since “True Finns” is an outdated name, 
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legacy of idealized welfare state in their anti-immigration oriented 
political agenda – or how their advocates on a grassroots level and 
in the political arena have positioned themselves as legitimate po-
litical actors within the online arenas of political debate and in the 
mainstream publicity. This doctoral study remedies this lacuna by 
exploring in detail the emergence, mainstreaming and consolida-
tion of neo-populist narratives in the Finnish public debates. This 
is achieved by analyzing public narratives within a wide range of 
arenas of public debate, focusing particularly on two kinds of inter-
twined narratives; the ones employed for justifying welfare national-
ist political agenda and those for consolidating neo-populist political 
advocacy. 
This introductory chapter is divided into two sections. First (1.1) 
I present the case of emerging neo-populist advocacy in public de-
bates, as well as some general features in how welfare nationalist 
narratives present immigration as a threat to the welfare state. The 
second section (1.2) presents the research objective; elucidating the 
analytical narrative of the dissertation and underlining how the 
structure of the dissertation supports the exploration of the consol-
idation of neo-populist advocacy. 
1.1 The Emergence of Welfare Nationalist Narratives and 
Neo-Populist Advocacy in Public Debate
The volume and status of the Finnish neo-populist political activism 
of the 2000s differed from that of the earlier variants of political 
nationalism in post-war Finland in that previously nationalist ac-
tivism had only occupied the political margins (Keskinen, Rastas 
and Tuori 2009a, 33). Drawing from experiences from other coun-
tries, as examined in international research literature – discussed in 
the chapter 2 – it is possible to emphasize certain particularities in 
the way Finnish neo-populists have developed and employed polit-
ical narratives that created a field of “immigration critical” politi-
but referring to them as “The Finns” is an analytically problematic translation, running 
the risk of the party being conflated to Finns as the people, using the original names 
allows for conducting the analysis with as little ambiguity as possible.
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cal debate used for successful political mobilization of large, new 
constituencies. This rapid growth in the political support for the 
right-wing populist Perussuomalaiset party, illustrated in the graph 
1 (below), is so exceptional in the context of European political 
movements that its background should be explored in some detail.
Graph 1. Support for the leading right-wing populist party in parliamentary 
elections in the Nordic EU countries.
The point of departure of this doctoral study is that the success-
ful political mobilization of the right-wing populism in Finland has 
benefitted from the neo-populist advocates’ ability to construct and 
link two types of public narratives; one for communicating their 
political goals and the other for developing neo-populist advocacy 
into a resonant collective identity. 
The first type of narratives emphasizes the saliency of the items 
in the welfare nationalist political agenda as possible remedies to 
widely shared political concerns. As I will discuss in more detail in 
2.2., the neo-populists’ ability to reach wider audiences with their 
narratives has been greatly facilitated by the overarching public in-
ternalization of the concern that globalization, immigration and in-
creasing heterogeneity may present an impediment for endeavors to 
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uphold national unity and solidarity necessary for the maintenance 
of the welfare state (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 3). In Finland, 
combating these developments is presented as the primary tasks on 
the welfare nationalist political agenda. 
This political agenda is heavily influenced by several European 
discourses that began to be domesticated in Finnish public debate 
already decades before the neo-populist political breakthrough (on 
domestication of global trends, see Alasuutari 2009, 69). A prime 
example of such a discourse would be the fear for declining national 
solidarity. International research literature discusses the “declining 
national solidarity argument” as pertaining to the sense of a di-
minishing consensus on social commitment and concern for the 
living conditions of compatriots, an understanding of solidarity 
developed in tandem with the welfare state itself (Crepaz 2008, 
113). The previous scholarship has highlighted that this discourse 
started to proliferate somewhat simultaneously with the European 
discourse according to which nation-states under the conditions of 
economic globalization are no longer capable of funding their redis-
tributive welfare regimes (Lavelle 2008, 2–3). Moreover, researchers 
on populism tend to agree that the neoliberal claim about the need 
to reorient state policies has helped to create a favorable political 
niche for the successful mobilization of populist welfare national-
ism (Kettunen 2008, 227). As the subsequent analysis will indicate, 
in the 2000s the Finnish neo-populists began to occupy this niche 
by using narratives that argued that since the welfare state is under 
the threat of diminishing, there must be stricter access criteria for 
the inclusion into the sphere of solidarity among welfare recipients. 
Another example of such a domesticated meta-narrative dis-
cussed in international scholarship, is the opposition to multicultur-
alism that drew from the emerging European discourse of “death of 
multiculturalism.” This discourse portrays the increasing presence 
of immigrant cultures as leading to segregation and as incompat-
ible with the goals of “our” modern way of life (Favell 2001, 10; 
Schinkel and Van Houdt 2010; Faist 2013, 22–23). In the welfare 
nationalist rhetoric of Finnish neo-populists, the supposedly immi-
gration-induced increase in heterogeneity is presented as incompat-
ible with the fostering of national solidarity that the maintenance 
of the welfare state is considered to require (Puuronen 2011, 244). 
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There exists a wide range of approaches towards solidarity-based 
welfare regimes among European right-wing populists. While the 
Nordic populist parties are regarded as the most keen on promoting 
an extensive system of welfare redistributions, Cas Mudde – having 
conducted extensive research on European populist parties – points 
out that this kind of solidarity is distinctly bounded in the sense 
that many of “the benefits of the welfare state should be limited to 
the ‘own people’” (2007, 131). Indeed, as the Perussuomalaiset party 
asserts in its electoral manifesto for the parliamentary elections of 
2011: “the point of departure in social policy must be to unite the 
people [and] encourage people to behave in a responsible and so-
cially sustainable way” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 11). The rhetoric 
that burdens the welfare policy with such high ambitions establish-
es the immigrants outsiders’ access to welfare benefits as a heavily 
loaded normative question of desert and morality (Kangas 2000). 
The most deeply domesticated Finnish narratives of welfare 
nationalism differ from their nationalist counterparts in Europe, 
primarily in their statist conceptualization of exclusionary welfare 
solidarity. The international literature on multiculturalism suggests 
that in the welfare state context, immigration is commonly framed 
as concern from the point of view of welfare redistribution. Gary 
Freeman (1986, 62), having pioneered the modern study of politics 
of immigration crystallizes this approach: “When the welfare state 
is seen as something for ‘them’ paid by ‘us,’ its days as a consensual 
solution to societal problems are numbered.” This framing, highly 
prominent in Finland, emphasizes that a willingness to maintain 
high levels of tax revenue requires that the recipients of the welfare 
benefits can be regarded as “people like us” (Crepaz 2008, 40). 
Any public discussion on the ideal and practical implications of 
national solidarity can easily develop into a heated political debate. 
This is especially so when the arena for conducting such a debate 
is the mainstream publicity within a modern welfare state. One of 
the reasons for this contestation within nation-state bounded public 
sphere is that the concept of solidarity is often presented as built 
on the notion of coinciding interests within an idealized, alleged-
ly homogeneous national group (Lepola 2000, 22). Public debates 
growing from this nationalist conceptualization of solidarity often 
employ assertions of the nature of the interests that most accurately 
91 INTRODUCTION: NEO-POPULIST WELFARE NATIONALISM AND EXCLUSIONARY 
CONCEPTUALIZATION OF SOLIDARITY IN A WELFARE STATE CONTEXT
define the national group in question. Indeed, since the early 2000s, 
the Finnish populism emphasized the necessity exclude immigrants 
as outsiders for the sake of maintaining levels of solidarity that the 
continued existence of the welfare state requires. The main welfare 
nationalist narrative for justifying exclusion and rigid control of im-
migration and minority politics that the neo-populists advocate is 
that, since the presence and recognition of minority groups dilutes 
the sense of “our common interests” on which solidarity is built, 
immigration undermines or even destroys the welfare state and the 
national culture it embodies (Förbom 2010, 47).
The narratives that facilitated the development of neo-populist 
advocacy into a resonant collective identity advance from the posi-
tion that the neo-populists, unlike other political actors, have the 
answers needed to counter the immigration-induced globalizing and 
heterogenizing developments that are threatening the Finnish wel-
fare state. The fact that both the problems (“immigration-induced, 
solidarity-eroding heterogeneity”) and solutions (“promotion of na-
tional values and norms”) are presented as simple also requires that 
they both remain relatively unspecific in terms of what kinds of 
policies they entail. This means that, upon closer examination, the 
neo-populists narrate their political goals in markedly open-ended 
manner which, in turn furnishes their advocacy with a distinctly 
chameleonic character (Taggart 2000, 117). 
This open-endedness also allows selling neo-populist advocacy 
for many kinds of potential constituencies by strategically employ-
ing different justificatory narratives in different arenas. For exam-
ple, the narratives for reaching the middle classes can be tailored 
to the arenas of mainstream publicity by avoiding explicitly essen-
tializing claims about immigrants and their qualities, and rather 
referring to “taxpayers’ monies.” The more radical narratives, on the 
other hand, tend to proliferate within the online arenas of public 
debate (Maasilta 2012, 14–15), where neo-populists actively reach 
for the younger dot.net generations. Indeed, the voter profile of the 
Perussuomalaiset party has been steadily moving from lower-class, 
blue-collared net-loser of globalization towards “middle class tax-
payers” and emerging, young voter cohorts (Rahkonen 2011, 434).
While there are important differences in how neo-populist col-
lective identity is narrated in various arenas – even to the extent 
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that its “ideological core” is often perceived to remain in a constant 
state of flux (Taggart 2000, 4) – the Finnish neo-populists are nev-
ertheless united in the narrative that claims the sole ownership of 
the policy solutions for saving the welfare state. This is typical in the 
tradition populist rhetoric where the established political order and 
their political opponents are presented as subject to elitist affilia-
tions which prevent them from identifying the most salient political 
challenges or developing policy solutions for them (see, for example, 
Mudde 2007, 65–66). In Finland, the contemporary neo-populist 
narratives have sought to justify the emphasis on immigration in 
political agenda with the idea of the fragility of the welfare state in 
the global era – a notion that permeated both academic and pub-
lic debates on immigration in Europe already towards the end of 
the millennia (Heikkilä et al. 2002, 235–236). At the heart of this 
neo-populist welfare nationalism, there has been a sense of disenti-
tlement to the “blue-and-white birthright,” a fearful narrative that 
presents Finns as a nation just about to lose their “fair share” of 
welfare state on which high national hopes were piled – their ad-
vocates often genuinely believing that the welfare state would be 
able to resolve the all kinds of social problems for its citizens in the 
foreseeable future. 
In this dissertation, I explore the development of public narra-
tives of exclusionary welfare solidarity from three aspects. Firstly, 
I illustrate how welfare nationalist narratives emerged in the high 
political arena. Secondly, I analyze how the neo-populists – justi-
fying their nationalist political agenda with welfare state idealizing 
narratives – were able reach salient coverage in the mainstream pub-
licity. Finally, I assess how neo-populist advocacy of blue-and-white 
welfare nationalism consolidated in the public debate as a resonant 
collective identity – channeling a wide range of societal discontent 
into narratives that present remedies to the, allegedly immigra-
tion-induced, challenges that welfare state is facing as something 
that only neo-populists can properly envision and implement.
1.2 The Research Aim and the Structure of the Dissertation 
Much of the existing research on Finnish right-wing populism 
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tends to emphasize the role of structural developments behind the 
recent politicization of “the immigration question” – focusing on 
the effects of globalization on its net-losers, disenfranchisement, un-
employment and the protest-mentality (Puuronen 2011, 204–205; 
Wiberg 2011), the subsequent changes in the party political oppor-
tunity structures (Rahkonen 2011), and developments in the right-
wing populist media exposure (Horsti and Nikunen 2013; Maasilta 
2012).
Contemporary research on European populism, however, sug-
gests that such macro-level developments can only account for the 
demand-side of the rise of populism, outlining the elements that 
create a fertile ground for populist electoral success (Mudde 2007, 
256). Therefore, it is important to complement the structural ex-
planations with an analysis on how right-wing populist agency has 
contributed to increased support for neo-populist advocacy and 
the strategic measures employed for harnessing the potential for 
growth. Indeed, several researchers have explored the changes in 
certain specific policy issues in the political agenda of the Perus-
suomalaiset party (Railo 2013; Ylä-Anttila 2014), but to so far very 
little research has been done to explore the emergence of welfare 
nationalist narratives in political debates and how these narratives 
are employed in the mainstreaming and consolidation of neo-popu-
list advocacy. Considering this gap in the existing research, the key 
aim of this dissertation monograph is to illustrate narrative practic-
es of and arenas for spreading and justifying neo-populist welfare 
nationalism. 
The decision to study these relatively recent historical develop-
ments under the label of neo-populism and neo-populist advocacy 
(rather than radical right-wing populism, for instance) reflects fact 
that the research object of this study is very much a moving tar-
get. While many of the items on the political agenda of Finnish 
neo-populists advocates are common to European right-wing popu-
list parties, this study is not only about the political subject matter 
of Finnish right-wing populist mobilization narratives. Instead, the 
primary focus in on what could be considered, following McAd-
am and Fligstein conceptualization, the neo-populism as a strategic 
action field (for more detailed discussion on strategic action fields, 
see Fligstein and McAdam 2011, 3–5) and the neo-populist mode of 
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operation in the Finnish context where “democratic institutions are 
strong, populists ideas […] cohabit with other political visions, com-
pete for electoral support, and are kept in check by opposing forces” 
(Mazzoleni 2003, 2). Studying this strategic aspect of neo-populism 
entails focusing on the meso-level between the Finnish right-wing 
populist agency and the political opportunity structures within 
which its advocates operate.  
For instance, rather than seeking to appeal to constituencies 
within a distinctly “conservative-reactionary spectrum of political 
ideology” (Mazzoleni 2003, 4), neo-populists employ diverse range 
of narratives for collective identity-work serving to consolidate a 
collective self-understanding in several distinct arenas of public de-
bate. Notwithstanding the commonly xenophobic underpinnings 
in right-wing populist “immigration critique”, neo-populists have 
sought to position themselves “as true democrats, voicing popu-
lar grievances and opinions [supposedly] ignored by governments, 
mainstream parties and the media” (Canovan 1999, 2). This calls 
for disciplined sociological examination on the proliferation of pub-
lic narratives for favorably presenting welfare nationalism to main-
streamed audiences and eventually successfully mobilizing middle 
class constituencies towards the end of the 2000s. 
The multi-faceted task of elucidating the advancement of 
neo-populist advocacy in contemporary Finland in this dissertation 
is divided respectively into the content-specific research aim, focus-
ing on the subject matter of welfare nationalist narratives and into 
the practice-specific research aim, focusing on the strategic narra-
tive agency of the Finnish neo-populists. In terms of the former, I 
aim to assess how the subject matter in welfare nationalist political 
agenda has been narrated in the public so that social political chal-
lenges for the welfare state can be linked to the exclusionary con-
ceptualizations of solidarity by neo-populist advocates. With regard 
to the strategic narrative agency, I aim to analyze how neo-popu-
lism consolidated as a resonant collective identity whose large and 
heterogeneous constituency actively seeks to position neo-populist 
advocacy favorably in public. 
As a result of such approach to neo-populism – aimed at exam-
ining the narrative practices contributing to the proliferation, mo-
bilization and public justification of neo-populism in various arenas 
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of public sphere – the research object in the analytical narrative 
put forward in this doctoral study extends beyond the agency of 
Perussuomalaiset as a political party. For instance, while the par-
ty apparatus, its political leadership and individual politicians first 
operationalized welfare nationalist narratives in the high political 
arena (chapter 4), the proliferation these narratives is studied in 
relation to the steadily growing saliency of issues of immigration 
politics and the increasing critical media exposure for “immigration 
critique” in the mainstream arenas of public debate towards the end 
of the first decade of the 2000s (chapter 5). Finally, for the purposes 
of analyzing the consolidation of a neo-populist collective identity, 
the focus shifts towards the neo-populist grassroots level advocacy, 
particularly within the social media “sphericules” (chapter 6). 
In order to meet these aims, I first conduct a literature review 
(chapter 2) that allows developing analytical tools from a body of 
research that incorporates three distinct disciplinary traditions; po-
litical sociology, political science and media research. Triangulating 
between these research traditions, this chapter portrays three per-
tinent approaches to the emergence, mainstreaming and consolida-
tion of Finnish neo-populist welfare nationalism. 
The first one (2.1) pertains to the boundary-drawing use of the 
notion of a national “we” as a point of departure for the neo-pop-
ulist to enter the political debate from a privileged position. The 
second approach (2.2) underlines the historical legacy of an encom-
passing and overarching welfare state, which has been considered 
necessary to protect against various erosive effects by emphasizing 
national unity and solidarity in similarity. The third pertinent re-
search approach (2.3) to the success story of neo-populist advoca-
cy focuses on the mediatized strategies for developing a collective 
resonant identity – particularly through a rapid organization in 
the emergent social media – that can be presented favorably in the 
mainstream arenas employing various subject positions, such as the 
silenced underdog, waging war against corrupted established parties 
and the elite media. Based on the literature review, section 2.4 then 
synthesizes an analytical framework and presents the empirical re-
search questions to be operationalized in analyses of the data. 
In chapter 3, I present the data sets to be analyzed, illustrating 
the practical considerations guiding the progression of the data col-
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lection and coding of the data. I also emphasize how the research 
methodology was developed and operationalized to be employed in 
the analysis of the different data sets. 
The empirical analysis is divided into three chapters, from 4 to 
6, each pertaining to specific sets of data. The fourth chapter looks 
into legislative process for developing Aliens Act of 2004, analyzing 
the narratives of exclusionary welfare solidarity in the high political 
arena prior to the emergence of neo-populist welfare nationalism. 
The fifth one analyzes the political mobilization of welfare nation-
alism in mainstream publicity during the electoral breakthrough of 
the right-wing populist Perussuomalaiset party in 2011, focusing on 
the narratives employed in the electoral manifestos of the party and 
in the online debates by grassroots level advocates of neo-populism. 
The sixth and final chapter of analysis looks into consolidation of 
neo-populist advocacy in the mediatized narrative contestations. I 
focus on two online arenas where neo-populists developed narratives 
for legitimizing their role in political scandals revolving around two 
Perussuomalaiset MPs in 2012 and 2013. Based on narrative analysis 
of oppositional public stories, the sixth chapter assesses the impli-
cations of these narrative contestations for the consolidation of a 
neo-populist collective identity in the public debate. 
The order of chapters of analysis follows the advancement of ex-
clusionary narratives of welfare solidarity in the civil society – start-
ing from the most formal arenas of public debate in early 2000s and 
moving into the next decade with analyses of welfare nationalist 
narratives as presented within the more informal and mediatized 
arenas of public debate.
In the discussion (chapter 7), I present a synthesis of how the re-
sults of the empirical analysis can be employed to meet the research 
aims and answer the research questions of this study. Finally, in the 
conclusion (chapter 8), I discuss the theoretical implications of this 
study for a compound body of literature that I refer to as critical na-
tionalism studies. I also assess the extent to which my finding both 
corroborate and challenge the contemporary understanding of the 
mediatized consolidation of a neo-populist collective identity and 
the role of the welfare nationalist political agenda in this process. 
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Sociological  Approaches  
to  Populis t  Advocacy of  Exc lusionar y 
Welfare  Nat ionalism
This chapter reviews how previous research has approached the top-
ics of right-wing populist political mobilization and the politiciza-
tion of immigration in public debate, discussing these phenomena 
with reference to the welfare state context, where appropriate. The 
body literature selected to be reviewed encompasses a variety of re-
search traditions – focusing mostly on sociology, political science 
and media studies – in order to meet two research aims. This chap-
ter aims to build an understanding of, firstly, how a neo-populist 
political advocacy can develop into a resonant collective identity 
and, secondly, how central elements on a nationalist political agen-
da can be successfully narrated to wider audiences in various de-
liberative arenas of the civil society. These aims will be met in this 
chapter by conducting the literature review in three sections, and by 
synthesizing the findings in the analytical framework for the disser-
tation in the fourth section. 
The first section in the chapter (2.1) focuses on the literature on 
nationalist boundary construction through notions of “the nation” 
and “the people,” emphasizing the available narrative avenues for 
flexibly harnessing them in welfare nationalist political mobiliza-
tion. The second section (2.2) discusses the contextual elements of 
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this boundary construction to the extent that they are pertinent 
to the context of Nordic welfare state. This includes an overview 
of the historical development of the idealized notions of “our” na-
tional past and the likewise idealized approach to institutions of 
an encompassing and potent welfare state as symbols of national 
solidarity and unity, that were eventually operationalized in mobi-
lization narratives by the advocates of populist welfare nationalism. 
The third section (2.3) focuses on the communicative dimension 
of neo-populist mobilization in various mediatized arenas within 
civil society. This entails a discussion of the discursive strategies 
through which neo-populist advocacy can be developed into a reso-
nant collective identity and how exclusionary conceptualizations of 
welfare solidarity at the core of the welfare nationalist agenda can 
be mainstreamed for the purpose of reaching salient media coverage 
in public debate. 
The final section of this chapter (2.4) synthesizes an analytical 
framework from this literature review by illustrating how each of 
the first three sections contribute to a specific theoretical “lens” or 
an analytical toolkit that can be operationalized in empirical anal-
yses that examine the role of welfare nationalism and neo-populist 
advocacy in the emergence, mainstreaming and consolidation of 
public narratives of exclusionary welfare solidarity.
2.1 Drawing the Boundaries of Citizenship  
and National Belonging 
Both in the academic literature and in more mundane arenas of day-
to-day political debates, nationalism is a highly contested concept 
that has proved exceedingly elusive to tackle. Indeed, there exists 
no commonly agreed, scientific standard definition for nationalism 
(Seton-Watson 1977, 5; Favell 2001, 12; Pakkasvirta and Sauk-
konen 2005, 9). However, for the purposes of studying nationalism 
as a means of building and maintaining a collectivity, as I endeavor 
to do, a useful point of departure can be derived from Benedict 
Anderson’s oft-quoted definition of nation as an “imagined political 
community” (2006, 5–7).
According to the social constructionist approach to nationalism 
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that Anderson spearheaded, nationalism should not be conceptual-
ized as an ideology – like liberalism or socialism – that emphasizes 
the importance of the nation. Rather, in the study of national iden-
tity formation, nationalism is typically understood as a narrative 
process through which an abstract, territorially and/or ethnically 
bounded sense of pre-existing kinship is “invented” in the sense be-
ing imagined and articulated into an existing political community 
(Smith 1991, 71). 
Manifestations of nationalism in this sense are not necessarily, 
or at least explicitly, “nationalistic,” but rather reproduced in a wide 
range of mundane or “banal” narratives that are reproduced in pub-
lic discourses (Billig 1995, 8). Making use of such a definition of 
nationalism in this dissertation also has the benefit that it renders 
it meaningful to explore how seemingly “benign” and “harmless” 
nationalist narratives – such as those of blue-and-white welfare na-
tionalism – are able to attribute a variety of rigorous and particular-
istic identity criteria as boundaries of belonging to a community in 
specific socio-historical contexts.
One of the predominant aims in critical research of nationalism 
– often conducted under disciplines such as political science and 
history, sociology, social psychology and anthropology – has been 
the illustration of boundary-work of symbolic resources that serve 
to create, institutionalize or contest various kinds of social differ-
ences. Lamont and Molnár (2002, 167–168), who have developed 
interdisciplinary research on boundary-work, also related to nation-
alist boundary constructions, emphasize that is necessary to differ-
entiate between two categories of boundaries: symbolic and social 
boundaries. The former pertain to the constructionist dimension 
of boundary work, consisting of conceptual distinctions that are 
employed by social actors struggling to structure the social reality 
and establish particular interpretative strategies and cultural tradi-
tions as hegemonic in a specific context. To the extent that these 
endeavors are successful, their outcome is the formation of symbolic 
boundaries that separate people into groups and generate “dichoto-
mous classifications in the organization of their thinking,” not only 
generating of feelings of similarity and group membership, but also 
interpreting societal inequalities so that they may become “regarded 
as normal, necessary and just” (Epstein 1992, 232–234). The cul-
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tural repertoires reproduced in context-sensitive narratives may take 
the form of institutionalized definitions of cultural membership, 
effectively separating people into high-status in-groups – such as 
the autochthonous population – and low-status out-groups – such as 
immigrants (Swidler 2000, 201; Fiske 2000, 312–313). In addition 
to categorizing people in different ways, boundaries also incorporate 
a behavioral element, offering “scripts of action” for relating to in-
dividuals depending on how they get classified (Wimmer 2013, 9).
This is also a significant reason for the ubiquitous contestation 
for symbolic boundaries. Once they are widely agreed upon, they 
can translate into institutionalized social boundaries, “objectified 
forms of social differences” that “pattern social interaction in im-
portant ways.” In contemporary literature on political sociology, this 
is considered to commonly lead to inequalities in the ways different 
groups can meet various criteria of belonging, through which they 
may gain access to both material and immaterial social resources 
and opportunities (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 168–169).
In the present transnational era, some of the most intense socie-
tal boundary-work – often marked by an “obsessive […] concern to 
remain different from others” – pertains to membership in nation-
al community (Parekh 2008, 61). Scholars engaging in the critical 
study of nationalism agree that the increased mobility of people in 
general – and of workforce in particular – has resulted in increase in 
support for political movements that seek to present the sovereignty 
of the nation-state and the boundaries of “the people forming the 
nation” as endangered by both internal heterogenization of the civil 
society and external glocalizing dynamics (Delanty 2000, 95–96; 
Hervik 2006, 39). Economic and political theorists contributing 
to critical nationalism studies have therefore sought to highlight 
how the notions of “nation” and “people” have emerged as what 
could be referred to as flexible “moral resources” in narratives of na-
tion-building in the modern era. They constitute readily applicable 
stocks of “trust, norms, and networks” that “tend to be self-rein-
forcing and cumulative” and the supply and applicability of these 
resources “increases, rather than decreases, when used” (Hirschman 
1984, 93; Putnam 1994, 10).
The shared point of departure in critical research on nationalism 
is that nationalist political actors are able to make wide use of these 
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resources not only because they are self-reinforcing once consistent-
ly articulated in the public, but also because “the nation” and “the 
people” can be made readily applicable in a variety of contexts and 
arenas due to their doubly flexible nature. First of all, the choice of 
the relevant markers for national identity and difference – around 
which the “the nation” and “the people” are constructed – is flexible 
in the sense that these markers are typically highly particular, vary-
ing significantly in between different contexts of nationalist mobili-
zation (Gellner 1964, 168). These notions are also flexible in relation 
to their use; by being ambiguous and void of any definitive or fixed 
meanings, “the nation” and “the people” can be discursively oper-
ationalized for the purposes of publicly justifying a wide range of 
nationalist narratives, attitudes, identity constructions and political 
positions (Canovan 2005, 65).
Theorists of citizenship have pointed out that some of the most 
powerful nation-building narratives are produced by highly formal, 
state-controlled, top-down institutions, as is the case with the leg-
islation that articulates the rights and obligations associated to cit-
izenship (Marshall 1992, 8; Brubaker 1992, 21). Even so, the vast 
majority of the nationalist boundary-drawing narratives are consid-
ered to originate in the civil society, articulated within various me-
diatized arenas of public deliberation (Lamont and Molnár 2002, 
186; Saukkonen 2007, 33). As such, boundary-drawing narratives 
typically seek to employ these symbolic resources in a manner that 
is rarely coherent and analytically sound – quite unlike the for-
mal, legislative articulations of citizenship codified in legislation on 
citizenship. Constructionist approaches to narratives of formal and 
informal boundary-drawing regard both as more usefully analyzed 
as “producing, rather than reflecting” differences in status among 
people (Bridget Anderson 2013, 2). 
According to Ernesto Laclau (2005, 129–133) – a pioneer of 
critical discourse analysis on nationalist and populist movements 
– these boundary-drawing narratives, seeking to construct a na-
tionally bounded “people,” tend to make wide use of insinuative, 
imprecise and metaphoric language, reifying internally conflicting 
categories into existence through the use of so-called “floating sig-
nifiers.” The reference points of those signifiers – quite like those 
of flexible moral resources – are perpetually “suspended”; never 
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fixed, but constantly in the process of being reconstructed in their 
context-sensitive articulation (Chandler 2007, 78–80). Research-
ers of political thought agree that nationalist political mobilization 
through these flexible boundary-drawing narratives of national be-
longing have been present in most European countries since the 18th 
century (see, for example, Gellner 1964; Smith 1991). 
While the contemporary literature on political sociology of the 
symbolic boundaries of national belonging often emphasizes how 
these boundaries are constantly in the process of being imagined 
in a wide range practices – discursively constructed and narrated 
by very different kinds of actors and institutions (Paasi 2002, 158) 
– it is possible to identify certain common denominators in the 
narratives contributing to exclusionary boundary-work of national 
belonging. This boundary-work is typically considered to advance 
through narratives that 1) select a relatively narrow set of features 
and 2) link these features to a national denominator (e.g. “blue-
and-white Finnishness”) in a manner that 3) emphasizes how these 
features constitute the community’s internal unity, difference from 
Others or temporal continuity (Saukkonen 1999, 144–145). Con-
temporary sociological research on negative attitudes towards im-
migrants in Europe (see, for example, Bail 2008) has indicated that 
exclusionary configurations of these symbolic national boundaries 
often employ discourses that juxtapose immigration with national 
solidarity, presenting the former as a particular challenge for devel-
oping a bonding sense of national collective identification (Putnam 
2000, 20).
In the Nordic countries, anti-immigration narratives based on 
exclusionary conceptualization of national belonging began to pro-
liferate rapidly in public debates from 1990s onwards (see, for exam-
ple, Cole 1997, 11–13; Hervik 2006, 93–94; Mudde 2007, 74–78; 
Norocel 2013, 14–15). The emergent anti-immigration populism 
developed two important features. The public discussants success-
fully used new forms of media for promoting exclusionary concep-
tualizations of solidarity in various arenas of public debates. They 
also invoked the welfare state as a national symbol in narratives 
for justifying anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalist narratives 
(Maasilta 2012, 27–28; Pakkasvirta and Saukkonen 2005, 180–182; 
Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 10–14).
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The rigidness of symbolic boundaries in the exclusionary con-
structions of national identity and solidarity is sometimes argued 
to accentuate in a welfare state context, where state-coordinated 
policies seek to actively redistribute opportunity-creating resources 
(Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 1–6). Some political theorists have 
argued that the willingness to make redistributive sacrifices for oth-
ers depends on the maintenance of a high level of solidarity that 
must be recreated by symbolic boundary-work through nationalist 
narratives of common membership and common identity (see, for 
instance, Miller 1989; Barry 2001; Joppke 2004). The notion that a 
nation is defined by its ability to deploy and enforce encompassing 
symbolic boundaries has been particularly predominant in French 
republican political theory. For example, Dominique Schnapper 
(1998, 16) has argued that what renders the nation unique and dis-
tinguishable from other types of communities “is that it integrates 
populations in a community of citizens, whose existence legitimates 
the internal and external action of the state”. Such characterizations 
of the nation have been heavily criticized in the study of gover-
nance as post-hoc rationalizations that give undue emphasis to the 
elements of solidarity-based association while downplaying nation’s 
character as an instrument of governance “through vertical hierar-
chies, bureaucracy, centralism, cultural normalization and illegiti-
mate domination” (Bader 1995, 218). 
Recent empirical research on multiculturalist politics has chal-
lenged the argument that increasing heterogeneity actually corrodes 
national solidarity (Crepaz 2006, 116–117; Crepaz 2008, 132). In-
stead, there has been wide range of contemporary empirical research 
on the mechanisms of interaction between solidarity and trust, on 
the one hand, and the particularities of redistributive regimes, on 
the other. This literature suggests that by augmenting the existing 
democratic institutions with contextually tailored multicultural 
policies can function as means for overcoming the alleged hetero-
geneity-induced erosion of solidarity. Specifically, it is argued that 
dismantling some symbolic boundaries delineating the mythical 
“people” by institutionalizing the recognition of heterogeneities 
and the contextual configurations of difference within nation-state 
through multiculturalist policies can actually promote solidarity 
and trust among its members (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 17). In 
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this respect, the formal power-sharing and majority-restricting leg-
islative institutions – regarded as particularly prominent within the 
Nordic welfare states – may offer a good starting point for multicul-
tural policies, as these institutions are generally considered to have 
important capabilities for facilitating societal trust and solidarity 
between heterogeneous groups of people (Maskell 2000, 119–120).
However, critical research on welfare nationalism has pointed 
out that there are several historical and contextual caveats that limit 
the ease with which multicultural policies can be built on welfare 
institutions (Suszycki 2011; Vad Jønsson et al. 2013). In the next 
section, I will discuss this legacy of the welfare state as a nation-
al project, and its implications to the particularities of the present 
populist political mobilization. 
2.2 Nordic Welfare State as a Seedbed for Promoting  
Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Civic Solidarity
Any attempt to account for the contemporary success of neo-pop-
ulist, welfare nationalist mobilization in a Nordic welfare state 
context must address the post-Second World War cementing of the 
long-standing emphasis on folkhemmet. Most importantly, the no-
tion of the welfare state as “people’s home” served as the guiding 
principle for the development of universalist social and welfare poli-
cy particularly in Sweden, but also in other Nordic countries during 
the post-war era (Esping-Andersen 1990, 48). One of the most im-
portant features of this welfare regime, labeled “social-democratic” 
in Esping-Andersen’s influential typology (1990, 28), is that it is 
commonly regarded as based on the notion of universal solidarity. 
The emphasis on universalism entails – in addition to redistributive 
policies’ indirect effect of stabilizing society, for instance by curb-
ing extreme poverty – that most citizens can directly benefit from 
several state coordinated economic redistributions at some point in 
their lives. The ability for the great majority to enjoy these benefits 
is also considered to create and maintain reciprocal trust in and 
legitimacy for the relatively stringent system of progressive taxation 
among citizens (Rothstein 2002, 213). 
It must be noted that the accuracy with which such regime mod-
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el typologies (and Esping-Andersen’s in particular) can capture the 
actual developments and contingencies in the Nordic countries, has 
been challenged by contemporary historical and political science 
research on welfare states. As Kettunen and Petersen point out, “[t]
here seems to be a growing awareness that regime or model typol-
ogies cannot be more than analytic ideal types or crude generaliza-
tions” and, as such, “tools of the research project, not its results” 
(2011, 2–3). 
It is nevertheless remarkable from a constructivist, sociological 
perspective that during the quarter of a century after WWII, some-
times referred to as the “golden era” of social democracy (Harvey 
2005, 11), a perception of there being a “Nordic model” started to 
develop in both academic and political discussions (Christiansen 
et al. 2006, 338). Indeed, there exists a consensus in the litera-
ture on political sociology that the notion of “the Nordic model of 
welfare state” pertains not to any historically existing, empirically 
observable policy model, but rather to a common Nordic self-un-
derstanding based on a “wide political consensus” concerning the 
universalist principles of redistribution as “the fundamentals of the 
welfare state [which] may be said to have developed during the post-
war period” (Allardt 1981, 411–413). Subsequent references to “the 
Nordic model” in this dissertation pertain to this common pub-
lic self-understanding of the Nordic countries distinctly as welfare 
states (Anttonen and Sipilä 2000, 17).
Considering that political historians typically define Sweden as 
“the leading country” in the development of the Nordic welfare state 
during the postwar period (Christiansen et al. 2006, 338), a solidar-
ity-promoting Nordic model of the “people’s home” was gradually 
established as a common, albeit abstract, goal that Nordic countries 
sought to realize through somewhat heterogeneous paths of social 
policy development. The Nordic model of welfare further attributes 
a very strong role for the state, as it is regarded to be responsible 
for extensive, “from cradle to grave” -provision of welfare to its cit-
izens through implementation and enforcement of a wide range of 
universally applicable social policies (Kiander and Lönnqvist 2002, 
23–25). However, notwithstanding the universalist principles and 
solidary-based justification in the core of the Swedish model of wel-
fare – aimed at “the provision of better […] welfare for their citi-
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zens” (Hay 1999, 57) – historians acknowledge that development 
of the welfare state soon manifested in the Nordic countries as a 
nationalistic and socially protectionist project. Critics point out, for 
example, that in Finland – where the welfare state was built by a 
series of coalition governments as opposed to the social democratic 
dominance in Sweden – the universalist regime of redistribution 
was from the beginning aimed at catering the needs of “sufficiently 
similar” groups of people that could be subsumed under the heading 
of the Finns (Wickström 2013, 55).
It is necessary to emphasize here that the origins for the success-
ful contemporary neo-populist political mobilization through xeno-
phobic and exclusionary rhetoric in the Nordic countries lie deeply 
rooted in the originally Swedish utopia of folkhemmet, “a trinity of 
democracy, the people and the nation that contributed to the estab-
lishment of the modern Swedish national community” (Hellström 
2010, 62). The national community, in which any fully-fledged cit-
izen was expected to take part in, entailed – from the very origins 
of the concept of the “people’s-home” in the 1920s onwards – a very 
particularistically defined membership in the national project. This 
project conceptualized belonging to the (welfare) state in terms of 
a family membership and used “the figure of the worker as synony-
mous with ‘the common folk’” (Hellström 2010, 97). Based on the 
people’s home model, the social-democratic welfare regimes in the 
Nordic countries “exhibited a restrictive and disciplining nature, 
drawing clear demarcation lines between those who were included 
in the community and their duties, and those who were deemed 
unworthy of it” (Andersson 2009, 114–115; Norocel 2012, 7). 
The end of the golden era of social democracy was met with a 
gradual disillusionment with the panacea of “the Nordic model” 
of welfare (Lavelle 2008, 145). As the economic recession of 1990s 
undermined the ability of the social democratic welfare-model to 
generate the revenues necessary for covering what Esping-Andersen 
calls “the enormous costs of maintaining a solidaristic, universalis-
tic, and de-commodifying welfare system” (1990, 28), there was a 
wave of the criticism to the extant welfare-regime, rooted partly in 
the global rise of neoliberal sentiment. Although much of the most 
vocal critique – based predominantly on economic considerations 
such as competitiveness, unsustainability and increasing dependen-
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cy ratio – remains controversial in academic debates to the date 
(Heikkilä et al. 2002, 7–8), the political climate vis-à-vis the wel-
fare state has fundamentally changed since 1990s. Political scien-
tists were able to observe how the Nordic countries started to adopt 
increasingly diverging paths in terms of the development of their 
social policy (Heikkilä et al. 2002, 1). 
Regardless of the increasingly diverging approaches to welfare 
policy towards 1990s, the Nordic countries continued to exhibit 
distinct commonalities on the level public discourse. These com-
monalities manifested in an increasingly critical approach towards 
the sustainability of the welfare state, also in the academic research, 
but more enduring in the practical political deliberations (Lavelle 
2008, 154–156). Most importantly, “the discourse concerning so-
cial policy […] moved from emphasizing the pitfalls of social se-
curity in securing the welfare of the citizens to underscoring the 
concern about the costs and incentive effects of social security and 
taxation,” also leading to sociological analyses claiming that the le-
gitimacy and “support for the welfare state is declining in the long 
run” (Heikkilä et al. 2002, 235–236). This discursive shift created 
favorable conditions for the rise of right-wing populist parties, not 
least by undermining the political stability and the trust in tra-
ditional political parties that the previously relatively consensual, 
social-democracy dominated approach to the welfare state politics 
served to uphold (Rydgren 2006, 38–39).
Although there have been parties trying to link tax populism 
to various kinds of nationalism in the Nordic countries since the 
1970s (Rydgren 2006, 1–2), the favorable conditions created by the 
discursive shift in the early 1990s did not initially result in much 
actual success in the political mobilization of the populist parties in 
the Nordic EU-countries, who only started to expand and consol-
idate electoral support more than a decade later in the mid-2000s 
(see graph 1 in 1.1). After the 2011 parliamentary elections in Fin-
land, several media researchers have argued that the proliferation of 
the ongoing discourse depicting the Nordic model as being threat-
ened by the EU, the Euro and the “economically irresponsible ‘PIGS 
countries’2”, contributed significantly to the victory of the right-
2 Portugal, Italy, Greece and Spain.
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wing populist Perussuomalaiset party (Tervonen-Gonçalves and 
Oinonen 2012, 9).
 Political scientists account the initial lack of success in pop-
ulist mobilization early concessions to neo-liberal and right-wing 
parties by the social democrats (Lavelle 2008, 144), but also to the 
underdevelopment of practical leadership and organization among 
the European populist parties, rendering them unprepared to make 
use of the changed political opportunity structures during the re-
cession (Mudde 2007, 263–264). Even though researchers of pop-
ulism agree that changes in political opportunity structures (and 
the demand-side of the political climate in general) can “potentially 
explain similar development [in party support] in very different set-
tings” (Mudde 2007, 202), the macro-level sociocultural develop-
ments in the conditions for political mobilization cannot account 
why such political parties fail in their attempts make use of “a fertile 
ground” and effectively facilitate mobilization (Van der Brug 2005, 
563). For instance, in the Swedish case, the breakdown of the Ny 
Demokrati in early 1990s and the meager electoral success of the 
Sverigedemokraterna in the early 2000s, is typically attributed to 
the failures in the parties’ media strategies, leading to difficulties in 
creating “a sufficiently respectable façade” – rather than the parties 
being regarded as xenophobic and potentially anti-democratic (Ry-
dgren 2006, 120).
The construction of a respectable façade as the prerequisite for 
sustained support can render identifying a successful populist party 
as belonging into the radical right a perilous task (Mudde 2007, 
32). This is partly because nationalism, anti-elitism and anti-estab-
lishment mentality – the traditional key markers of radical right 
populism (Mudde 2007, 66; Schedler 1996, 303) – easily become 
interpreted among the wider public as the kind of radicalism that 
undermines a populist party’s attempts to portray itself as socially 
acceptable. In contrast, focusing on the role of state and national 
solidarity in sustaining welfare economy is a relatively respectable 
endeavor that “has never failed to engage people’s minds” in the 
Nordic context (Rydgren 2006, 121). 
This focus, although shared with the established parties, opens 
the avenues for the right-wing populist parties – such as the Perus-
suomalaiset – to criticize the perceived widening of the sociocultural 
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cleavage. One way to build a respectable façade for welfare nation-
alist populism is to raise the abstraction level from the more poli-
cy-oriented agenda towards emphasizing national solidarity, often 
by various reinterpretations of the so-called “primordial argument.” 
Originally, the concept of primordial argument was introduced by 
T.H. Marshall in his ground-breaking work on post-war citizenship 
theory, defined in quite general terms as the notion that citizenship 
“requires a direct sense of community membership based on loyalty 
to a civilization which is a common possession” (1992 [1949], 24).
Nordic literature on immigration suggests that nationalist, typi-
cally anti-diversity interpretations of this primordial argument can 
be made to resonate strongly in the Nordic countries – not only in 
monolingual Denmark and Norway, but also in bilingual Finland 
– where the perception of a long tradition of national homogeneity 
has remained relatively uncontested up until 2000s (Lepola 2000, 
21). The welfare nationalist narratives of primordialist juxtaposition 
of welfare redistribution and increasing heterogeneity have some 
parallels within the academic literature on welfare states, too. Es-
pecially before the extensive empirical studies on multiculturalist 
policies in the mid-2000s (see, for example, Banting and Kymlicka 
2006; Crepaz 2008), many political philosophers argued that the 
logical outcome of increasing societal heterogeneity is the erosion 
of solidarity and growing tax resistance, since: “if the ties that bind 
you to increasingly diverse fellow citizens are loosened, you are like-
ly to be less inclined to share your resources with them” (Wolfe 
1997, 28).
Finnish studies of racism and xenophobia suggest that in the 
2000s – an era marked by the growing scepticism towards the sus-
tainability of the welfare state in the Nordic EU-countries – the 
reappropriation of the primordial argument benefitted the right-
wing populists. Narratives grounded in the primordial argument 
opened an avenue for employing and justifying exclusionary nation-
alist and xenophobic arguments in neo-populist mobilization also 
in the mainstream publicity, for example by interpreting certain 
mediatized violent crime cases as evidence of how ethnic heteroge-
nization is threatening the national security (Keskinen, Rastas and 
Tuori 2009a, 12; Keskinen 2014).
Finnish research on electoral behaviour suggests that this suc-
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cessful mainstreaming of anti-immigration narratives during the 
late 2000s can be seen in the ability of the Perussuomalaiset to in-
creasingly attract middle class constituencies (Rahkonen 2011, 
433–434). In Finland, the neo-populists’ success in mainstream-
ing their exclusionary narratives in public debate is regarded as fa-
cilitated in part by the failure of traditional parties’ overly careful 
strategy “to silence the criticism towards immigration politics to 
death”, even as late as during the campaigning for the parliamen-
tary elections of 2008 (Puuronen 2011, 207; Hannula 2011). In the 
public debate on immigration politics, neo-populists were able to 
dub themselves supposedly benign, moderate and analytical “im-
migration critics” (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a, 10–11). By 
monopolizing the term, they could also present their political oppo-
nents as the small, irresponsible elite, often constructing derogatory 
and distinctly gendered figures such as “the lady with flowery hat” 
(Maasilta 2012, 75–78; Keskinen 2011, 118–119). It can be argued 
that by employing this rhetoric, the neo-populists were able to rep-
resent themselves as “blue-and-white” voices in a debate, whereas 
others are, by default, unpatriotic in their neglect of “the legacy of 
the Finnish welfare state.”
In the next section of this chapter – drawing from the contem-
porary literature on media studies and right-wing populism – I will 
further discuss the narrative agency of the right-wing populist ad-
vocates, particularly concerning their ability to position themselves 
favorably in mediatized arenas of public debate. 
2.3 Promoting Neo-Populist Advocacy in Mediatized Arenas 
through Strategic Social Action
In the previous sections of this chapter, I explored how the critical 
research on nationalism and the literature on historical trajectories 
in the development of the Nordic welfare state ideology form a use-
ful starting point for explaining how the context-sensitive favorable 
conditions for proliferating narratives of anti-immigration advocacy 
came about in Finland. However, even though much of the con-
temporary literature on the electoral success of right-wing populism 
tends to focus on these demand-based, macro-level explanations 
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(Mudde 2007, 8), the political opportunity structures do not sim-
ply translate to the growing right-wing populist advocacy. Overem-
phasizing the demand-based explanatory avenues runs the risk of 
overlooking populist agency, and reduce its advocates to little more 
than a “hapless victims” of economic or demographic externalities 
(Berman 1997, 102). A sound theoretical approach must thus com-
plement the demand-based approaches with a discussion on how 
right-wing populist advocates can organize internally and present 
themselves in public arenas in order to capitalize on the demand 
for welfare nationalist politics, or even further increase its demand. 
This entails a discussion of the literature in media studies, illustrat-
ing how nationalist and populist movements may facilitate a suc-
cessful entry into the public debate and the political mainstream.
While conventional wisdom in political science regards “party 
positioning in the competitive space [as] an important determinant 
of political outcomes,” the study of political communication sug-
gests that this significance of positioning is severely limited by the 
party’s capacity to reach the potential constituencies with their mo-
bilizing narratives (Ellinas 2010, 3). In order to maximize this com-
municative capacity, the successful use of – and good contacts to – 
media are crucial. This is not only because it helps to communicate 
their message to wider audiences than they could otherwise reach 
with their own resources, but also because requisite mainstream vis-
ibility can “confer legitimacy and authority to political newcomers,” 
particularly when the social acceptability of their agenda is ques-
tioned to the degree that anti-immigration narratives are (ibid.). 
Indeed, recent media research points to the conclusion that “the 
fortunes of the Far Right largely depend” on two interlinked fac-
tors: “how the mainstream parties compete over national identity 
issues and on how the media treat the Far Right” (Ellinas 2010, 21). 
The interlinkedness of these two considerations is important to note 
in this study because, as the history of immigration politics in the 
Nordic countries testifies, a successful and visible entry of anti-im-
migration advocates into the public debate exerts a strong pressure 
on the mainstream parties. The more conservative parties typically 
feel particularly compelled to respond to people’s immigration-re-
lated fears in order to mitigate the loss of votes to other parties 
(Roemer, Lee and Straeten 2007, 199, 320). In doing so, however, 
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the mainstream parties further facilitate the political saliency of an 
anti-immigration political agenda and bring them closer to the po-
litical mainstream (Ellinas 2010, 28). By forcing the mainstream 
parties to compete over issues of national identity in public fora, 
neo-populist advocates may actively generate favorable political op-
portunity structures and media saliency, rather than merely depend 
on them as external conditions for their success (Mudde 2007, 276).
The strategy of forcing the mainstream parties into compet-
ing over issues of immigration is only rendered feasible for the 
neo-populist advocates of exclusionary welfare nationalism through 
relatively high levels of media exposure, without which the main-
stream parties are able to remain silent on issues that can potentially 
hurt them. Indeed, research on European populism suggests that 
media indifference towards anti-immigration advocates may be a 
much larger obstacle for their popular success than unsympathetic 
coverage (Mazzoleni 2003, 8–9; Mudde 2007, 251; Ellinas 2009, 
219–220; Horsti and Nikunen 2013, 501). Mudde attributes this to 
the “logic of media populism” that – especially in a tabloid context 
– is based on “personalization, emotionalization and an antiestab-
lishment attitude” (Mudde 2007, 249–251). As these features are 
regarded as shared with the logic of party populism, too, right-wing 
populists already have the tools at their disposal to formulate narra-
tives that are lucrative for tabloid media to cover. Once anti-immi-
gration advocacy reaches the position of a media phenomenon, the 
advocates are increasingly able to bring their political agenda to the 
fore (Hannula 2011, 180).
Political science has traditionally emphasized the importance of 
personalized, charismatic leadership that gives the face for a populist 
party, anchoring its position to be repeatedly discussed in the media 
(see, for example, Taggart 2000, 75; Weyland 2001, 5). However, 
more recent research on right-wing populism suggest that after the 
electoral breakthrough, the relative importance of this charismatic 
figurehead in the successful facilitation of media exposure seems to 
fade (Ignazi 2006; Mudde 2007, 261–262). A recent media study 
suggests that during the post-breakthrough period there are more 
interesting and juicy news to be found by focusing on the internal 
strife and cleavages within the populist camp, allowing new political 
characters to be presented in the popular, archetypical news frames 
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of the villain, the victim and the tragic hero (Van Gorp 2010, 86).
This interpretation is further supported by observing how the 
attempts to devise concrete policy solutions to meet abstract polit-
ical goals – embedded in a national identity-based political agenda 
of right-wing populism – bring about internal fragmentation into 
the ranks of anti-immigration advocates, often leading to the kind 
of political drama that the mainstream media is keen to comment 
on. On the one hand, “[t]hemes related to national identity are ide-
al for politicization because of their great emotional potential and 
because they do not always create concrete policy commitments” 
and “because they do not confront similar pressures to moderate 
their appeals” (Ellinas 2010, 27–29). On the other hand, this “pro-
grammatic flexibility granted by its opposition status” also easily 
translates to dissension in the ranks, because it is rarely easy to 
agree what kind of policy-level implementation a certain, relatively 
abstract and radical formulation entails. In a sense, the media can 
provide “a venue for direct communication with voters but at the 
expense of organizational development“ (Ellinas 2010, 74).  
For the reasons considered earlier, such “bad publicity” might 
be considered good publicity, at least in the breakthrough period, 
because it facilitates persistent media visibility. Later on, after the 
exposure is established, this might be less beneficial, as the critical 
exposure undermines the ability of anti-immigration advocates to 
present themselves as a serious political force to be reckoned with 
(Ellinas 2010, 206–207). Regardless of whether the critical media 
exposure can advance the public acceptability of welfare nationalist 
politics and neo-populist advocacy, there is not always much the 
advocates are able to do to counter this development. The largest 
challenges are commonly considered to relate to their relative lack 
of organization and concrete political guidelines. Although many 
right-wing populist parties have resorted to relatively autocratic in-
ternal leadership in order to sustain electoral support against inter-
nal fragmentation, these attempts have met with only varying levels 
of success, and among the more successful instances of electoral 
persistence one finds “parties with several strong leadership figures” 
(Mudde 2007, 270–271), who may be taking the party to different 
directions. 
While the programmatic flexibility and divided leadership may 
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give many opportunities for media to illustrate the ambiguity in 
neo-populist advocacy, skilled social actors within neo-populist 
movements can actually nurture this ambiguity so as to develop 
a loose political movement into a resonant collective identity with 
open-ended strategic action (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 51–52). 
For example, when expendable neo-populist discussants present 
radical arguments against immigration in public – and face critical 
media coverage that seeks to position neo-populists as racists – the 
neo-populists may publicly shun or expel these members. In so do-
ing, they can illustrate strong leadership in being able to delineate 
how anti-immigration political agenda can be narrated in public, 
thereby positioning themselves favorably towards the more moder-
ate advocates in the (potential) neo-populist constituency. At the 
same time, they may internally justify their actions to the radicals 
in strategic terms – sympathizing with the demands for heightened 
mechanisms for controlling immigration while also emphasizing in-
strumental importance in maintaining a respectable public façade 
for neo-populism. 
Unsympathetic media coverage of neo-populist advocacy may 
also open avenues for strategic social action. Successful narratives 
for confronting delegitimizing subject positioning may construct 
“the elite media” as a common enemy and thereby promote a sense 
of internal unity among neo-populist advocates. Media researchers 
have pointed out that Finnish neo-populists have been able to pres-
ent themselves as brave media martyrs (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 
2009a, 47–49), thereby adopting the common populist position of 
underdogs; fighting the unfair war against the elite media “with 
bows and arrows facing an adversary using heavy artillery, bombers, 
missiles” (Copsey 1996, 123). Claiming to be harassed, silenced and 
misrepresented in mainstream publicity can also be employed as a 
persuasive media strategy by neo-populist advocates who seek pub-
lic sympathy of the moderates. Here the most commonly employed 
justificatory narratives make use of the concept freedom of speech, 
since it is “especially susceptible to being mobilized for political 
interests because of [its] unquestioned and mythological status that 
prevents the critical examination of [its] premises” (Garnham 2000, 
165–166; Karppinen 2007, 25; Keskinen 2012).
The introduction of new forms of media can also facilitate the 
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capacity of neo-populist advocates to position themselves and their 
narratives advantageously in the public debate, and make the most 
use of their victimized subject position. Political historians agree 
that successful adaptation to a new media environment has been 
proven to change the fortunes of political movements rapidly, al-
lowing (neo-)populists to employ novel strategies for developing a 
diverse range of contextually alternating narratives consolidating 
popular support among their heterogeneous potential constituen-
cies. For example, contemporary literature in journalism research 
points to the conclusion that the increasing accessibility of, and ex-
posure to, a chaotic flow of information is rapidly creating more 
demand for opinion-journalism (for a brief discussion on increasing 
demands “participative journalism,” see Cammaerts and Carpentier 
2007, 88–89). Several media studies have pointed out that online 
communities have responded to this challenge by taking the form of 
more or less hermetic “sphericules” (Gitlin 1998; Papacharissi 2002; 
Galston 2003) or “information cocoons” (Sunstein 2009). 
Within these sphericules a sense of communality can be con-
structed through debates that take largely place in discursive isola-
tion from the public sphere at large; a process which may “contribute 
to the diminution of a shared public culture, as the communicative 
environment of politics for different groups separates from each oth-
er” (Dahlgren 2009, 49, 164). Quite like the introduction of tele-
vised political debates allowed small and emerging parties to suc-
cessfully develop new performative vocabularies (Ellinas 2010, 31), 
neo-populists’ cyber-campaigning in the 2000s made increasing use 
of social media and various online fora as means for internal com-
munication and as recruiting bases for more radical constituencies 
(Römmele 2003, 17–18). These online sites can facilitate a sense of 
an open horizontal and vertical communication among the advo-
cates in the neo-populist collectivity. Jointly interpreting contem-
porary events within the sphericules amongst likeminded advocates 
with different formal and informal statuses can help neo-populist 
advocates to consolidate a common political agenda and a mutual 
understanding concerning the practices and policy tools at their dis-
posal (Norris 2003, 42–43). 
As the neo-populist sphericules do not welcome contesting inter-
pretations within their boundaries but tend to marked by a distinct 
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degree of closure, the online discussants are often able to brainstorm 
with little exposure to any critical interference from the highly con-
tentious public sphere outside. Those who increasingly exchange 
ideas between the likeminded advocates within sphericule arenas 
may become more prone to interpret any critique against neo-pop-
ulism in the public sphere at large as evidence that its advocates 
are discriminated against by the elite-controlled media. This may 
further facilitate the internalization of a “silenced pariah” subject 
position among the populist advocates (Caiani, della Porta and 
Wagemann 2012, 130). At the same time, some – typically young 
– online discussants are keen on making their own sphericule’s in-
terpretations of contemporary events acknowledged in the wider 
public sphere, thus devising mainstreamed narratives for proliferat-
ing neo-populist political agenda (Cammaerts and Carpentier 2007, 
265–266).
Political discussions containing xenophobic or nationalist ar-
ticulations that may not be considered acceptable in mainstream 
media do, however, reach new potential constituencies in social 
media. This applies particularly to the IT-adept “Dot.Net gener-
ation” of 15-28 year-olds which the literature on political science 
has traditionally considered difficult reach with traditional means 
of political mobilization (Zukin et al. 2006, viii). During the period 
of rapid social media expansion in the early 2000s in Finland, the 
populist online communities were among the first ones to organize 
(Horsti and Nikunen 2013, 14–16). As the support for right-wing 
populism has been steadily growing among the Dot.Net generation 
whose political activity increasingly takes place on online arenas 
(Vaalitutkimuskonsortio 2012), their exposure to issues that are sa-
lient in public debates is becoming increasingly framed by spher-
icule-specific neo-populist narratives. 
Media researchers exploring the internal dynamics of these close-
knit online communities point out that the debates in social media 
often do not entail actual analyses concerning issues of shared in-
terest. Rather, they fortify a sense of communality, shared identity 
and purpose by adopting a common language, narrative tropes and 
interpretative frames (Horsti and Nikunen 2013, 19; Vänni 2009). 
Within right-wing populist online activism, these narratives typ-
ically sketch an idealized vision of “our society” where unwanted 
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phenomena (for example, “multiculturalism”) would be eradicated. 
This can radicalize advocates of the political movement to interpret 
contemporary events in binary terms; as simply either impediments 
or facilitators for the realization political goals on which there is 
very little critical exchange inside the movement (Witschge 2007, 
146–147). 
While the lack of critical public exchange on their welfare na-
tionalist political agenda is often interpreted by Finnish neo-pop-
ulists as evidence of them being silenced by the elite media, me-
dia researchers tend to agree that many of the challenges populist 
movements face in the mainstream publicity are common to most 
aspiring political movements (Dahlgren 2009, 50–53). Moreover, 
the Finnish neo-populists’ sense of alienation is exacerbated by the 
confrontational and provocative narratives through which they po-
sition themselves as victims. They also commonly position their po-
litical opposition into distinctly reified populist enemy categories 
– such as “the small, but vocal minority” or “the political elite, far 
distanced from the common man” (Canovan 2005, 74–76; Caiani, 
della Porta and Wagemann 2012, 110). Such rhetoric is likely to fur-
ther discourage the established parties from engaging in dialogue 
with Finnish neo-populists in their uncompromising terms (Maas-
ilta 2012, 9–11). While this narrative practice may be successful in 
promoting a sense of collective identity within neo-populist spher-
icule arenas, it is also commonly believed to hamper their ability to 
promote exchange on issues in their political agenda in the wider 
public sphere and the mainstream arenas.
Indeed, by attaching the stigma of elitism to those seeking to 
publicly question the viability of exclusionary politics of immigra-
tion, neo-populists can effectively dodge the inconvenient, poli-
cy-oriented criticism and present individual targets – public dis-
cussants and members of the government – as the scapegoats for 
the arguably immigration-related challenges (Horsti and Nikunen 
2013, 497–498). As such, the quick adoption of the subject posi-
tions of “the silenced whistleblower” and “the pariah in the media 
war” can be understood in terms of nurturing a collective identity 
in an environment perceived as hostile. Many neo-populist advo-
cates may want to rely on hermetic in-group sphericules as more ac-
cessible source of information (Caiani, della Porta and Wagemann 
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2012, 107). Paradoxically, though, this closure largely follows from 
their own endeavors to insulate their political agenda from criticism 
in the public sphere. 
2.4 Theoretical Framework for Analyzing the Consolidation 
of Welfare Nationalist Narratives 
The three critical perspectives to welfare nationalism discussed in 
the previous three sections relate to the general features of nation-
alist boundary-drawing narratives, to the historical development of 
political narratives on welfare solidarity in Finland and the medi-
atized narratives for developing neo-populist advocacy into a reso-
nant collective identity and its favorable positioning in the main-
stream media. They each serve to elucidate a specific category of 
narrative resources available for neo-populists seeking to consoli-
date an exclusionary public understanding of welfare solidarity. The 
theoretical framework presented in this chapter is based on these 
three interlinked dynamics that will be used as analytical lenses to 
guide the analysis. Each of the empirical chapters (4–6) employs 
a particular set of lenses, based on an assessment of which of the 
dynamics are deemed most relevant for the purpose of illustrating 
the narratives for neo-populist consolidation of exclusionary welfare 
solidarity in a particular set of data. Next, I will present these lenses 
and the way in which they are triangulated in the subsequent chap-
ters of analysis. I conclude this chapter by pointing to the research 
questions I seek to pursue by employing these analytical lenses.
The first analytical lens, nationalist boundary-drawing, focuses 
on illustrating the flexible use of narrative resources in welfare na-
tionalist boundary-drawing and exclusion, discussed in 2.1. It un-
derlines how the exclusionary categories of “the people” and “the 
nation” are constructed in narratives by selectively emphasizing cer-
tain markers of blue-and-white national identity. This lens is used 
in the analysis to illustrate how different markers of identity are 
employed in narratives that construct a bounded frame of reference, 
through which sentiments of national safety, belonging and solidar-
ity can be portrayed as being threatened by externalized develop-
ments, such as immigration. 
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The boundary-drawing lens is the most abstract of the three lens-
es because it underlines the open-endedness in the use of cultural 
repertoires in narratives that seek of a sense of communality and 
unity in a modern nation state. Indeed, the nationalist logic at play 
in the use of such repertoires is not specific to the particular subject 
matter of this dissertation. Employing this lens makes it possible to 
emphasize how the flexible applicability of the nationalist narratives 
of “people building” can be operationalized in welfare nationalist 
political mobilization. It also supports the illustration of how the 
welfare nationalist narratives that belong in this long-standing tra-
dition of nationalist boundary-work have been employed in Finnish 
public debate on immigration, consolidating a “public philosophy” 
(Favell 2001, 14–16) of exclusionary welfare solidarity.
With regard to boundary-drawing, abstractness and flexibility 
are two sides of the same coin. The fact that the reference point 
for categories such as “the nation” and “the people” is, in Laclau’s 
terms, perpetually suspended (2005, 131), means that the advocates 
of welfare nationalism can make contextually informed assessments 
concerning which markers of identity and difference should be em-
phasized in a particular narrative. Even when the narratives em-
ployed may be at odds with each other, together they can still con-
tribute to a particularistic public understanding concerning how the 
boundaries of national belonging should be drawn. 
For instance, by asserting that immigration challenges the eco-
nomic sustainability of the welfare state, welfare nationalist narra-
tives promote a kind of public understanding of “the people” where-
by the capacity for economic self-sustainability is presented as a key 
marker of national belonging. Such a boundary-drawing narrative 
can then be employed for the purposes of justifying a political agen-
da that aims to exclude immigrant outsiders from welfare redistri-
bution. 
To continue with this example, the boundary-drawing lens can 
render the flexibility of blue-and-white narrative resources visible 
in the data by identifying how welfare nationalists seek to justify 
the public spending for non-self-sustainable people. These narra-
tives underlining the importance of maternity leave or elderly care – 
items of welfare expenditure that also rank highly in the right-wing 
populist agenda – use a very different set of markers for nation-
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al belonging while operating within the same logic of nationalist 
boundary-drawing.
In short, the boundary-drawing lens is used in this dissertation 
to draw attention to the common features in the welfare nationalist 
narratives of inclusion and exclusion, particularly to their flexible 
use of symbolic boundaries of belonging.
While the boundary-drawing lens focuses on revealing the ubiq-
uitous aspects that are present in welfare nationalist narratives, the 
second analytical lens, welfare state idealization, is employed in this 
dissertation with the purpose of revealing what is particular to the 
Finnish narratives that promote an exclusionary public understand-
ing of welfare solidarity. Through this lens, it becomes possible to il-
lustrate how the strong legacy of the social democratic welfare state 
has created some highly specific, contextual narrative repertoires 
that can both reinterpret and resonate with a public understanding 
of what the nation as a “community of value” (Bridget Anderson 
2013, 2–5) stands for in Finland. 
In more concrete terms, focusing on welfare state idealizations 
makes it possible to understand why Finnish right-wing nationalism 
may appear quite leftist in its agenda on social policy – not only in 
a global perspective but also within the Finnish political climate 
as well. Indeed, through this lens, it is possible to illustrate how 
narratives reconstruct empowering capabilities of the welfare state 
– idealizing elements such as the strong statism, consensual deci-
sion-making, instrumental efficiency and the citizen as stakeholder 
in the welfare state – thereby narrating an exclusionary political 
agenda as built on the public support for these seemingly benign 
idealizations of the welfare state.
These notions enjoy such widespread public support in Finland 
that their use can furnish contested narratives in public debate 
with an important degree of social acceptability. By successfully 
grounding an exclusionary political agenda in idealized narratives 
of welfare state, arguments that might otherwise be considered in 
mainstream publicity to carry a stigma of populism, xenophobia 
or radicalism may transcend party political divisions and redefine 
some of the fundamental norms among a great variety of citizens 
and political actors across the political spectrum. Therefore, the ap-
plication of the second analytic lens in the analyses reveals how 
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idealized, blue-and-white notions of the welfare state are juxtaposed 
with the “reality” in which the welfare solidarity that supposedly 
maintains these idealized institutions is being eroded by influences 
external to the welfare state, particularly by immigration. 
The two first analytical lenses described above pertain to quite 
different types of narrative resources available to the promotion of 
exclusionary public understanding of welfare solidarity. Even so, 
both lenses can still be applied in the analysis of narratives pro-
duced by any kinds of political actors in Finland – from ministers 
in the government to grassroots political actors – regardless of how 
implicitly or explicitly their narratives draw symbolic boundaries 
or reinterpret the legacy of the Finnish welfare state. This is pos-
sible because the property that these lenses share is that they are 
employed to reveal features and properties in any Finnish welfare 
solidarity pertinent narratives. 
The third analytical lens, strategic neo-populist social action, is, 
however, different in this respect. While the lenses of nationalist 
boundary-drawing and welfare state idealization can be used to an-
alyze narratives developed by great variety of public discussants, 
this lens focuses on narratives authored by people who identify as 
neo-populist advocates, emphasizing the strategic social action in 
the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy into a resonant collec-
tive identity and for positioning neo-populist advocacy favorably in 
various arenas of public debate.
The main purpose for complementing the theoretical framework 
with this lens is that it allows for the analysis of neo-populist nar-
rative agency in the rapid growth in public and electoral support 
of right-wing populism in Finland. As discussed in more detail in 
section 2.3, in order to compete against other political actors in 
public space, right-wing populists must be able to politicize issues 
of national identity and the related boundary-work of belonging in 
public debate. The ability of the neo-populist advocates to achieve 
this depends on how acceptably they are able to narrate their welfare 
nationalist political agenda in public and on their ability to bring 
these narratives into mediatized arenas of public debate. In addition 
to these considerations, the strategic neo-populist social action also al-
lows analyzing how neo-populist narratives manifest the social skill 
required to develop the divided support for an open-ended welfare 
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nationalist political agenda into a resonant collective identity. As 
such, this lens focuses on the strategic social action employed when 
narrating neo-populist advocacy in a manner that “help[s] induce 
cooperation from people by appealing to their identity, belief and 
interests, while at the same time using those same stories to frame 
actions against various opponents” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, 
50–51). 
The lens of populist subject positioning is therefore employed in 
this dissertation for the purpose of analyzing the narrative practices 
with which the political advocates of nationalist populism – both 
the party members and grassroots level public discussants – are 
seeking to establish and sustain media saliency and favorable pub-
lic exposure for themselves and their political agenda, and present 
themselves as a political force representing “the Finnish people.” 
The narrative agency highlighted through the use of this analyt-
ical lens pertains to the contextual management of open-ended, 
even conflicting narratives across various arenas of public debate. 
The social skill this lens focuses on manifests in the coordination 
of collective action that produces a resonant collective identity 
while pursuing several lines of action simultaneously. It supports 
the analysis concerning the consolidation of the diverse range of 
neo-populist narratives with different functions. A good example 
of consolidation of conflicting narratives is the mobilization new, 
young constituencies through online arenas of public debate while 
editing the more radical and xenophobic nationalist narratives de-
veloped in hermetic sphericules of social media into subtler argu-
ments concerning the implications of immigration to social policy 
when reaching for audiences in mainstream arenas of public debate. 
Another example would be responding to critics in media by posi-
tioning them as “elites” or “ladies with flowery hats” while adopting 
the subject position of the underdogs in the media war, bravely sac-
rificing themselves in the name of freedom of speech and the future 
of “our” Finnish welfare state.
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, this theoretical 
framework – built around the three analytical lenses – serves as a 
tool for conducting the empirical analyses. As such, this framework, 
and particularly the hierarchical ordering of the three lenses, should 
not be taken to suggest that the public narratives of exclusionary 
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welfare solidarity are always examined in this study by consistently 
using each of the three lenses. Rather, considering that the research 
object alternates in the three chapters of analysis between narra-
tives produced by public officials, politicians, online activists and 
other grassroots level advocates, the empirical analysis triangulates 
between the three lenses in a non-hierarchical manner – largely de-
pending on which actors, audiences and arenas a particular data set 
pertains to. 
Indeed, this triangulation is an important element of the analysis 
as it makes possible to capture the flexible use of narrative resources 
through which advocates of welfare nationalism are able, for exam-
ple, to downplay some of their central boundary-drawing narratives 
when seeking to secure favorable media coverage in a mainstream 
arena of public debate. 
For the purposes of presenting a lucid analytical narrative and 
documentation of this doctoral research, there are, however, cer-
tain advantages in structuring this study on the proliferation of 
exclusionary public understanding of welfare solidarity in immi-
gration-related public debates around the three lenses. Most impor-
tantly, this research design facilitates the operationalization of the 
research aims (presented in chapter 2) into clear-cut sets of research 
questions, each pertaining to a specific dimension. The research 
questions for this study are:
1. How do welfare nationalist narratives operationalize the nation-
alist, blue-and-white conceptualizations of “the nation” and “the 
people”? What kinds of narratives link these concepts to the poli-
tics of immigration and delineate an exclusionary set of criteria for 
belonging to the Finnish national community? 
2. How are idealized reinterpretations concerning the legacy of the 
welfare state narrated as the foundation of the welfare nationalist 
political agenda? What kind of public understanding of welfare sol-
idarity do these mediatized neo-populist narratives promote?
3. How do the neo-populist advocates facilitate salient media expo-
sure for their political presence in various arenas of public debate? 
How do they seek to make use of this exposure and consolidate 
support from heterogeneous political constituencies into a resonant 
neo-populist collective identity? 
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While each of these sociological research questions relate to the 
contemporary academic debates within critical nationalism studies, 
they also contribute to different research traditions. The first ques-
tion contributes to the literature on political sociology, reassessing 
how welfare nationalist narratives can be used in neo-populist de-
lineation of national belonging. The second provides an opportunity 
to assess how the political history of the Finnish welfare state as a 
seedbed for exclusionary welfare nationalism may have contributed 
to the recent neo-populist electoral successes. The third research 
question seeks to bridge a gap between media studies, political sci-
ence and political sociology, contributing to a coherent understand-
ing of how neo-populist advocates can narrate their collective action 
so that it consolidates the support for an open-ended welfare nation-
alist political agenda between divergent constituencies into a reso-
nant collective identity that consistently reaches salient exposure in 
mediatized public debates. 
These contributions, only briefly summarized here, will be dis-
cussed in detail in the concluding chapter of this dissertation, also 
addressing the question of how triangulating focus between the nar-
ratives by different actors facilitates a better understanding of public 
opinion forming in civil society at large.
In the next chapter, I will present the collection and coding of 
the data sets to be analyzed in the chapters 4-6, also outlining the 
methodological operationalization of my theoretical framework and 
the research questions.
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Studying the Nar rat ives  Employed in 
the Consolidat ion of  Blue-and-White 
Welfare  Nat ionalism
This chapter describes the development of the research design of this 
study. I first illustrate the progression of the data collection process 
and then continue to present the priorities guiding the coding of 
the data sets for the empirical analysis. In the final subsection, I 
demonstrate the methodological operationalization of the research 
design for the purposes of producing a lucid analytical narrative of 
the neo-populist consolidation of welfare nationalism in the Finn-
ish public debate.
3.1 Collecting the Data in the Key Arenas of Public Debate 
The data for the empirical analysis conducted in this dissertation 
was collected in three phases during the period of seven years, from 
2008 to 2014. This process of data collection was progressive in the 
sense that the earlier data collection phases informed the subsequent 
collection of data by introducing new sets of criteria according to 
which data was collected. In this section I present the developing 
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process of data collection in detail3.
The initial phase of data collection began in 2008, when I was 
leading the planning of a joint article with two other doctoral re-
searchers  (Pyrhönen, Creutz and Weide 2015). The parts in this 
article that were authored by me were eventually developed into the 
first chapter of empirical analysis of this dissertation (chapter 4). 
The key considerations in the collection of data for this article must 
be discussed in some detail, because they eventually developed the 
research agenda of the whole dissertation towards examining public 
debate on immigration, thereby informing the subsequent data col-
lection process at large. 
The core aim of the original article was to illustrate how the 
boundaries of national belonging are discursively reproduced in the 
Finnish high political debates during the 2000s. In order to col-
lect data that can be operationalized for the purposes of conducting 
qualitative content analysis on discursive reproduction of national 
identity in the high political arena, the first task was to focus on a 
particular process of legislative development that would serve as a 
source for collecting a rich corpus of data on debates on national 
identity. The decision to focus on immigration-related legislation 
was justified by three important considerations. 
Firstly, the academic literature concerning the recent politiciza-
tion of immigration in various European countries during the late 
1900s and early 2000s suggests that questions of national identity 
tend to become particularly accentuated in conjunction of political 
debates on immigration. Indeed, based on his extensive research on 
nation-specific “public philosophies” of integration in several Eu-
ropean countries, Adrian Favel has identified national identity and 
fragmentation of the civil society – rather than actual immigration 
policy measures – as common sources of the heated contention in 
public debate on immigration. According to Favell, “[i]mmigration, 
and the citizenship questions it invites, is a political issue that can, 
if it unsettles any of the other social, class, or regional divisions that 
characterizes these societies, rapidly throw into doubt much broader 
assumptions about the bases of social and political integration in a 
nation: its moral and cultural identity, in short” (2001, 22).
3  An exhaustive listing of all the data analyzed is presented in the Appendix A.
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Secondly, by the 1990s Finland – having remained a country of 
emigration up until 1980s – had faced several challenges in har-
monizing its immigration legislation with the several international 
treaties and, eventually, with European Union membership guide-
lines. This incited public debate on immigration that challenged the 
traditional understanding that regarded Finland’s legal responsibil-
ities to apply only to Finnish citizens (Lepola 2000, 44–48).
Thirdly, these two considerations set the context for the excep-
tionally encompassing legislative review during the period from 
2000-2004 that led to enacting the Aliens Act of 2004 that incor-
porated a hearing process of 60 NGOs, something unprecedented 
in the Finnish legislative history. The debates taking place in the 
course of this legislative review – and in the preparatory process it 
entailed – were, therefore, deemed to provide an excellent source to 
collect the data from for the purposes of analyzing discursive repro-
duction of Finnish national identity and the drawing of boundaries 
of national belonging.
The first empirical chapter (chapter 4, “Conceptualizations of 
Exclusionary Welfare Solidarity in the High Political Arena Prior to 
the Rise of Neo-Populism”) uses two sets of data, both of which are 
collected from the documents and the background material pertain-
ing to the revision of the Finnish Aliens Act of 2004. The first data 
set consists of background documents and memoranda produced 
in preparatory process of the Act, dating from 1999 to 2004, and 
an interview with the Legislative Councellor Jorma Kantola, the 
public official in charge for the preparation of the Aliens Act in the 
Ministry of Interior. This data set covers approximately 600 sheets 
of documents. 
The second data set consists of the minutes of six Finnish par-
liamentary debates between 2002 and 2004. Five of these debates 
discuss the Aliens Act of 2004 and one debate discusses the Inte-
gration Act of 2002. The debate on Integration Act of was included 
in the second data set in order to evaluate whether the narratives of 
national identity are somehow exceptional in the debate on Aliens 
Act or whether another parliamentary debate on immigration-relat-
ed topic contains similar national identity reproducing narratives. 
Together these debates in the second data set cover some two hun-
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dred addresses to the parliamentary floor by seventy Finnish MPs.4 
The interview was conducted in December 2008 and the rest of the 
data in the first two data sets was collected in 2009 and 2010.
The decision to collect data on immigration policy debates, and 
the subsequent analysis of this data, informed the development of 
the research agenda of this doctoral study. Having produced re-
sults concerning the welfare nationalist narratives on immigration 
control in the high political arena, I soon realized the importance 
of comparing these findings with an analysis of welfare nationalist 
narratives in other contexts of political debate. Reviewing the aca-
demic literature on nationalism, and particularly on its banal and 
everyday variants, suggested that – notwithstanding the symbolic 
significance of the legislative process in the reproduction of nation-
al identity – the vast majority of articulations of national identity 
takes places civil society outside the strictly political sphere (Lam-
ont and Molnár 2002, 186; Saukkonen 2007, 33). The next phase 
of data collection would, therefore, have to focus on the less formal 
arenas of public debate.
This phase of data collection, conducted in 2011, produced two 
data sets to be analyzed in a peer-reviewed article (Pyrhönen 2013) 
which was eventually developed into the second empirical chapter 
(chapter 5, “The Neo-Populist Breakthrough and the Mainstream-
ing of the Blue-and-White Political Agenda of Welfare National-
ism”). The aim of this chapter was to assess the narratives for pre-
senting welfare nationalist politics in the mainstream publicity. That 
year was an exceptionally fruitful time to start collecting such data 
because of the campaigning for the Finnish parliamentary elections 
of 2011. In the elections, the right-wing populist Perussuomalaiset 
party (PS) managed to muster support for their anti-immigration 
oriented, welfare nationalist political agenda to the extent that their 
number of MPs increased from 4 (in 2007) to 39 (out of 200 seats). 
As a result of the neo-populist campaigning and the electoral re-
sult, there was extensive media coverage on the topic of immigration 
politics that PS raised as the key issue on the political agenda. This 
4 The exhaustive list of the addresses to the parliament floor in the Aliens Act debates 
in the second data set – quoted and translated in chapter 4 – is presented in the Appen-
dix B: Original Quotations from the Parliamentary Debates on the Aliens Act of 2004.
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provided an excellent opportunity to collect data for exploring the 
welfare nationalist mobilization narratives and its commentaries in 
the public debate right before and after this critical turning point in 
the Finnish political climate.
The data used in the fifth chapter is separated into two data sets. 
First of all, it was deemed important to collect data as data set that 
would allow the analysis of the mobilization narratives employed 
by the PS. This third data set consists of two electoral manifestos 
by PS, used in their most successful electoral campaigns. The first 
manifesto was prepared for the municipal elections of 2008 (Perus-
suomalaiset rp. 2008) and the second one for the parliamentary elec-
tions of 2011 (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011). This data set also includes 
the only part of data collected from outside Finland, the electoral 
manifesto of the Swedish right-wing populist party Sverigedemokra-
terna for 2010 parliamentary elections (Sverigedemokraterna 2010). 
While the fifth chapter does not constitute a full-fledged compar-
ative analysis, assessing the manifestos from both parties side by 
side underlines certain particularities in the mobilization rhetoric of 
Finnish neo-populists, especially concerning a distinctly welfare na-
tionalist emphasis in comparison to its Swedish “sister-party”. Since 
this material is expressly presented to the public for the purpose of 
convincing as large a potential constituency as possible, the third 
data set pertains to a less formal, and in many respects “more pub-
lic” arena of political debate on immigration, than the high political 
debates. 
While the electoral manifestos provided a rich material for an-
alyzing the neo-populist narrative agency in mobilizing new con-
stituencies behind welfare nationalist political agenda, it was also 
important to somehow address the emergence of a novel mediatized 
phenomenon, the extensive coverage of the Perussuomalaiset in the 
mainstream media. Instead of focusing on the newspaper articles 
themselves, I wanted to analyze the grassroots level narratives for 
supporting neo-populist advocacy. As such, the fourth data set 
was collected from the largest online arena of public debate, the 
discussion boards of Helsingin Sanomat [HS] in the website of the 
Finland’s largest nationwide newspaper. This data set consists of a 
sample of three online discussion board threads, each consisting of 
a follow-up commentary of frontpage newspaper article, in which 
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a Finnish high-profile politician outlines ‘an immigration-related 
problem’. This data was collected from online debates that took 
place in 2009 (right after the smaller PS victory in municipal elec-
tions of 2008) and 2011 (one right before the electoral victory and 
one right after). The data was collected from this time period in 
order to have the fourth data set coincide with the time period from 
which the electoral manifestos included in the third data set origi-
nated (2008, 2010 and 2011). The threads selected for analysis were 
collected by adhering to three distinct selection criteria worth dis-
cussing in more detail.  
Firstly, each of the three threads of online debate analyzed is 
based on a newspaper article in the Helsingin Sanomat (HS) that 
exhibits a critical evaluation of an immigration-related phenome-
non, and is articulated by a high-ranking political actor. The articles 
are based, respectively, on statements by the Minister of Economy, 
Jyrki Katainen (Mölsä 2009), the PS leader Timo Soini (Helsingin 
Sanomat 2011a) and President Tarja Halonen (Silfverberg 2011).
Secondly, immigration had to be a central, reoccurring topic in 
each of the threads, defined as making an explicit reference to ‘im-
migration’ at least once per A4-sheet. With the discussion within 
each of the threads consisting of about 300 A4 sheets, this translates 
to at least 300 references to immigration per thread.
Thirdly, each of the threads included in the analysis belong 
among the ten most commented topics of the month the thread 
originates in, each thread consisting of more than 200 posts.5 The 
minimum requirement200 posts is a very high threshold that ex-
cluded the vast majority of debate threads. As a point of compari-
son, the average number of posts in the 17 most discussed threads 
of any topic in January 2011 was 173 posts per thread according to 
the HS. Any thread exceeding this threshold therefore signifies an 
exceptionally intense debate.
Posts from each of the three threads were coded using the Atlas. 
TI -program up until a saturation point is reached. Each of the 
5 It is important to note that the discussants participate in the debates anonymously 
using aliases, and sometimes submit posts that are not in accordance with the Finnish 
legislation against hate speech. Considering that the debates are being moderated by 
the HS staff, the number of posts submitted is likely to exceed the actual number of 
posts published online.
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threads is considered saturated when, firstly, more than 50 posts are 
analyzed and, secondly, the number of posts not expressing sup-
port for anti-immigration oriented welfare nationalism (labelled as 
off-topic or anti-racism) exceeds the count of the anti-immigration 
narrative with the highest coded frequency in a given thread.
When I started planning the third and final chapter of empirical 
analysis in 2013 (chapter 6, “Scandalized Underdogs of Xenopho-
bic Satirists? Consolidation of a Neo-Populist Collective Identity in 
Mediatized Contestations”), I wanted to focus on a new facet of col-
lective advocacy of neo-populism and pursue the research aims with 
a different type of analysis. I had already previously analyzed how 
exclusionary conceptualizations of welfare solidarity in the high 
political arena contributed to a fertile ground for the emergence 
of Finnish neo-populism, and how their mobilization was facili-
tated by successfully mainstreamed welfare nationalist narratives. 
To complement these analyses, I focused on the consolidation of 
neo-populist advocacy as a resonant collective identity. 
An important theoretical consideration that informed the data 
collection for chapter six was that academic literature on media 
studies and the neo-populist media use indicates that many of the 
collectivity-producing narratives originate from within relative-
ly hermetic “sphericules” of social media outside the wider public 
sphere (Gitlin 1998; Papacharissi 2002; Galston 2003). I therefore 
decided to collect the data from two distinct arenas of online de-
bate; a mainstream newspaper discussion board (Helsingin Sanomat) 
and a more intimate debating arena for the likeminded neo-populist 
advocates (Hommaforum).
Another theoretical consideration, corroborated by my initial 
empirical observations, informed this focus on data collection. 
During the electoral breakthrough period of the Perussuomalaiset 
party, the welfare nationalist justificatory narratives had often been 
used in the public debate to counter the critique according to which 
the anti-immigrant political agenda of the right-wing populists 
was built on racism and xenophobia (see, for example, Keskinen, 
Rastas and Tuori 2009a; Maasilta 2012). During the institution-
al persistence phase of the Finnish neo-populism, the public cri-
tique towards right-wing populism shifted away from their political 
agenda towards the actions of prominent neo-populist figures (for 
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more detailed assessment on the “breakthrough” and “persistence” 
phases in the lifecycle of populist political movements in Europe, 
see Mudde 2007, 232). Especially when news journalism started to 
increasingly focus on right-wing populist hate speech scandals after 
electoral breakthrough of the Perussuomalaiset in 2011, the public 
discussants found it increasingly difficult to position neo-populist 
advocacy favorably in the media without addressing the contested 
behavior of their figureheads. Instead, they often chose to employ 
various subject positioning narratives for reinterpreting the role of 
neo-populist advocacy behind events framed as scandals in the me-
dia. These narratives would commonly seek to either distance the 
discussants themselves, supposedly representing the great majority 
of sensible advocates of neo-populism, from the scandals, or alter-
natively seek to reinterpret the scandalized behavior as justifiable. 
The sixth chapter presents a reconstruction of these mediatized 
narrative contestations of neo-populist advocacy as the catalysis of 
their identity-work after the electoral breakthrough of the Perus-
suomalaiset party. This is established by operationalizing and ana-
lyzing data collected from a mainstream arena and sphericule arena 
of online debates that pertain to two front page media scandals 
revolving around the allegations of racism and xenophobia against 
two Perussuomalaiset MPs.
The fifth data set analyzed in this chapter consists of a total 429 
posts. With the single exception of the debate thread originating 
around the interpretative news article on ”The Hirvisaari Case”, 
these posts are distributed evenly among six online debate threads, 
so that online discussion board threads are consider in both scandal 
cases (table 1). 
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The Hirvisaari Case The Halla-aho Case
HS online debate: the 
descriptive news article
(Helsingin Sanomat 2013a)
80/80 posts
(Helsingin Sanomat 2012a)
80/110 posts
HS online debate: the 
interpretative news 
article
(Helsingin Sanomat 2013b)
29/29 posts
(Helsingin Sanomat 2012b)
80/236 posts
Homma online debate 
thread
(Hommaforum 2013)
80/1158 posts 
(Hommaforum 2012)
80/2718 posts
Table 1. Online debate threads in the data set 5.
For each scandal case, two mainstream threads and one spher-
icule thread are analyzed. In each of these threads, the discussants 
comment on newspaper articles published by Helsingin Sanomat 
(HS). For both scandal cases, two articles are considered. The first 
ones present the scandal story (Helsingin Sanomat 2012a; Helsingin 
Sanomat 2013a), while the second ones present how the subject of 
the scandal seeks to justify his actions (Helsingin Sanomat 2012b; 
Helsingin Sanomat 2013b).
For the mainstream arena, the data is collected from the HS 
online discussion boards6, one thread per each of the articles. The 
remaining two threads (Hommaforum 2013; Hommaforum 2012) 
are collected from a sphericule arena called Hommaforum (Hom-
ma), which I will briefly present in the following. 
Founded in the beginning of 2009 by active discussants of the 
online blog by the Perussuomalaiset MP (since 2011) Jussi Halla-aho, 
Homma is a discussion forum with a strong “immigration critical” 
agenda (Hannula 2011, 145–146). According to the Homma mod-
erators, the debate in Homma is conducted by some 9200 regis-
tered users (in February 2015), each whom can start a discussion by 
opening a discussion thread within dozens of “discussion rooms”. 
The volume of the debate in Homma totaled at some 1.7 million 
comments or posts, divided among all the threads since its found-
ing in 2009 (“Hommaforum” 2015). Homma has been extensively 
covered in the mainstream media and is widely known among the 
6 Described in more detail as part of the presentation of the data set 4, earlier in this 
chapter.
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Finnish population as a neo-populist arena of debate with close, but 
informal ties to the Perussuomalaiset party (Horsti and Nikunen 
2013, 18–19). 
The fifth data set is operationalized for narrative analysis by iden-
tifying and coding the right-wing populist subject positioning nar-
ratives in each of the six online threads by using Atlas.TI, up until a 
saturation point of 80 posts is reached. Setting the saturation point 
at 80 posts is based on the observation from the data collection 
process in the fourth data set, in where the discussion board debates 
started to rapidly generate more off-topic and self-referential posts 
after about 80 posts. Only one of the discussion board threads, HS 
Hirvisaari B, consists of less than 80 posts. For this thread, all 29 
posts were included. 
3.2 Coding the Data to Explore the Critical Turning Points  
in the Uses of Neo-Populist Mobilization Narratives 
Collecting the data progressively in several phases – each informed 
by the previous data collection phase – makes it possible to trian-
gulate between different types of data. This allows reconstructing 
three critical turning points in the development of the arenas, the 
audiences and the subject matter of welfare nationalist narratives. It 
must be emphasized here that identifying “critical turning points” in 
the data collected is primarily a rhetorical means for advancing the 
analytical narrative of this dissertation monograph – I do not sug-
gest that these are the critical turning points through which (neo-)
populist mobilization advances, even in the Finnish context. Using 
this term for the purposes of historical reconstruction underlines 
the importance in analyzing the introduction of certain interesting, 
previously less employed narratives and modes of strategic social ac-
tion that occur before, during and after the political breakthrough 
of the Perussuomalaiset party (Taira 2008, 236–237). Another im-
portant caveat is that the empirical reality manifested in a “critical 
turning point” is fuzzy (Abbott 2001, 249–252). As such, I do not 
suggest that the turning points mark the emergence of particularly 
abrupt or pinpointable departures from longer historical trajecto-
ries or that they that render the previously employed ethno-cultural 
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and nativist logic inherent in (neo-)populist mobilization narratives 
somehow obsolete. 
Being contextually sensitive in the analysis to the particularities 
in these critical turning points requires, however, that each of the 
three empirical chapters inductively approaches the data collected 
from separate arenas of public debate. This also means that the har-
monized operationalization of the data between the chapters – be-
yond the common focus of collecting data on welfare nationalist 
narratives in immigration-related debates – is not a priority that 
informs the coding of the data. Instead, the guidelines for coding of 
the data are different with each of the data sets in order to explore 
the specificities in separate stages of the progressive consolidation of 
neo-populist advocacy of welfare nationalism.
The first step in operationalizing the data employed in each of 
the chapters exploring the critical turning points requires identify-
ing the most appropriate arenas of public debate for the data collec-
tion. The first critical turning point in the exclusionary narration of 
welfare solidarity is the politicization of role of the welfare state in the 
management of immigration, analyzed in the first empirical chapter 
(chapter 4, “Conceptualizations of Exclusionary Welfare Solidarity 
in the High-Political Arena Prior to the Rise of Neo-Populism”). 
These politicizing narratives first manifested in the public debate 
within in the high political arena during the early 2000s, several 
years before the successful political mobilization of welfare nation-
alist political agenda by neo-populist advocates. 
Contextual sensitivity to the subject matter of welfare national-
ist narratives was the key consideration in operationalizing the vast 
amount of data collected from the high political arena. This is estab-
lished by coding the various narratives employed in the preparatory 
process and in the parliamentary debates with a particular regard to 
how immigration is conceptualized as a critical challenge for the fu-
ture of the welfare state. This coding is both informed by the theoret-
ical framework, specifically the analytical lenses of nationalist bound-
ary-drawing and welfare state idealization, and an inductive content 
analysis of the first two data sets. In practice, this means searching 
the data for narratives that belong to one or more categories of wel-
fare nationalist politicization of immigration, coded as instrumental-
ism, civic solidarity, consensualism and statism (figure 1, next page).
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Figure 1: Frames of high political narratives that link immigration control 
and the welfare state
Each of the four codes pertains to a specific type of narrative 
through which political control of immigration is presented in the 
debates as having particularly significant implications to the wel-
fare state. The model entails, firstly, that immigration is present-
ed in the high political arena as a potential burden to the welfare 
state, necessitating an instrumental weighing of quantifiable pros 
against the cons. Immigration is further presented as a catalyst for 
the heterogenization of civil society, which in turn can erode the 
solidarity, to which the venerated Finnish tradition of consensualist 
decision-making is commonly linked in the Finnish public under-
standing (for critical commentaries on the Finnish solidarity-based 
consensualism, see Lepola 2000, 21; Förbom 2010, 10–12). Finally, 
with regard to this threat of eroding civic solidarity and consensu-
alism, the statist frame refers to the use of narratives that emphasize 
the (welfare) state’s overarching responsibility for universal distri-
bution of welfare among its citizens (Esping-Andersen 1990, 27–28; 
Kiander and Lönnqvist 2002, 23–25), thereby also justifying the 
expansion of policies controlling immigration.
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Coding the first two sets of data (1 and 2) – employed in the 
fourth chapter of analysis – like this makes it possible to analyze the 
narratives of that constitute the first critical turning point in public 
narration of welfare nationalism, namely the welfare state pertinent 
politicization of immigration. 
The second empirical chapter (chapter 5, “The Neo-Populist 
Breakthrough and the Mainstreaming of the Blue-and-White Polit-
ical Agenda of Welfare Nationalism”) employs data from two data 
sets, both collected from arenas of mainstream publicity, thereby 
seeking to reconstruct the second critical turning point in the con-
solidation of welfare nationalism, the neo-populist mainstreaming of 
the welfare nationalist political agenda. In this chapter, the analyt-
ical focus shifts from the early narratives that formed the political 
subject matter of the emergent of welfare nationalism towards the 
neo-populist political mobilization through mainstreamed narra-
tives of the welfare nationalist political agenda. ”Mainstreaming” 
does not only denote the fact that these narratives proliferate in the 
mainstream arenas of publicity. Even more importantly, the con-
cept of mainstreaming refers here to the narratives through which 
welfare nationalism is being “sold” for a potentially increasingly 
large and heterogeneous (electoral) constituency. This purpose of 
underlining how welfare nationalism is narrated to the wider public 
informs the operationalization of these two data sets (3 and 4). 
The analysis of the third data set, collected from electoral man-
ifestos, focuses on how the mainstreamed narratives seek to tran-
scend the abstract political jargon within the high political narra-
tives and present welfare nationalism as the political movement for 
promoting the wellbeing of “the people”. The narratives for advo-
cating stricter measures of immigration control in this data set are 
coded into three distinct categories – formed around the themes 
related to labour markets, refugees and national identity. Each of 
these themes is constructed as a specific globalized challenge to 
the welfare state as an immigration-induced and to position the 
neo-populists as the advocates for the political agenda championing 
the cause of an ordinary, autochthonous Finn.
The analysis of the fourth data set, collected from particular-
ly contentious online discussions revolving around three news ar-
ticles on Finnish immigration politics, complements the analysis 
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of welfare nationalist mainstreaming narratives by focusing on the 
neo-populist grassroots level advocacy. These discussants within 
the informal online arena of public debate do not represent the Pe-
russuomalaiset party, even though they identify as sympathizers of 
neo-populist “immigration critique.” While the third data set could 
be coded with focus on the proactive mainstreaming narratives for 
the promotion of welfare nationalism, the online discussants are 
not in a position to mobilize new constituencies behind the welfare 
nationalist political agenda. Rather, facing the stigmatizing accusa-
tions in the mainstream publicity of being racists and xenophobes, 
they are occupied with developing justificatory narratives for pre-
senting their advocacy of neo-populist “immigration critique” as 
socially acceptable. 
The coding of the fourth data set underlines the characteristics 
of these reactive narratives for insulating the “immigration criti-
cal” political agenda from the public critique of racism and xeno-
phobia. Each of the posts that employs a narrative of justificatory 
mainstreaming of neo-populist advocacy is attributed a code that 
pertains to one of the eleven most common narratives justification, 
such as “scarcity of goods” or “reaffirming our ways.” Each of these 
codes are also distributed among one of the four meta-codes that 
signify the justification type – “Rights of the Majority,” “Immi-
grants as the Other,” “Economic redistribution” or “Norms of the 
public debate” – depending on which narrative justification they 
employ.7 With this coding scheme, it is possible to analyze how the 
use of justificatory narratives in mainstream publicity has developed 
during the second critical turning point, particularly how the fre-
quencies of various mainstreaming narratives change between on-
line discussions on the articles published before, during and after 
the Perussuomalaiset electoral victory of 2011. 
The sixth chapter (“Scandalized Underdogs or Xenophobic 
Satirists? Consolidation of a Neo-Populist Collective Identity in 
Mediatized Contestations”), the final one of the empirical analy-
ses, assesses the most recent developments in the public debate on 
7 For more detailed illustration of the justificatory discourses and their types are coded 
for the purposes of analysis, see Appendix C: Operationalization of the Justification 
Types and Discourses in Chapter 5.
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neo-populist advocacy of welfare nationalism. Securing the insti-
tutional persistence of the party developed into a priority for the 
Perussuomalaiset after their electoral breakthrough, when the hate 
speech scandals in which several members of the party were in-
volved started to feature in numerous frontpage news articles. This 
chapter seeks to reconstruct this critical turning point, mediatized 
catalysis of neo-populist identity-work, by focusing on the narratives 
– proliferating in the online arenas on public debate – with which 
neo-populist online discussants seek to position themselves favor-
ably vis-à-vis the scandal publicity by reinterpreting their negative 
media exposure in order to legitimize neo-populist advocacy. 
While the fourth data set was operationalized for analysis by 
coding the various narratives employed in support for more exten-
sive political control of immigration, the fifth data set codes the 
narratives for legitimizing the neo-populist advocacy that is chal-
lenged in the scandal debates. The key difference here is that in the 
data collected from the debates during electoral breakthrough, the 
neo-populists could focus on narratives for justifying their political 
agenda and their emphasis on the questions of immigration. The 
mediatized scandals do not challenge the political agenda of the 
Perussuomalaiset, but rather question the neo-populists’ willingness 
and ability to promote this political agenda without breaching the 
legal and social norms against hate speech. 
This shift in the post-breakthrough political climate is emphasized 
in the operationalization of fifth data set. This data on two promi-
nent online scandal debates is coded to illustrate the distribution of 
various subject positioning narratives in the narrative contestations 
on the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy.  Coding the posts with 
regard to how neo-populist advocacy is legitimized or delegitimized 
in narratives originating in the mainstream and sphericule arenas re-
veals a strong presence of neo-populist discussants in both arenas. To 
underline the role of the contested narratives as collectively produced 
public understanding on neo-populist subject position, it was feasi-
ble to operationalize the data collected in the fifth data set as public 
stories, whose oppositional nature could be assessed with narrative 
analysis (Feldman and Almqvist 2011). In chapter six, I discuss the 
practical operationalization of this methodology in more detail. 
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3.3 Developing the Analytical Narrative on Neo-Populist 
Consolidation of Welfare Nationalist Rhetoric
The empirical part of this study is developed into an analytical nar-
rative on the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy of welfare na-
tionalism in the Finnish public debate by operationalizing the theo-
retical framework with regard to two principle features that inform 
the research design. These features are the methodological focus on the 
rhetorical discourse analysis of collective narratives and the illustration 
of critical turning points of political welfare nationalism by triangu-
lating between the data collected from salient arenas of public debate. 
The common methodological approach that guides the empir-
ical analysis is that the material in all of the five data sets is first 
operationalized as collective narratives that can be then studied with 
rhetorical discourse analysis (see, for instance, Billig 1987; Potter 
1996; Jokinen, Juhila and Suoninen 1999). Among contemporary 
narrative researchers, narratives are commonly regarded as a dis-
tinct form of discourse where the concerted ordering of the material 
is a crucial factor that shapes the process of meaning making (Chase 
2011). The focus on collective narratives in the operationalization 
of the data emphasizes the fact that the material is produced by 
multiple authors or discussants. Regardless of their often divergent 
individual affiliations or personal motivations for employing certain 
kinds of rhetoric or conceptualizations, the discussants enter a col-
lective process of meaning-making in public fora, thereby contrib-
uting to a wider public understanding concerning the social phe-
nomena they discuss. 
In order to first identify specific types of narratives from the 
material, the empirical chapters employ the analytical lenses of na-
tionalist boundary-drawing welfare state idealization and strategic 
neo-populist social action (as discussed in 2.4). As such, while the 
subsequent rhetorical discourse analysis is empirically grounded, 
the operationalization of the material into collective narratives en-
tails a theoretically informed approach to the processes of thematic 
sorting and coding of the material. This way of operationalizing 
the data does not seek to reconstruct the multiplicity of narratives 
produced by the discussants in a given data set, but instead focuses 
on “what is socially accomplished” in the contested, collective pro-
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cess of narrative storytelling within specific arenas of public debate 
(Holstein and Gubrium 2011, 6–7). 
The method of rhetorical discourse analysis makes it possible 
to examine in detail how the most successful and persuasive col-
lective narratives employ various, often implicit justificatory strat-
egies, through which discussants in public debate seek to alter and 
manage public perceptions concerning acceptability, justifiability 
and necessity of welfare nationalist politics of immigration control. 
Some of the narrative strategies that rhetorical discourse analysis of 
public narratives can make visible include fact construction through 
invitations for an imagined audience to complete suggestive nar-
ratives, favorable speaker positioning and enemy representations 
(Potter 1996, 114–128, 142–169), reductive quantification of com-
plex qualitative questions, lists and repetition (Jokinen, Juhila and 
Suoninen 1999, 146, 152–154) and metaphorical conceptualization 
of social action (Billig 1987, 40–41).
By employing rhetorical discourse analysis as tool in the narra-
tive analysis of public stories, it is also possible to alternate between 
the three analytical lenses to assess how distinct narratives seek to 
bundle the questions of immigration, national belonging and the 
future of the welfare state. For example, by juxtaposing the per-
ception of increasing demands from growing immigrant minorities 
with the state’s idealized capabilities for providing encompassing 
redistribution of welfare (illustrated through the welfare state ide-
alization lens), it is possible to employ exclusionary categorizations 
of national belonging (revealed by the nationalist boundary-drawing 
lens) for the purpose of presenting the neo-populist advocacy of 
heightened immigration control as benign welfare nationalist social 
policy (a subject positioning narrative examined through the lens of 
strategic neo-populist social action) (Billig 1987, 149–150). 
The other key feature for advancing the analytical narrative en-
tails selective triangulation between the data collected from salient 
public arenas order to illustrate the critical turning points of how 
welfare nationalism is debated in the civil society. First of all, the 
chronological ordering of the three chapters of analysis presents a 
historical reconstruction of the consolidation of welfare nationalist 
advocacy in three critical turning points. The data from the early 
2000s focuses on the politicization of role of the welfare state in the 
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management of immigration, the data collected from the period of 
near the 2011 electoral victory of Perussuomalaiset illustrates the 
neo-populist mainstreaming of the welfare nationalist political agenda 
and, finally, the data from 2013 and 2014 emphasizes the narratives 
employed in the mediatized catalysis of neo-populist identity-work. 
Obviously, these critical turning points could not be used as the 
guideline for data collection, because identifying these three as the 
critical turning points could only be established post hoc. The pre-
requisite for identifying the turning points was first identifying an 
emergent public arena for debating a salient facet of welfare nation-
alist politics, and then collecting data from the debates conducted 
within these arenas. The results from the analysis of the narrative 
data collected like this made it possible to emphasize the particu-
larities in each data set and then use them to identify the critical 
turning points. This was established by illustrating what features of 
welfare nationalism were first debated in public in conjunction to 
which arena and what was particular in these debates, and naming 
these accordingly as the critical turning points.
This progressive process is documented in detail by the analytical 
narrative that is advanced in the three chapters of empirical analysis 
and in the synthesizing concluding discussion. Before proceeding 
to the empirical part of this study, two important features linking 
the data triangulation and the analytical narrative on neo-populist 
consolidation of welfare nationalism in three critical turning points 
should be emphasized here. 
Firstly, the decision to advance the analytical narrative through 
the concept of consolidation of welfare nationalism and its neo-pop-
ulist advocacy was made possible by the observation that, from the 
early 2000s to 2013, the most salient emergent arenas for debating 
welfare nationalism in public have become increasingly informal. 
In the early 2000s, welfare nationalism was only debate in pub-
lic within the high political arena. During the electoral victory of 
Perussuomalaiset, the most heated debates were conducted in the 
mainstream publicity. Finally, the narratives for justifying welfare 
nationalism within the intimate, quasi-public sphericules of social 
media helped to develop neo-populist advocacy into a resonant col-
lective identity. 
61
3: STUDYING THE NARRATIVES EMPLOYED IN THE 
CONSOLIDATION OF BLUE-AND-WHITE WELFARE NATIONALISM
Secondly, analyzing the narratives by triangulating between the 
data indicates that the subject matter of what is being debated vis-
à-vis welfare nationalism is specific to the arenas and the critical 
turning points. In the high political arenas, the level of abstraction 
is high, and much of the debate pertained to the aims and ideals of 
welfare nationalism. In the analysis of these debates, the lenses na-
tionalist boundary-drawing and welfare state idealization are partic-
ularly useful. When welfare nationalism is debated in mainstream 
publicity, the focus is on how the neo-populists are able to justify 
their anti-immigration oriented political agenda to the wider public 
as the proper interpretation of welfare nationalism that can save 
“our” welfare state. Analyzing these debates requires complement-
ing the analytical tools with the strategic neo-populist social action 
lens. Finally, when neo-populist advocacy is heavily challenged in 
mainstream media, the political agenda of welfare nationalism is 
barely discussed in the data. Instead, the debates are mostly con-
testations between subject positioning narratives. While anti-popu-
list discussants are keen to employ narratives that delegitimize the 
neo-populist advocacy by focusing on their inability to keep the 
rampant racism at bay, the neo-populists seek to construct the po-
sition of a “true” neo-populist advocate as impossible for racists to 
hold, thereby presenting the accusations against the true advocates 
as false by definition.
The subsequent empirical chapters employ the data and methods 
as described in this section, approaching the material as collectively 
produced narratives through rhetorical discourse analysis. In these 
three chapters, I aim to offer an analytical narrative that explores 
critical turning points in the consolidation of welfare nationalism 
and its neo-populist advocacy.
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4 
 
Conceptualizat ions of  Exc lusionar y 
Welfare  Solidar i t y  in  the High Poli t ica l 
Pr ior  to  the Rise of  Neo-Populism 8
This chapter examines the political narratives, proliferating in the 
Finnish political arena during the beginning 2000s, that empha-
size the welfare state’s duty to manage and control immigration 
into Finland. The analysis focuses on the high political arena where 
nationalist conceptualizations of immigration and welfare solidar-
ity became a salient topic for political debate several years before 
immigration-related narratives were harnessed more widely in the 
public debate in neo-populist political mobilization. The role of this 
chapter is to present a reconstruction of the Finnish, pre-populist 
political climate where the narratives linking exclusionary bound-
ary-work of welfare solidarity to the politics of immigration first 
emerged. The data analyzed is gathered from the debates revolving 
around the legislative development of the Aliens Act of 2004 – in-
cluding material from the preparatory process in the Ministry of 
8 This chapter builds on an article that included the first version of my analysis of the 
case of the legislative process of the Aliens Act 2004 (Pyrhönen, Creutz and Weide 2015). 
Here I develop that analysis further, conducting a secondary analysis that uses the 
theoretical framework of this dissertation as the new point of departure for the ana-
lysis. Where relevant, I acknowledge the work of the co-writers of the original article. 
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Interior as well the parliamentary debates concerning the Act.9
In order to illustrate a welfare nationalist rationale in the high 
political debates on Finnish immigration policy, the narrative anal-
ysis is based on two analytical lenses discussed in the theoretical 
framework in chapter 2.4 – nationalist boundary-drawing and wel-
fare state idealization. By employing these analytical lenses, it is 
possible to analyze the nationalist boundary-work in the narratives 
produced by state officials and MPs, particularly focusing on how 
policies aimed at more rigorous control of immigration are justified 
in narratives that present several challenges to the welfare state as 
immigration-induced. 
In the following, I will first present the case of Aliens Act of 
2004, contextualizing the historical background against which the 
political debate is assessed. I will then move into the analysis, di-
vided into four thematic sub-sections, before finally discussing the 
findings and their implications, relating both to the research agenda 
of this dissertation.
The Finnish Debate on Immigration and Welfare State within 
the High Political Arena: The Case of the Aliens Act of 2004 
The Finnish Aliens Act is a piece of legislation through which much 
of citizenship related immigration policy is implemented. This ex-
plicit purpose of the Act is 
to implement and promote good governance and legal protec-
tion in matters concerning aliens. In addition, the purpose of 
the Act is to promote managed immigration and provision of 
international protection with respect for human rights and 
basic rights and in consideration of international agreements 
binding on Finland.  (“FINLEX ® - Translations of Finnish 
Acts and Decrees: 301/2004 English” 2014).
In the year 2000, the Ministry of the Interior organized an ex-
tensive legislative review of this legislation. The outcome of the leg-
9 For a more detailed discussion concerning how the data was collected and operatio-
nalized for the analysis, see chapter 3.
64
THE TRUE COLORS OF FINNISH WELFARE NATIONALISM
islative review was the Aliens Act of 2004, which was the third iter-
ation of the Aliens Act in Finland. The earlier Acts were enacted in 
1983 and 1991 – of which the latter was regarded as “an exception-
ally thorough revision of the earlier Act” – necessitated largely by 
the ratification of international and EU-level regulations on human 
rights and the projected increase in the number of asylum seekers in 
Finland (Lepola 2000, 77–78). 
Even though the previous Aliens Act had only been enacted nine 
years before, the Minister of the Interior Kari Rajamäki (SD)10, sup-
ported the need for another review as motivated by the need “to 
prepare the legislative means to confront the inflow of immigrants 
from the upcoming enlargement of the EU in May 2004 and to 
capitalize on the assets of international migration whilst eliminat-
ing any possible negative repercussions for Finland” (PTK 40/2003 
vp)11. The extension of the preparatory process over the period of five 
years of work in the Ministry of Interior (2000-2004) is quite un-
common in the Finnish legislative practice, and the related hearing 
process, involving over 60 civic bodies and NGOs, was at the time 
the largest in Finland’s legislative history. Eventually, the process 
that was approaching to be finished in 2003 was further delayed by 
the parliamentary elections and change of the government that year. 
This exceptionally lengthy process, and the fact that it was seen 
fit to make the next government responsible for the outcome of the 
Aliens Act, was nevertheless defended by Rajamäki on the grounds 
that there must be an “extensive, active hearing process of national 
and international NGOs” (Ibid.). The laborious development of the 
Aliens Act of 2004 serves to illustrate how difficult and political-
ly divisive the forging of immigration related policy solutions were 
considered in Finland already in the beginning of the 2000s. 
Hundreds of expert statements submitted by human rights and 
migration NGOs are documented in “The General Overview of the 
Statements Concerning the Aliens Act Memorandum”. Comparing 
this overview of statements to the memoranda of the parliamentary 
10 SD = The Finnish Social Democratic Party. The other party abbreviations used in this 
paper are: NC, The National Coalition Party; SPP, The Swedish People’s Party; C, The 
Centre Party of Finland; CD, The Christian Democrats; PS, Perussuomalaiset (The Finns 
Party); G, The Green League of Finland; LA, The Left Alliance.
11 The policy documents in the empirical material are listed in the Appendix A.
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committees that are supposed to assess these expert statements in 
the preparatory process (especially “The Memorandum of the Par-
liamentary Administrative Committee”, (HaVM 4/2003)) reveals 
that the vast majority of the feedback – although formally “heard” 
in the process – has not been discussed and considered in the par-
liamentary committees. 
This suggests that extensiveness of the hearing process does 
not seem to correlate with any measurable increase in the politi-
cal power or influence of the expert organizations that were heard. 
Moreover, of the few NGO-mediated revisions acknowledged and 
initially supported by the committees (such as the removal of the 
anomalous right to appeal from the Finnish Immigration Service 
or the right for recently graduated students extend their stay while 
seeking employment), most failed to influence the letter of the law. 
This empirically meagre outcome can be used to question the offi-
cial rhetoric lauding the role and the impact of this hearing process.
However, it is important to underline the sense of gravity with 
which immigration related challenges were perceived at the time 
by politicians and participants in public debates alike, and contrast 
these perceptions with the demographically minute migratory flows 
to Finland. Indeed, despite the fact that Finland has since the early 
2000s experienced the second lowest levels of immigration of all the 
EU-15 countries in absolute terms (United Nations 2006, 1), the 
political debate on immigration has significantly intensified, both 
in terms of volume and rhetoric (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a, 
7–8). 
This discrepancy between the demographic hard data on immi-
gration to Finland on the one hand, and the political climate to-
wards immigration on the other, makes it particularly hard to grasp 
the essence of early politics of immigration in Finland through pol-
icy analysis or by developing quantitative indicators that pertain to 
outcomes of immigration policy. Rather, this discrepancy calls for 
a social constructionist mindset and a research agenda that focuses 
on how immigration is perceived and narrated in the public sphere. 
In the following, I will therefore analyze how the participants in the 
high political debate on Aliens Act consistently narrate the signifi-
cance of immigration policy by relating to considerations national 
identity and welfare solidarity. This also supports the concluding 
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discussion, where I consider how these early narratives – developed 
years before the rise of the populist, welfare nationalist mobilization 
– have contributed to the public discourse that constructs immigra-
tion as difficult challenge for the welfare state.  
Narrating Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Welfare  
Solidarity in High Political Debates on Immigration Policy
This analysis advances in four sections, each focusing on a particular 
narrative frame employed in the Finnish high political arena (figure 
2, below). The four-fold scheme of narrative frames is grounded in 
the inductive content analysis of the empirical data, gathered and 
coded by the three independent researchers for an original article 
(Pyrhönen, Creutz and Weide 2015) and aligned to the theoretical 
framework in a manner discussed more closely in the chapter 3.  
Figure 2: Frames of high political narratives that link immigration control 
and the welfare state
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Each of the four frames pertains to a specific type of narrative 
through which immigration management is represented in the de-
bates as having particularly significant implications to the welfare 
state. The model entails, firstly, that immigration is presented in the 
high political arena as a potential burden to the welfare state, ne-
cessitating an instrumental weighing of quantifiable pros against the 
cons. Immigration is further presented as a catalyst for the heterog-
enization of civil society, which in turn can erode the solidarity, to 
which the venerated Finnish tradition of consensualist decision-mak-
ing is commonly linked in the Finnish public understanding (for 
critical commentaries on the Finnish solidarity-based consensual-
ism, see Lepola 2000, 21; Förbom 2010, 10–12). Finally, with re-
gard to this threat of eroding civic solidarity and consensualism, the 
statist frame refers to the use of narratives that emphasize the (wel-
fare) state’s overarching responsibility for universal distribution of 
welfare among its citizens (Esping-Andersen 1990, 27–28; Kiander 
and Lönnqvist 2002, 23–25), thereby also justifying the expansion 
of policies controlling immigration.
The interconnectedness between the narrative frames is high-
lighted during the analysis where appropriate, and will be discussed 
in more detail in the concluding discussion. This discussion sum-
marises the results of the analysis, focusing on how the official nar-
ratives belonging to each of the four frames rely on each other and 
effectively present immigration as a problem for the Finnish welfare 
state to resolve.
Focusing on the costs and gains  
of immigration through the instrumentalist narrative
The first narrative frame – “instrumentalism” – refers to the nar-
rative whereby the immigration question is presented as one of in-
strumental management of pros and cons. This costs-versus-gains 
frame is frequently employed during the preparatory process of the 
Aliens Act of 2004, as well as in the parliamentary debates revolving 
around the Act. These quantitative approaches to migration and di-
versity appear in the material as references to both positive potential 
and negative expenses, although the latter appear to be emphasized 
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in the data. While it is possible to see the references to “resources” 
as opposed to articulations of the “costs,” the two approaches share 
the logic of measurability and rationality. 
The instrumentalist narrative frame is commonly adopted when 
the debate touches on the subject of public expenditure. For ex-
ample, some discussants point out that if municipal economies are 
burdened with the costs of immigration, it will severely deteriorate 
the public security (Soini, PS, PTK 40/2003). Another example on 
the use of this narrative frame, underlining the instrumentalist em-
phasis on minimizing the costs, can be found in the account of 
Minister of Interior Rajamäki. In presenting the governmental bill 
to the parliament, Rajamäki states that reaping the benefits of im-
migration must be subject to minimizing its ill effects to the greatest 
possible extent:
[T]he positive aspects of the cross-border migration flows 
had to be capitalized on while keeping its ill effects as small 
as possible. [...] The government considers it important that 
the motion for Aliens Act will be given to the parliament 
[...] as soon as possible with the aforementioned justification. 
(PTK 40/2003 vp) (a).
While it is only logical to try to minimize the ill effects of any 
societal phenomenon, the instrumentalist narratives tend to prior-
itize the prevention of the ill effects in the short term, rather than 
investing in resources for immigrant integration. In this sense, the 
instrumentalist narratives are strictly at odds with multicultural-
ist perspectives to immigration – favored by many minority NGOs 
statements commenting Aliens Act – that regard sustainable immi-
gration as primarily a process of give-and-take (see, for instance, 
Kymlicka 1995). 
As opposed to Rajamäki’s negative use of the instrumentalist 
narrative – suggesting that the most prudent immigration policy is 
based minimizing the “gives” rather than maximizing the “takes” – 
some discussants argue that it is possible to facilitate some quantifi-
able benefits to welfare economy by investing in immigrant integra-
tion. These MPs employ instrumentalist logic in order to emphasize 
the potential value of migrants as an untapped resource, typically 
referring to the potential economic gains related to non-labour mi-
69
4: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF EXCLUSIONARY WELFARE SOLIDARITY
IN THE HIGH POLITICAL ARENA PRIOR TO THE RISE OF NEO-POPULISM
gration. Such arguments deal with the future needs of Finland and 
seek to refer to the education of immigrants as an investment rath-
er than as a cost. The notion that there are ample resources to be 
harnessed through proper implementation of immigration policy is 
captured neatly in a quote by a Centre party MP: 
Finland does have a comparably short immigration history. 
Maybe that’s why we are not yet fully capable of recognizing 
and utilizing the social, linguistic and cultural know-how 
brought by immigrants. Taking into productive use of this ex-
isting but untapped resource would serve Finland on various 
fronts. – Paula Lehtomäki, C, (PTK 195/2002) (i).
In terms of actual costs of immigration, some of them are pre-
sented in more critical light than others within the instrumentalist 
frame. The proponents of the strictest entry policy are quick to un-
derline that those in “real distress” should be allowed to stay. Indeed, 
attempts to discern between worthy and scam asylum seekers are 
typical of European immigration debates (Bridget Anderson 2013, 
7) and one of the core elements of the costs discourse pertaining 
to individual migrants. MPs disapproving of undeserving asylum 
seekers operate with clear-cut categories of “real” and “unfounded” 
distress, as illuminatingly expressed by a Social Democratic MP: 
If only someone would bring [to light] the figure in a quite 
straightforward way and tell the truth about who are real 
refugees and who have only come in the hope of better [life] 
[...] – Tero Rönni, SD, (39/2004 vp) (j).
The discussants focusing on the false asylum cases employ the 
instrumentalist narrative in order to play with two sets of cards at 
the same time. On the one hand, the provision of welfare to un-
grounded asylum seekers is claimed to translate directly into dimin-
ished public expenditure on deserving Finns. On the other hand, 
the resources of the reception system are viewed as relatively stable 
since the sluggishness of granting protection to those worthy of it 
is said to be caused by the burden of processing bogus applications: 
The more we have people groundlessly applying for asylum, 
who only have arrived in order to seek access to our social 
welfare, the less resources we are left with to receive those 
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individuals who would really be in the need of an asylum. – 
Pertti Hemmilä, NC, (39/2004 vp) (k). 
These instrumentalist calculations construct the asylum seeker as 
an ultimately immoral individual who whittles away the welfare of 
needy Finns and stands in the way of a deserved new life for the 
few truly persecuted applicants. In a similarly dual argument, the 
substandard wages paid to foreign workers are referred to both as 
a violation of the rights belonging to the foreigners themselves (cf. 
worthy asylum seekers) and a reason for economic suffering of Finns 
(Kuoppa, LA; Soini, PS, PTK 16/2004 vp).
The commonly used notion of “legitimate distress” – intended to 
separate the bogus applicants from the deserving asylum seekers – is 
not clearly defined by those who refer to it within the instrumental-
ist frame. Here the expression “life in danger” (Soini PTK 45/2004 
vp) is employed in a particularly loose and purposeful sense. These 
expressions are commonly linked to the narrative that the right to 
asylum should not apply to people who subsistence is endangered 
because of economic or social circumstances, and that grounds for 
asylum can only be justified with reference to political causes of 
distress (Paajanen, NC, PTK 39/2004 vp). Some discussants also 
juxtapose the refugees suffering from discriminatory minority poli-
cy with those suffering from “real” persecution: 
The goal is, after all, to prevent the misuse of our asylum 
regulations and social security. Of course, the aim is to give 
protection from persecution to those who are in need of such 
protection, but repatriate as soon as possible those who seek 
to misuse our system. […] The actual problem with the latter 
people [Eastern European Roma] is, of course, the minority 
policy of their countries of origin […]. – Ben Zyskowicz, NC, 
(PTK 40/2003 vp) (nn).
Indeed, the boundary-drawing juxtapositions that present cer-
tain groups of asylum seekers as categorically undeserving welfare 
recipients appear most commonly in conjunction to a specific in-
strumentalist narrative. As exemplified in the quote above, this 
narrative emphasizes how the Aliens Act should be revised for the 
purpose of preventing immigrants, especially the most underserving 
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ones, from further burdening the welfare expenditure.
Immigration politics at the centre  
of the negotiations on the boundaries of civic solidarity 
The civic solidarity frame pertains to narratives that present the im-
migration-induced heterogeneity of the civil society as a challenge 
to Finnish welfare solidarity that must be countered through im-
migration policy. The arguments that employ this narrative present 
civic solidarity as a kind of social capital that is based, first and 
foremost, on bonds among native Finns as a group of supposed-
ly similar people (for critique against the idealized constructions 
of Finnish homogeneity, see Lepola 2000, 21). The discussants in 
the high political arena commonly claim that as a sovereign nation 
Finland should legitimately care more for wellbeing of Finns than 
for the wellbeing of immigrants, thereby juxtaposing “Finnish na-
tional interests” with the interests of the immigrant Other as an 
important guideline for developing immigration policy. By using 
this exclusionary narrative of civic solidarity, the discussants rein-
force the boundary between ethnic Finns and immigrants, rather 
than vesting immigration policy with the multiculturalist task of 
bringing these boundaries (see Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 17, for 
arguments for the latter conceptualization of immigration policy). 
The civic solidarity narratives typically advance through reifica-
tion of a common, ostensibly civic (i.e. non-ethnically based) nation-
al unity, regarding this unity-based solidarity as both the goal for 
and legitimization of immigration policy against social and cultural 
stratification. Stratification, perceived as a central negative effect 
from societal heterogenization, is commonly narrated in the data as 
being due to increased immigration and lack of control mechanisms 
for immigration. For example, the juxtaposition of national security 
and the immigrants’ rights in the preparatory material is a clear 
manifestation of such an assimilationist way to employ the civic 
solidarity narrative: 
The most fundamental aim [in the revision of the Aliens Act] 
has been to find a balanced whole where Finnish internal 
security as well as the rights of the alien residents and immi-
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grating aliens are taken into consideration. – Kari Rajamä-
ki, SD, (PTK 40/2003 vp) (b).
Although Rajamäki argues that it is possible to balance between 
national security and the rights of immigrants, it is telling that he 
presents – the ideally reconciliatory – immigration policy in terms 
of balancing act between these two opposite goals. The discussants 
do not typically explicate why and how exactly national security re-
quires compromises pertaining to immigrants’ rights and vice versa.
Instead, the discussants employing civic solidarity narratives 
tend to portray welfare solidarity as based on an idealized notion 
universalism, implying that both are threatened by the existence 
of an immigrant population, when their particular rights are being 
protected through context-sensitive policy solutions. 
The analysis of the preparatory material support this interpre-
tation, which appears in a particularly lucid form in report by the 
Finnish Institute of Migration – commissioned by the Ministry of 
Labour in 1999 and used as background material in the revision of 
the Aliens Act of 2004. In defining the term “ethnocentrism” as a 
“willingness to live without social disruptions from the outside,” 
this document bluntly states: “Finns are mostly ethnocentrists” (In-
stitute of Migration 1999). 
This underlying ethnocentrism in the Finnish polity has quite 
problematic implications for the high political debates on the Aliens 
Act, where the discussants face the challenge of presenting new pol-
icy solutions as promoting national solidarity but still compatible 
with an idealized, universalist conceptualization of welfare solidar-
ity. Indeed, when the securing of immigrants’ rights necessitates 
a revising of existing practices with immigrant-specific solutions 
in the Aliens Act, the discussants are keen to point out in explicit 
terms that the native Finns are nevertheless prioritized in the high 
political arena. This nativist way of employing the solidarity frame 
manifests particularly lucidly in the statements by right-wing MPs: 
The task of this parliament [...] is to take care of our own 
citizens. In certain situations, taking care of our own citizens 
requires that we receive [...] foreign workers [and] refugees 
[and] take care of them. It’s a part of the whole. But [...] the 
primary task is that we in this hall decide first and foremost 
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on the problems of Finnish people. – Ahti Vielma, NC (PTK 
39/2004 vp) (f ).
Some right-wing MPs further emphasize the importance of regu-
lating immigration as a common, national effort that manifests the 
state’s capabilities in the exercising popular sovereignty:  
Finland and the Finns have always the right to decide who 
and how many come here. It is our task and our right in this 
country, as the Turks in Turkey, Slovaks in Slovakia and 
Swedes in Sweden. This is a national question. – Timo Soi-
ni, PS, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (g).
Many articulations justify the value of drawing national bound-
aries in an exclusionary manner as a solidaristic pursuit, regarding it 
“only natural” to define the possible outcome of immigration policy 
from the point of view of a native Finn (e.g. Zyskowicz, NC, PTK 
39/2004 vp). Presenting their solidarity promoting role first and 
foremost as gatekeepers against the immigrant Other, the discus-
sants rarely articulate how immigration policy could generate more 
encompassing ties of solidarity among the autochthonous popula-
tion and the new Finns. 
Parliamentarians also attach themselves to the frame of national 
solidarity in less explicit ways. The fact that Finnish citizens are 
consistently referred to in the parliamentary debates simply as Finns 
(suomalainen) – a word also bearing a connotation of Finnish eth-
nicity – employs the solidarity narrative in a manner that is typical 
to countries marked by a strong public understanding on ethnic 
homogeneity. In such contexts, the notion of bridging civic solidar-
ity between citizens of a state becomes indistinguishable from the 
concept of bonding solidarity that can only develop between people 
of shared ethnicity (for a critical commentary on the Finnish per-
ception of national solidarity and ethnic homogeneity, see Lepola 
2000, 20–22). 
A similar emphasis on Finnish particularity is also conveyed 
in articulations that link notions of pride in nationally developed 
structures, the distinctiveness of other cultures and the non-nego-
tiability of existing political arrangements that are considered to 
produce national solidarity. The perceived interconnected between 
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these notions is reinforced in solidarity narratives that employ ex-
pressions such as “rules of the game of the Finnish labour market,” 
“norms of the Finnish society” or “becoming a part of the normal 
Finnish everyday life.” This is particularly true when these expres-
sions are employed in contexts where the actual policy related argu-
ment would be comprehensible even without the national attribute: 
The situation is such that when people come to Finland, they 
live in accordance to our rules. Here we celebrate Christ-
mas in kindergartens and sing Suvivirsi [a religious Finnish 
hymn] in schools. Once you take these considerations into ac-
count – without backing off and fooling around and starting 
to make demands for exceptions – then we have enough room 
in here for everyone and we can organize things. – Timo 
Soini, PS, (PTK 45/2004 vp) (oo).
A similar “Finns first” solidarity narrative runs through most of 
the other frames considered, particularly within the instrumentalist 
costs-and-gains frame. Particularly with many of the left-wing MPs, 
the exclusionary use of the civic solidarity narrative often overlaps 
with the instrumentalist narrative according to which labour im-
migration should not be encouraged out of solidarity towards the 
fellow citizens “as long as there are Finns out of work” (e.g. Rönni 
PTK 39/2004 vp). The leftist discussants also justify the control of 
immigration by articulating a cosmopolitan perspective of global 
responsibility for conceptualizing solidarity. This way of employ-
ing the solidarity narrative emphasize that many of the immigrants’ 
countries of origin suffer from brain drain, and that solidarity to-
wards these countries entails heightened control of immigration: 
[I]t is not either in the interests of Finland that we would 
coax the best work force of the small Estonia to come here, 
rather it [the work force] should be there, taking care of patri-
otic duties. – Jouko Skinnari, SD, (PTK 195/2002 vp) (h). 
There are a few more rights-oriented ways articulations where the 
solidarity narrative is employed to challenge the gatekeeper position 
often attributed to the Finnish state vis-à-vis immigrants. These ar-
ticulations are commonly presented by MPs from the left and the 
green spectrum within the parliament:
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Our welfare state facilitates equal treatment and fair society, 
which also creates security. This requires that our population 
develops towards a more international mindset […] Facing 
the recession, the differences in income are growing increas-
ingly rapidly, risking to turn security into a concept that only 
applies to a small privileged class, for whom security entails 
more police officers and security personnel, more prisons and 
barriers […] and laws that only protect us from the disadvan-
taged citizens of our own country. – Matti Kauppila, LA, 
(PTK 39/2004 vp) (pp).
These articulations, relating to civic solidarity in more universal-
ist terms, suggest that solidarity has equally important implications 
to both the autochthonous population and the new residents of Fin-
land. They present a less common, but important contrast point 
that illustrates how the typically exclusionary emphasis in the high 
political debates on immigration policy can also be challenged from 
within the civic solidarity frame.
Justifying the development of immigration policy: consen-
sual decision-making or invoking the Finnish consensus? 
The third narrative frame – “consensualism” – refers to a tradition 
of doing politics that has been considered particularly pertinent to 
Finland as a Nordic welfare state. According to this ideal, all in-
terested parties are heard in order to produce an overarching com-
promise that both facilitates and is facilitated by a encompassing 
conceptualization of national unity (Lijphart 2007, 93).  Indeed, 
the core elements of consensualism in the Finnish political culture 
– particularly the pluralist tradition of proportional power-sharing 
– are often linked in political science literature to bridging solidari-
ty functions (see, for instance, Baron, Field and Schuller 2000, 10). 
The high political debates on the Aliens Act, however, suggest that 
the actual implementation of consensualist practices is often ques-
tionable. For example, some discussants do criticize the “law of the 
land” where parliamentary committees ignore “external” dissenting 
opinions by immigrant NGO’s in the hearing process:
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The committee has also presented changes that I think are very 
well justified, but unfortunately do not appear to be accepted 
on the pages of the memorandum developed by the Admin-
istrative Committee […]. […] I do wonder if we have this 
dominant practice in which the committee issuing the mem-
orandum still does not necessarily consider the statements as 
well as we should expect. – Anne Holmlund, SD, (PTK 
39/2004 vp) (qq).
Often MPs, however, criticize such emphasis on the procedural 
considerations for securing consensual decision-making in the de-
velopment immigration policy. Some note that ignoring dissenting 
viewpoints in this process is “politics as usual” since it has taken 
place during the preparatory processes of other legislation as well 
(Pulliainen, G, PTK 39/2004). Discussants also juxtapose consen-
sualist practices with instrumental efficiency in the development if 
immigration policy: 
I said in my earlier address to the parliamentary floor that 
this issue [the suggested process for rapid turning away of ref-
ugees], and that we should not dramatize it in any way or 
give the citizens wrong signals concerning this very delicate 
issue. […] [I]t is often more important to do right things, 
rather than doing things right. – Ahti Vielma, NC, (PTK 
39/2004 vp) (rr).
While the hearing of minority members in issues concerning 
them has a certain legitimizing value, the substantial purpose for 
hearing minorities as part of the preparatory process remains un-
clear when weighted against allegedly consensual, but actually 
somewhat majoritarian practices. To the extent that the officially 
recorded minority perspectives coincide with the majority ones, the 
consensualism narratives emphasizing the practice of hearing mi-
norities does create a semblance of a multiculturally-minded ad-
ministrative process. However, when the minority views challenge 
the majority’s perspective, the consensualism narrative appears to 
be employed mainly in the justification of outcome marked by an 
assimilative, majoritarian bias. 
Indeed, while the narrative that emphasizes Finnish consensu-
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alism tends to be invoked in addresses that seek to legitimize the 
legislative process for developing policies for controlling immigra-
tion, consensualism is often asserted as a feature of the process that 
is not evaluated against the outcomes of the process. An excellent 
example of this narrative reification of consensualism can be found 
in how the Ministry of Interior defends the preparatory process of 
the Aliens Act. Legislative counsellor Jorma Kantola – the civil ser-
vant in the Ministry of Interior in charge of the preparation of the 
Act – challenges the NGOs’ critique according to which minority 
opinions were not properly acknowledged in the process:  
Some NGOs have been disappointed in the Aliens Act claim-
ing that it failed to note opinions expressed by the minorities, 
but that is not true. All statements were duly noted. But it is 
not easy to implement minority opinions when the majority 
disagrees. (Interview with the Legislative Councellor Jor-
ma Kantola from the Ministry of Interior in 5.12.2008) 
(c).
The excerpt above indicates that while the consensualism narra-
tive asserts the importance of the tradition of consensual practic-
es in decision-making, the outcome of the political process can be 
marked with a distinct majoritarian bias. This is in line with how 
the consensualism narratives are employed in the data. Even the dis-
cussants seeking to portray the development of immigration policy 
as a process that incorporates the Finnish tradition of consensual 
decision-making in its core, are at loss in terms of how to deal with 
immigrant viewpoints when they challenge dominant practices. In-
stead of forming new ways to consensually implement immigration 
policy in a more heterogenizing society, policy solutions with a dis-
tinct majoritarian bias are just presented as outcomes of a “consen-
sual” political process.  
This selective and particularist way of employing the consensu-
alism narrative in justifying new guidelines for immigration policy 
is also present in the Integration Act debates. In these debates, there 
are references to “immigrant participation,” whereby “more active 
participation and cooperation with public authorities by immi-
grants” is sanctioned in a consensual spirit (for instance, Haatainen, 
SD; Lehtomäki, C; Salo, C; PTK 195/2002 vp). However, articula-
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tions concerning how such participation could be implemented or 
enforced tend to be lacking, and the responsibility for having their 
opinions heard is often placed on immigrants themselves: 
[C]ivic and immigrant associations should be given the pos-
sibility to participate in the preparation and implementation 
of the municipal integration programme, if they so wish. – 
Lauri Kähkönen, SD, (PTK 195/2002 vp) (q). 
When some guidelines for acknowledging “immigrants’ needs” 
in immigration policy are articulated, MPs tend to emphasize that 
these needs should be acknowledged on the condition that these 
needs can be operationalized directly in accordance to the existing 
“Finnish way” of doing things:
One must remember the adage: when in Rome, do as Romans 
do, or get out Rome. In this case it means that integration 
takes place as flexibly and well, so that to the incomer learns 
the new language and finds employment and through employ-
ment the crime rates are kept in check. On the other hand, 
we should not use the Finnish taxpayers’ monies to support 
their previous culture very forcibly, considering that the fast-
er they become more Finnish, the quicker they will receive 
acceptance. […]  I think that would be, in a sense, funding 
racism. As long as they stay different, there is the danger of 
facing racism, but as soon as they become more Finnish, if 
can you such an expression, they are in a way outside of racist 
fears. They must of course be given the possibility to develop 
and cherish their own culture […]. – Pekka Vilkuna, C, 
(PTK 195/2002 vp) (ss).
The prevalence of such distinctly conditional endorsement of 
consensualism suggests that consensual power sharing is commonly 
understood in the high political arena as a narrative that can legiti-
mize developing immigration policy towards the goal of reinforcing 
existing ties of bonding solidarity among Finns – and those immi-
grants who become “Finn-like” enough to be accepted.
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Immigration policy as the grounds  
for enhancing the core competences of the welfare state
The fourth frame – “statism” – incorporates narratives that empha-
size the role of the state as a potent actor capable of governing, ad-
ministering and regulating a wide range of areas of civic life through 
policy solutions. These narratives seek to justify the development of 
immigration policy as part of the responsibilities that must be re-
garded as competences of an internally strong and legitimate Finn-
ish state. This way of articulating the state’s role vis-à-vis its citizens 
emphasizes the welfare state’s overarching responsibility for devel-
oping the civil society. This responsibility is articulated most com-
monly through two statist narratives of welfare state idealization: 
the preservation of “civic morals” and national unity of the citizens 
through universalist implementation of social policy, on the one 
hand, and paternalist interventions through immigration policy, on 
the other.12
In the parliamentary debates on the Aliens Act, statist narratives 
are commonly employed by the left wing MPs in conjunction to 
work related considerations for immigration policy. The discussants 
commonly establish a clear division between the orderly Finnish 
working life and the “wild, grey” economy that is attributed to the 
immigration of a foreign workforce: 
It is very important to act against the grey economy, because 
if it is allowed to grow [...] it almost inevitably erodes Finnish 
working morals, Finnish ethics, our conduct. This particu-
larly high ethics, that taxes are paid and fines are paid [...] 
has, after all, been born in the course of hundreds of years. 
This kind of moral ethics can also weaken relatively quickly 
if space is given. – Kari Uotila, LA, (PTK 16/2004 vp) (l).
In these narratives, the necessity for the state interventions 
through immigration policy is often justified with reference to the 
12 It must be noted that the emphasis on the necessity of state interventions employed 
in the statist narratives is not particular to the debates on Finnish immigration policy 
per se, but are rather considered to belong in the core operating modes of the Nordic 
variant of universalist welfare state, sometimes portrayed as the “People’s Home” (Es-
ping-Andersen 1990, 67–69).
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disruptive effects the labour migration is considered to carry as ex-
emplified in Matti Kangas’ (LA) illustrative assertion: 
ungoverned immigration messes up the labour market (PTK 
40/2003 vp) (m). 
Kangas’ argument attributes disruptions within the labour mar-
ket to immigration. His choice of verb [“sotkea”: to mess up, literal-
ly: “to stain”] carries a connotation to dirt thus linking immigration 
to impurity that he implicitly juxtaposes with the orderly Finnish 
society (for closer examination of the narrative linking of “dirty-
ness” to “disorder,” see Douglas 1994, 161–162). The emphasis on 
the state’s responsibility to control immigration is, however, more 
commonly justified in statist narratives with articulations that re-
fer to the exploitative practices against the immigrant labour force 
by the Finnish employers. According to many discussants, immi-
gration policy must include policies that specifically protect immi-
grants from exploitation (Laakso, LA, PTK 40/2003 vp).   
This paternalist rationale for state interventions is also exempli-
fied in the motion by Esko-Juhani Tennilä (LA) that sought to alter 
the governmental bill on the Aliens Act. According to Tennilä’s mo-
tion (which was eventually ruled against by the Administrative par-
liamentary committee), in labour disputes where a foreign citizen 
is a party, the state capabilities to intervene should be expanded by 
effectually allocating minor complainant offences against the immi-
grations under public prosecution by furnishing the labour market 
organizations with the right to sue (LA 163/2003 vp).
It is worth noting that here Tennilä argues for corporative rep-
resentation of immigrants in courts instead of a legally protected 
right for the immigrants to seek legal counsel from the said orga-
nizations. Indeed, the rationale of many of the statist narratives on 
immigration policy is to help immigrants to integrate by first and 
foremost having the judicial system “taking care” of them – even if 
such policy undermines immigrants’ own agency and might make 
it riskier for corporations to hire foreign labour in comparison to 
native workers. This way of employing the statist narrative frame 
suggests that the expansion of paternalist state control can be legit-
imated by implementing the heightened measures of regulation and 
documentation exclusively to the immigrant population:
81
4: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF EXCLUSIONARY WELFARE SOLIDARITY
IN THE HIGH POLITICAL ARENA PRIOR TO THE RISE OF NEO-POPULISM
The monitoring [of the working conditions of immigrant 
workers] cannot be made encompassing unless the register of 
foreign persons in Finland also includes the working condi-
tions of those foreigners, who are not required to have em-
ployee’s residence permit. – Jukka Gustafsson, SD, (PTK 
39/2004 vp) (tt).
The statist narratives often emphasize the state’s role in taking 
care of immigrants as a reason for the state to develop practices for 
monitoring the immigrants’ own activity in the integration process 
more carefully:
In the memorandum by the committee, it is stated that in-
tegration programme should be something like tray for the 
immigrant, from which he may choose suitable items. The 
Perussuomalaiset thinks that the immigrant must be respec-
tively compelled to eat from that tray, meaning that he must 
include a large enough selection of integration measures in his 
programme. […] The authorities’ responsibility is to enforce 
that the immigrant follows his programme. We think that the 
best measure for enforcement and direction in this case is to 
appoint a personal supervisor for each immigrant who starts 
his integration programme. – Raimo Visbacka, PS, (PTK 
195/2002 vp) (uu).
The rationale for “taking care of the immigrants” that runs 
through the statist narrative frame is also commonly linked to 
considerations for national solidarity – presented as precarious and 
threatened by the lack of proper mechanisms for immigration con-
trol that deprives ethnic Finns of employment: 
The case of strawberry pickers illustrates that [immigrants’] 
working conditions cannot be enforced […]. This is why I 
think we should […] first get jobs for Finns. – Esa Lahtela, 
SD, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (vv).
The issue of national solidarity is also employed within the statist 
narratives by MPs, who propose increased control of immigration 
and monitoring of foreigners within the country as means to oppose 
the “sickness of racism” (Tiusanen, LA, PTK 99/2003 vp). The ad-
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dresses concerned with racism, analyzed in our earlier article, pres-
ent foreign labour force and groundless asylum seekers as a hazard 
for the Finnish society. In an extreme depiction below, an MP even 
links domestic violence and the management of foreigner policy. 
Again, the state is called to act and to manage immigration in order 
to guard the well-being – the morals as well as material security – of 
Finns.
[I]f we can handle this foreigner policy right, it will also ef-
fectively prevent the furthering of racism, which already now 
smoulders [...] kind of hidden in many places and in people’s 
minds, but doesn’t manifest itself. We [the Finns] are the kind 
of people that we grouse and grouse and then go behind the 
house and give the wife and the kids a caning, and talk like 
‘I would have wanted to say it in the meeting and I should 
have told those people home truths for once’, but as one doesn’t 
dare to say, they go behind the house and do that [the caning]. 
[...] [W]hen racism really breaks out, like it did in Joensuu, 
it was indeed because too many folk [foreigners] pack in one 
place and people [Finns] feel they are now in an unequal po-
sition. – Tero Rönni, SD, (PTK 39/2004 vp) (n).
It is argued or feared that “the people” (Finns) cannot accept the 
public spending on the asylum system in which many applicants 
are not eligible (but “ungrounded”), and/or that “the people” can-
not accept being offered lower pay as a result from the “dumping” 
of wages due to unfair foreign competition. The statist narrative 
is repeatedly employed in this way in the parliamentary debates, 
suggesting that without proper expansion of state control over im-
migration, the autochthonous citizens are likely develop undesired 
racist attitudes and resentment towards all foreigners, including the 
“innocent ones”.13 
13 With different emphases and angles in: Karhu PTK 39/2004 vp, Kangas PTK 
40/2003 vp, Lahtela, E. PTK 39/2004 vp, Peltomo PTK 40/2003 vp, Salo PTK 39/2004 
vp, Satonen PTK 39/2004 vp, Soini PTK 45/2004 vp, Tennilä PTK 45/2004 vp, Ra-
jamäki 39/2004 vp.
83
4: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF EXCLUSIONARY WELFARE SOLIDARITY
IN THE HIGH POLITICAL ARENA PRIOR TO THE RISE OF NEO-POPULISM
Consolidation of Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Welfare 
Solidarity in the High Political Arena
In this chapter I have examined how debates on immigration policy 
within high political arenas employ narratives that reproduce na-
tionalist and exclusionary conceptualizations of welfare solidarity. 
Analyzing these debates that took place during the early years of 
2000s, serves to contextualize the subsequent analyses (in chapters 
5 and 6) that address the rapid growth in political fortunes of Finn-
ish right-wing populism later in to the 2000s. In their mobilization 
narratives, the welfare nationalist “immigration critics” make ex-
tensive use of this nationally particularist way of understanding of 
welfare solidarity – one that is rooted deeply in the Finnish political 
culture as exemplified in this chapter. In the following, I summarize 
the key findings in this chapter, illustrating the interplay between 
instrumentalist, civic solidarity, consensualist and statist narratives 
within the Finnish high political debate on immigration. 
One of the most striking general findings in the material is that 
in the parliament and in the ministries, immigration policy is most 
commonly discussed in conjunction to the concern for “our Finn-
ish” welfare state in a manner that presents immigration as an exter-
nal threat to the state’s ability to maintaining requisite levels welfare 
solidarity. The discussants within the high political arena common-
ly present immigration as a potentially heterogenizing and divisive 
challenge to welfare state and civic solidarity, but only rarely refer to 
any “internal” (i.e. non-immigration related) dynamics within the 
civil society that might contribute to these challenges. By framing 
the erosion of welfare solidarity as an external ailment to the welfare 
state, the discussants emphasize the importance of welfare nation-
alist immigration policy as a crucial means for responding to this, 
allegedly immigration-induced challenge to the welfare state. 
In order to emphasize the narrative reproduction of the welfare 
nationalist discourse of “immigration as threat to welfare state,” it 
is useful to contrast the seemingly quantitative calculus in the core 
of the instrumentalist narratives with the demographic impact of 
immigration. Even though during the Aliens Act debates Finland 
received immigrants less than any other EU-15 country (save Lux-
emburg) (United Nations 2006), instrumentalist narratives consis-
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tently refer to “limited resources” and “items of expenditure” to 
underline the significance of immigration to the Finnish welfare 
state. It should be noted here, that this is not only a question of the 
Finnish MPs being explicitly against immigration. Rather, even the 
pro-immigration addresses to the parliament present immigration 
as the kind of source of human resources that, if adequately tapped 
by policy solutions, can resolve many of the challenges the wel-
fare state is facing. In this way, the MPs present the future of the 
Finnish welfare state as ultimately depending on how immigration 
is managed, thereby also contributing to the increased saliency of 
questions of immigration in the high political agenda in Finland.
The instrumentalist narratives that put “the immigration ques-
tion” into such an elevated position in the Finnish politics often 
emphasize a statist approach to the management of immigration, 
suggesting that immigration related challenges must be resolved, 
first and foremost, through state coordinated interventions. One of 
the most important outcomes of referring to immigration politics 
as the cornerstone of responsible development of the welfare state 
is that the saliency of all kinds of political considerations can be 
emphasized by linking them to immigration. For example, several 
Social Democrat and Left Alliance MPs argue that allowing trade 
unions to represent individual immigrant workers in courts is an ef-
ficient strategy for combatting racism by preventing the exploitation 
of the migrant workforce, because their exploitation causes resent-
ment against immigrants by undermines the working conditions of 
Finnish workers. Notwithstanding the advantages of preventing ex-
ploitation in the labour markets through immigration policy, these 
statist narratives clearly employ the esteemed positioning of immi-
gration in the political agenda in their attempts to justify increasing 
the state’s role in the control of the labour markets. 
It is interesting that while the role of the state and the national 
context are becoming less pertinent in the actual process of im-
migrant integration – especially in comparison to the local and 
regional level practices of integration (Caponio and Borkert 2010, 
9) – articulations of how the state should manage the increase in 
the allegedly immigration-induced societal heterogeneity appear 
to proliferate within the high political debates analyzed. Indeed, 
this emphasis on the state’s competences in the management of 
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immigration on the national level is common in countries with a 
long-standing self-understanding as welfare societies that face new 
serious macro-level challenges, as is particularly the case with the 
Nordic countries (Hemerijk 2002, 184–185).
Some of the reasons behind this discontinuity between the ac-
tual policy-level practices and the national level emphasis in high 
political narratives can be addressed by looking into the arguments 
belonging to the “civic solidarity” and “consensualism” narrative 
frames. First of all, more explicitly than in any of the other of the 
frames analyzed, the discussants employing civic solidarity narra-
tives refer to “Finnish internal security” and “solidarity” when de-
bating immigration. Right-wing MPs are particularly keen to un-
derline that the task of the parliament is “to take care of our own 
citizens,” and that in terms of immigration control, this means that 
“Finns always have the right to decide who and how many come 
here.” While the narratives within the instrumentalist frame, in and 
of themselves, emphasize the material implications of immigration, 
the civic solidarity narratives suggest that the most acute of the sup-
posedly immigration-related challenges to the welfare state are first 
and foremost symbolic ones, and that this symbolic threat may then 
manifest as social problems. For example, discussants addressing 
the projected social challenges of immigration commonly maintain 
that in order to legitimate the aims of immigration policy to the 
autochthonous Finns, the development of policy solutions must pri-
oritize the production of national solidarity. 
This suggests that what is being debated during the formative 
years of Finnish immigration politics is often not the solutions to 
the demographic impact of immigration per se. Instead, with the 
exception of explicit articulations of costs and gains employed in 
instrumentalist narratives, much of the high political welfare na-
tionalist narratives emphasize the symbolic dimension of national 
unity and its allegedly immigration-induced challenges. Such a fo-
cus can also be partly attributed to the limited demographic impact 
of immigration. After all, comparatively speaking there are not re-
ally that many concrete and acute problems to be solved that relate 
to volume of immigration. Rather than developing narratives for 
localized and decentralized policy solutions that address particular 
86
THE TRUE COLORS OF FINNISH WELFARE NATIONALISM
immigration-related problems, the discussants tend to focus on de-
veloping justificatory narratives for legitimizing an abstract, nation-
ally particularistic approach to immigration. 
The “Finnishness” in the way of relating to immigration in the 
high political arena is also reflected in the arguments that belong 
in the consensualist narrative frame. Discussants seek to legitimize 
the development of mechanisms for controlling immigration by re-
ferring to the Finnish tradition of strong power-sharing and ma-
jority-restricting discourses in the core of “our” political culture. 
Indeed, the consensualism narratives commonly present the heavy 
preparatory process, particularly the extensive hearing of minority 
NGOs, as the evidence of the procedural fairness in the develop-
ment of the Aliens Act. However, the analysis of the preparatory 
material suggests that the participation of immigrant organizations 
is evaluated by the Ministry of Interior solely on a procedural basis, 
rather than comparing the outcome of the draft bill with the mi-
nority opinions expressed during the hearing process. The most lu-
cid manifestation of the majoritarian reality behind the consensual 
narratives can be found where the Ministry of Interior defends the 
modest presence of immigrant viewpoints in the bill on the grounds 
that “it is not easy to implement minority opinions when the major-
ity disagrees.” As such, the consensualist narratives employed in the 
development of the Aliens Act manifest as narratives for justifying 
the legislative procedure that is nevertheless based on an ostensibly 
Finnish consensus on how immigration should be managed “in our 
country”. 
Overall, in the high political debates on immigration politics 
seem to consist, first and foremost, of negotiations aiming to devel-
op a Finnish national regime of immigration – presented as an in-
stitutionalized, legal stance towards the immigrants through which 
the Finnish welfare solidarity can be defended against the heterog-
enizing challenges. Herein lies the central blue-and-white paradox 
with boundary-drawing narratives that consistently frame articula-
tions of immigration management. On the one hand, solidarity is 
perceived as a naturally pre-existing condition of the Finnish civil 
society. On the other hand, though, the national welfare solidarity 
is presented as requiring support from the state in the form of an 
officially articulated legislative regime through which the welfare 
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state can alleviate the supposedly solidarity-eroding impact of the 
supposedly immigration-induced increase in heterogeneity. 
This zero-sum approach to the reproduction of welfare solidarity 
in the Finnish high political immigration debates contributed to a 
highly particularistic public understanding of national unity and its 
immigration-related challenges. The findings in this chapter support 
the decision to build the analytical narrative of this dissertation on 
the data collected from the high political arena. Having exemplified 
in this chapter how exclusionary articulations of welfare solidarity 
were employed in the high political debates on immigration in the 
early 2000s, it is possible to foreshadow how the common welfare 
nationalist political discourse became available to be operational-
ized the neo-populist narratives of political mobilization in main-
stream publicity. In short, this chapter has developed the argument 
that the rationale for heightened immigration control was first jus-
tified in high political narratives that were built on the concern 
for “our” welfare state. In the next chapter, the welfare nationalist 
rhetoric within the esteemed high political arenas can be treated as 
an attitudinal seedbed on which neo-populist advocates of welfare 
nationalism were able to base their political agenda and successful 
mobilization narratives towards end of the first decade of the 2000s.
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5 
  
The Neo-Populis t  Break through  
and the Mainst reaming of  the  
Blue-and-White  Poli t ica l  Agenda  
of  Welfare  Nat ionalism14
Neo-populist political mobilization and the rapidly rising public 
support for the anti-immigration oriented political agenda became 
a particularly salient and heatedly debated topic in the Finnish and 
Swedish mainstream media after the electoral victories of the Perus-
suomalaiset party (PS) in 2008 and 2011 and Sverigedemokraterna 
party (SD) in 2010 (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009b, 7; Hannula 
2011, 179–185). Towards the end of the first decade of 2000s, public 
debate grew ripe with contestation between neo-populist advocates 
and other public discussants concerning the reasons behind the suc-
cess of populist anti-immigration political agenda. Editorials, blogs 
and letters to the editor have referred to the electoral victories of 
the two parties with a great variety of expressions, among others as 
“redneck elections” (Kononen 2011), “manifestation of resentment 
towards upper classes” and “the end of consensus” (Räty 2011), 
“victory of democracy” (Helsingin Sanomat 2011b), “the yeast that 
14 This chapter is based on a peer-reviewed research article ‘This welfare of ours’: Jus-
tifying public advocacy for anti-immigration politics in Finland during the late 2000’s 
(Pyrhönen 2013).
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brings the spirit back to politics” (Helsingin Sanomat 2008), a de-
velopment that “could have been avoided through a more open pub-
lic debate” (Neuding and Lundberg 2010), and brought about by 
“the myth of immigration debate being a taboo” (Tydén 2010). 
What such interpretations in the mainstream media have in 
common, is that they attribute the electoral result – the increased 
support for populist parties – to various latent, macro-level phe-
nomena; resentment, erosion of political consensus or problems in 
how the public debate functions. It was far less common to encoun-
ter accounts that focus on the agency side and emphasize on what 
the parties and the people affiliated to them actually said or did in 
order to facilitate the manifold increase in electoral support. 
Also regarding the recent academic approaches to anti-immi-
gration advocacy, much of the literature has been looking into the 
demand side15 of the phenomenon, fleshing out how factors such as 
the social psychology of xenophobia and the societal macro-level 
developments – most importantly globalization and work-related 
precariousness – facilitate public anti-immigration advocacy (see, 
for example, Crepaz 2006; Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a; Hi-
manen and Könönen 2010; Koivunen and Lehtonen 2011). Another 
branch of relevant academic literature focuses on the mechanisms 
through which public media exposure facilitates the electoral suc-
cess of right-wing populist parties that commonly advocate anti-im-
migration policies on their agendas (Mazzoleni, Stewart and Hors-
field 2003; Ellinas 2010; Horsti and Nikunen 2013). In the Finnish 
context, Mari Maasilta (2012) conducted an interesting study that 
indicates how immigration-related topics are channelled from tra-
ditional types of media to social media and vice versa during the 
Finnish parliamentary elections of 2011.
Even so, the agency-oriented supply side – that is, what various 
anti-immigration actors do and say in concrete and empirical terms 
15 Here I refer to the Muddean typology (briefly discussed in the 2.2) that divides 
approaches seeking to explain the support for European populist radical right parties 
into supply and demand approaches. The demand side approaches focus more on the 
macro level societal features that render the potential electorates favorable to the po-
pulist political agenda. The supply side approaches, on the other hand, focus on how 
the parties themselves construct and make use of various “background phenomena,” 
effectively converting a potential for support to actual support (see Mudde 2007, 201, 
232, 256).
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in order to actualize the potential for popular support – has been 
somewhat less studied. Cas Mudde has extensively researched pop-
ulist radical right parties in Europe in the late 1900’s (2003; 2007; 
2010), and Antonis Ellinas has studied how differences in party or-
ganization help to explain why some populist parties “survive their 
initial electoral breakthroughs while others collapse” (2009). These 
agency-informed studies of anti-immigration parties are invaluable, 
but unfortunately do not include the Nordic countries or assess the 
implications of a welfare state context for party behaviour. In her 
Master’s thesis, Johanna Ryan-Kraujale (2010) assesses how Finnish 
online discussants construct their anti-immigrant arguments, but 
without a particular focus on how the advocacy for anti-immigra-
tion politics is being justified. Most recently, Milla Hannula (2011) 
has studied how anti-immigration advocates themselves perceive the 
change in the attitudinal climate and the increased presence of an-
ti-immigration arguments in the public debate. 
Rather than assessing the reasons behind the public demand for 
introducing anti-immigration issues on the political agenda, this 
chapter focuses on the narratives through which neo-populist ad-
vocates present themselves and their welfare nationalist political 
agenda in various arenas of public debate. To that end, this chapter 
analyzes how the advocacy for anti-immigration politics – highly 
pertinent in both the PS and SD political agendas – is narrated for 
mainstream audiences during the period between the elections of 
2008 and 2011 that marked to rapid increase of neo-populist polit-
ical fortunes in Finland (see graph 1 next page).
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Graph 1. Support for the leading right-wing populist party  
in parliamentary elections in the Nordic EU countries.
The process of “mainstreaming” analyzed here signifies, first-
ly, to the change in Finnish political climate brought about by the 
neo-populists’ ability to secure salient coverage in the mainstream 
media, a historical development that can be roughly traced back to 
the four-year period between the campaigning for the municipal 
elections of 2008 and the aftermath of the parliamentary elections 
of 2011. Secondly, and more importantly for the purposes of this 
analysis, “mainstreaming” also refers to the shift in the political 
rhetoric through which the neo-populists sought to distance them-
selves from the public critique of xenophobia and radicalism by nar-
rating their political agenda in welfare nationalist terms, thereby 
reaching for new, increasingly middle class constituencies. 
Analyzing the mainstreaming of the neo-populist mobilization 
narratives entails, firstly, an empirical assessment of how the necessi-
ty of anti-immigration politics is narrated in a welfare state context 
by presenting neo-populist advocacy as benign political activism 
based on mundane political concerns for social policy and the eco-
nomic sustainability of redistributive welfare mechanisms. Second-
ly, the analysis elucidates how the justificatory narratives, building 
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on the notion of necessity, seek to decouple neo-populist advocacy 
for anti-immigration policies from the public critique of xenophobia 
which might otherwise undermine the broader social acceptability 
of neo-populist politics.
These research aims will be met in this chapter through analyses 
of two sets of empirical data16 that illustrate how anti-immigration 
elements in the neo-populist political agenda are embedded in – and 
justified by – welfare nationalist narratives that focus on questions 
of social policy and welfare economy. In accordance to the analyt-
ical narrative of this dissertation that advances from more formal 
arenas of public debate to less formal arenas, the first set of data to 
be analyzed here is collected from two electoral programmes17 of the 
Perussuomalaiset party (for 2008 and 2011 elections) and the pro-
gramme for 2010 parliamentary elections by its Swedish neo-pop-
ulist counterpart, the Sverigedemokraterna party (SD). While this 
analysis is not a full-fledged comparative study, using the SD pro-
gramme as a point of contrast helps to highlight the crucial role that 
the questions of welfare economy and social policy – mostly lacking 
in the SD programme – play in the Finnish, welfare nationalist vari-
ant of neo-populism. 
The analysis of the electoral programmes is complemented by 
the analysis of the second data set in which the focus is shifted 
from the party political agency to the grassroots level neo-populism 
in the online discussion boards of Helsingin Sanomat (HS), Fin-
land’s largest newspaper. Rather than looking at the predominately 
anti-immigration activists’ blogs and fora where important debates 
were also conducted during the period of 2008 to 2011,18 this set 
16 A more detailed presentation of the data sets, the collection of the data and the 
methodology of rhetorical discourse analysis employed here can be found in the chap-
ter 3.
17 The PS refers to its manifestos as “programmes,” while the SD calls the document 
a “contract”. Considering that the focus of this paper is on the PS, I refer to the ma-
nifestos by both parties as “programmes” as a compromise between maintaining the 
integrity of the primary sources and having the text as fluent as possible. 
18 As a result of this delineation of focus, several anti-immigration blogs and pam-
phlets that have received significant media coverage – such as Jussi Halla-aho’s Scripta, 
Nuiva vaalimanifesti and Hommaforum – are not assessed here. This variety of more 
radical anti-immigration activism, however, has been studied elsewhere with varying 
emphases (Puuronen 2001; Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 2009a; Förbom 2010; Hannula 
2011; Puuronen 2011; Horsti and Nikunen 2013).
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of data consists of public narratives aimed at wider audiences. This 
makes it possible to focus the grassroots level narrative analysis on 
the process of mainstreaming in a manner similar to the analysis of 
the electoral programmes.  
Both analyses employ the methodology of rhetorical discourse 
analysis. In addition to being informed by the analytical lens of na-
tionalist boundary-drawing that guided much of the analysis in the 
fourth chapter, this chapter also makes extensive use of the welfare 
state idealization lens. This makes it possible to answer the research 
questions pertaining to the operationalization of the idealized leg-
acy of the blue-and-white welfare state in narratives seeking to jus-
tify the support for exclusionary boundary-drawing. The analysis 
of grassroots debate data is further informed by the third analyti-
cal lens, strategic neo-populist social action, shedding light to the re-
search questions concerning the neo-populist advocates’ endeavors 
to emerge as a resonant collective identity.
The analyses lead to a concluding discussion that evaluates the 
implications that emergence of welfare nationalist narratives in the 
mainstream publicity may have for the public understanding of the 
raison d’être for the welfare state at large. The discussion also con-
siders the avenues for opening a meaningful political debate with 
welfare nationalist neo-populists, who base their advocacy on the 
conviction that their arguments are based on a sound economic as-
sessment of the welfare economy and social policy, and attribute any 
and all racism, xenophobia and ethnocentrism only to ‘extremists’.
Justifying Anti-Immigration Policies with Welfare  
Nationalist Narratives in Neo-Populist Electoral Programmes 
Considering that the period between 2008 and 2011 marked the 
steepest rise in the electoral success of the Perussuomalaiset party 
– the most rapidly growing Nordic political party in decades – it is 
important to complement structural explanations of these victories 
by assessing the role of the neo-populist agency in their political 
success. In the previous chapters, I have sketched a picture of the 
Finnish pre-populist political climate as a fertile ground or seedbed 
for the neo-populist emergence as a major political force to be reck-
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oned with. This chapter continues by analyzing the public narratives 
with which the neo-populists capitalized on this fertile ground by 
operationalizing mainstreamed welfare nationalist narratives, facili-
tating political saliency and social acceptability needed for mobiliz-
ing new constituencies behind neo-populist politics. 
Before presenting the results from the empirical analysis, it is 
important to note how much the format varies between the three 
documents analyzed. The PS programme for the 2008 municipal 
election totals 21 pages and the programme for the 2011 parliamen-
tary elections incorporates 69 pages – being far more verbose than 
any other electoral programme in the Finnish 2011 parliamentary 
elections. The SD programme for the 2010 parliamentary elections 
– used as a point of contrast to highlight the heavy focus on welfare 
economy in the PS programme – presents the immigration-pertinent 
problems and their remedies within the confines of seven pages and 
largely in a bullet-point format, constructing its boundary-drawing 
and welfare state idealizing narratives on a significantly higher ab-
straction level. Thus, even though a direct comparison of these docu-
ments is less fruitful an endeavor, it is important to illustrate how the 
PS elaborates on the concerns for financing welfare policies as the 
justification for its anti-immigration focus, while the SD relies on 
abstract, nativist articulations of its ethnocentric political agenda. 
The following analysis is structured by an inductive content 
analysis of the electoral programme data, making it possible to fo-
cus the analysis on three themes that are most commonly discussed 
by the neo-populists in conjunction with questions of immigration. 
Structuring the analysis around these themes – the labour markets, 
refugees and national identity – also reflects the discursive choices 
the parties employ in their programmes in order to construct and 
emphasize the immigration-related competences of the welfare state 
and persuade their imagined audiences of their validity.
Mitigating the perceived impact of migrant labour force 
and unemployment on the domestic labour markets
Controlling working life has typically ranked highly in contempo-
rary welfare policy agendas (Hemerijk 2002, 195), and both the SD 
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and the PS are keen to refer to working conditions in their critique 
toward existing immigration policy. In their 2008 programme, the 
PS discusses the issue of the foreign workforce within the care sector 
under the subheading “For the Nordic welfare state” (Perussuoma-
laiset rp. 2008, 12. All translations are by the author (NP).). They 
argue that in the long run, importing inexpensive labour “endangers 
the education of our own youth as well as their possibilities to be 
employed with the wage required to cover Finnish living expenses”. 
Here the welfare nationalist anti-immigration message is conveyed 
to an autochthonous blue-collar worker “of ours,” juxtaposing the 
images of an undeserving alien and the image of a poor but deserv-
ing Finn, with the latter having an obvious claim to “our” welfare. 
A person in this category is implied to have much to gain econom-
ically from the regulation of labour that the PS portrays as a core 
competence of the welfare state.  
This kind of narrative seeks to appeal to the blue-collar constit-
uencies with an explicit reference to the economic benefits of labour 
regulation. In order to reach middle class audiences, the anti-im-
migration narratives rely on the rhetoric that attributes both moral 
and economic value for the maintenance of the “willingness to pay 
taxes”. This willingness is presented as threatened by, for example, 
“ethnically based operations” “endorsed by the parties in power” 
that serve to promote the “mass migration” of the labour force – a 
practice that is considered to “increasingly diminish the welfare re-
distributions to our families” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2008, 5).
In the 2011 programme, the PS steered away from potentially 
divisive labour market issues, such as the immigration of foreign 
work force.  Instead, the programme makes several references to 
“non-labour oriented immigration” within the welfare frame, con-
structing it as “abuse of the welfare system.” The programme fur-
ther explicates: “Non-labour oriented immigration will cost a lot 
for Finland.” Distinctions between the categories of asylum-seeker 
and immigrant are downplayed in the narrative that concludes that 
the burden of non-labour oriented migration can be alleviated by 
“handling applications for asylum rapidly and efficiently, in order 
to save public funds” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 42). The amount 
of public funds that can be saved is carefully left unmentioned, 
an instance of a pseudo-quantifying rhetoric (Jokinen, Juhila and 
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Suoninen 1999, 146), in which the actual quantifications are only 
implied to and the narrative of prudent spending is left for the au-
dience to fulfil. 
Actual labour migration is mentioned only once in the 2011 pro-
gramme and, contrary to the 2008 programme, no moral hierar-
chies between the autochthonous Finns and foreign labour force 
are explicated in conjunction with it. Rather, the whole issue is only 
discussed in terms of the potential economic loss to the welfare state 
because of illegal workers: “The Perussuomalaiset does not think 
that we should accept the kind of labour migration to Finland that 
involves breaches of Finnish labour regulation or where taxes are 
not paid to Finland” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 40). The assertion 
that it is immigration that creates these illegal working practices is 
both the point of departure and conclusion by the PS, and is thus 
constructed as a fact that needs no further discussion. The prob-
lem in the allegedly ongoing acceptance of these illegal practices is 
emphasized by referring to the potential benefits in avoiding them 
in explicitly economic terms: “Eradicating the grey economy will 
allow society to recoup a multifold amount of the costs involved” 
(Ibid.). This justificatory narrative idealizes the state’s capabilities 
to provide welfare by postulating the immigration as the source of 
grey economy and the severe drain of “our monies.” The narrative 
is also built on a vague quantification of economic benefits – rein-
forced with the evocative expression “multifold” – with the purpose 
of presenting the regulation of immigration as a socially acceptable 
political agenda; not xenophobic or racist (van Dijk 1992, 94), but 
only motivated by a firm pro-welfare state stance.
The SD begins its programme by defining itself as a “Swe-
den-friendly” party and continues directly to the issues of labour. 
They demand “stricter regulation for labour immigration” because, 
as they mention in the lead: “In our Sweden, each Swedish wage 
earner can feel safe with their interests being the top priority” 
(Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 2). This formulation, taken together as 
a whole, bears some resemblance to the earlier PS programme in the 
sense that it seems to address the blue-collar workers whose interests 
are suggested to be challenged by labour migration. The nativist 
frame of justification, however, allows no additional resource with 
which to appeal to middle class taxpayers, and the only economic 
97
5: THE NEO-POPULIST BREAKTHROUGH AND THE MAINSTREAMING 
OF THE BLUE-AND-WHITE POLITICAL AGENDA OF WELFARE NATIONALISM
justification for stricter labour market regulation is the privileged 
position given to each individual Swedish wage earner, rather than 
any reference to welfare economy. 
Even though various welfare economic justifications for the an-
ti-immigration stance were given in both of the PS programmes, no 
justification transcending the immediate economic benefit to the 
“Swedish wage earner” is postulated or any reference is made to the 
welfare state in the SD programme. Unlike the PS’s programme, 
the SD’s approach to labour in their electoral programme appears to 
corroborate with the prevailing consensus in the current research of 
political science, according to which economy for right-wing pop-
ulists an instrumental means to a nationalist core ideology (Mudde 
2007, 119–120).
The management of refugees and the national  
responsibility for the victims of global inequality
While both PS and SD discuss questions related to asylum seekers 
in their programmes, their approaches diverge significantly when 
touching upon the issues of human suffering and welfare redistri-
bution in immigrants’ countries of origin. The SD, in demanding 
“responsible immigration politics,” qualifies this demand with the 
juxtaposition of Swedish welfare and help to others: “Our Sweden 
helps people in distress, but Swedish welfare and prosperity must 
come first” (Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4). What is notable in the 
SD narrative – prioritizing the promotion of welfare among eth-
nic Swedes over addressing immigrants’ needs – is that it does not 
employ any economic rationale in order to justify the juxtaposition 
between the two groups. Quite the contrary, in the programme SD 
goes as far as to advocate for “heightened support for the world’s 
millions of refugees through a multifold increase in the funds for 
the UNHCR” (Ibid.). Such argumentation positions the SD as an 
unselfish actor whose arguments for regulating immigration are not 
justified in terms of potential savings in public spending. Instead, 
the notion that controlling immigration promotes “Swedish pros-
perity” – even if it means greatly increasing UNHCR spending – 
suggests that the central justificatory narrative for anti-immigration 
98
THE TRUE COLORS OF FINNISH WELFARE NATIONALISM
elements in the SD’s political agenda is based on cultural, rather 
than economic considerations. 
One of the few significant similarities between the PS and the 
SD positions on granting asylum is that both advocate addressing 
refugees’ distress with policies implemented outside the receiving 
country. However, in 2008 the PS programme qualifies this posi-
tion by constructing the economic “fact” that a border closing an-
ti-immigration policy can be justified in terms of the practical and 
efficient allocation of economic resources: “The Perussuomalaiset 
thinks that it would be wiser if the state promoted the safety [of ref-
ugees] closer to their countries of origin, where using less economic 
resources would likely result in an equally good or even better out-
come” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2008, 19). 
In the 2011 programme, the PS takes a greater step away from 
the spending on supra-national bodies that the SD promotes. The 
programme’s focus on welfare economy is emphasized in the nar-
rative that constructs the EU as the common enemy that seeks to 
overburden the Finnish economy with asylum seekers: “The EU 
would likely want to increase the number of refugees and migrants 
taken into Finland […] Finland must not participate in the shar-
ing of this burden.” This welfare nationalist, economyemphasizing 
narrative for justifying measures of immigration control is further 
invoked with regard to the question of refugee quotas: “The amount 
of quota refugees must be adjusted with regard to the general eco-
nomic development. If public spending and services are cut, refugee 
quotas must be cut as well” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 42). The 
role of PS as an actor actively seeking to regulate immigration is 
forcefully downplayed in the passage that justifies the opposition 
to immigration through an instrumentalist narrative of economic 
necessity. According to this narrative, the idealized welfare state can 
mitigate the impact that an economic recession imposes on welfare 
services simply by lowering the refugee quotas. No calculations or 
estimations are, however, given to support this interpretation that 
emphasizes the magnitude of the economic impact that refugee 
quota can exact on public spending. 
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Reproducing national identity and exclusionary  
welfare solidarity through immigration policy 
The SD programme employs a nativist narrative that emphasizes the 
cultural dimensions in the Swedish welfare system, but makes no 
references to welfare economy in narrating the party’s position on 
national identity. Instead, the programme constructs a homogenic 
“Swedish society” as being challenged by refugees and other immi-
grants alike: “Immigrants must adjust to Swedish society and not 
vice versa” (Sverigedemokraterna 2010, 4). The SD’s investment in 
the Swedish identity, culture or lifestyle is repeatedly narrated as an 
inherent value to be protected: “In our Sweden, the Swedish cultur-
al heritage, the people’s home is built on a common value base and 
the Swedes right to develop their culture as they see fit is protected.” 
In a similar vein – apart from the single reference to “ending the free 
health and dental health care of illegal immigrants” – their rhetoric 
established no links to financing the welfare state or its social policy 
in formulating their anti-immigration policies (Ibid.).
On the PS political agenda, too, national identity is held in very 
high esteem and both of the programmes argue in several contexts 
for the importance of protecting “a Finnish unity and communality.” 
However, most commonly these values are presented as instrumen-
tal to the preservation of the welfare state, instead of being justified 
in exclusively nativist or cultural terms or presented as normative 
ideals sprouting from an idealized notion of Finnishness. Instead, 
the anti-immigration oriented remedies to the allegedly immigra-
tion-induced threats to national values are repeatedly justified in 
the PS programmes with narratives drawing from an exclusionary 
understanding of how the welfare economy can be sustained. One 
of the most explicit narratives for linking the national identity and 
welfare economy constructs a textbook example of the contested 
“recognition-redistribution trade-off”19 as social fact. According 
19 Recognition-redistribution trade-off refers to the variety of arguments that are 
based on the assumption that there is an inverse relationship between the degree the 
state is able to recognize and accommodate the special needs of minorities and the 
state’s ability to redistribute welfare. The trade-off commonly postulates that the reco-
gnition policies either crowd-out the redistributive policies from the political agenda, 
that they corrode the solidarity on which the redistributive policies are based or that 
they misdiagnose issues rising from economic inequality as minority recognition issues 
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to the PS, because national solidarity must be protected from the 
corroding effect of value-heterogenization, “in the integration of 
immigrants our national identity and patriotism must play a role” 
(Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 9). This assimilative response to heter-
ogenization – constructed as a result of immigration – is justified 
through a narrative according to which a “[u]nified people guaran-
tees the willingness to pay taxes” (Ibid.).
Moreover, the tax populist argument for stricter regulation of 
immigration seeks to justify why the “Perussuomalaiset thinks that 
the requirement for economic self-sustainability must be extended 
to all immigrants coming to Finland on the basis of family reunifi-
cation” because, “[i]n accordance to the Danish model, it is possible 
to expect, for example, that a person applying for family reunifica-
tion has not received income support during the past two years.” 
The PS further refers to a crowding-out effect that immigration can 
have for welfare redistribution presented as a zero-sum game (Ry-
dgren 2006, 52), calling it “irresponsible to attempt to gather se-
niors in our country when at the same time the elder care queues are 
growing and the age structure of the Finnish population is a cause 
of concern” (Perussuomalaiset rp. 2011, 42–43).
Both the PS and the SD approach the concept of national uni-
ty also in nativist terms, occasionally narrating it as an inherent 
value that the development of immigration policy must respect. In 
the PS programmes, however, the focus on national unity is also 
commonly presented in a mainstreamed narrative in order to reach 
potential middle class constituencies without strong patriotic dis-
positions. This is established by repeatedly narrating the value of 
national unity in instrumentalist and welfare nationalist terms; pre-
senting national unity as means for facilitating the requisite levels of 
in-group solidarity for maintaining an enduring support for welfare 
redistributions. Moreover, and unlike the SD, the PS also repeated-
ly justifies the necessity redistribution of welfare in terms of a ze-
ro-sum game, where anti-immigration politics are the sine qua non 
for the preservation of the welfare state and the welfare nationalist 
redistributive regime it entails.
(For a more detailed account on the recognition-redistribution trade-off, see Banting 
and Kymlicka 2006, 10–30).
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Justifying Anti-Immigration  
Advocacy in Discussion Board Debates
The mobilization rhetoric of the populist parties with anti-immigra-
tion political agenda analyzed in the previous section is only one of 
the facets of anti-immigration advocacy in public debate – seeing as 
the electoral programmes are aimed at more or less potential con-
stituencies with the purpose of gaining more votes for the parties. 
On the other hand, the grassroots level discussants – as private po-
litical actors on a mainstream public forum – are highly concerned 
with the social acceptability of neo-populist narratives and political 
identities they are representing behind aliases. This is why the grass-
roots actors, unlike political parties, do not primarily seek to con-
vert their imagined audiences into voters of populist parties. Rather, 
they hope to present their anti-immigration advocacy as a soundly 
justifiable political agenda and, accordingly, seek to discursively in-
sulate their political activities from the social stigmas of racism and 
xenophobia (van Dijk 1992, 87–88). 
As such, the analysis of the Finnish discussion board data com-
plements the analysis of anti-immigration political mobilization in 
electoral programmes in two important ways. Firstly, this analy-
sis illustrates a high degree of transference between the economic 
justificatory rhetoric used by the party political actors, on the one 
hand, and the grassroots level of the anti-immigration advocacy on 
the other. Secondly – by focusing on grassroots level narratives seek-
ing to promote anti-immigration advocacy and insulate this political 
agenda from stigmatizing criticism (of being xenophobic) – it also 
allows a broader understanding of the discursive practices through 
which neo-populist anti-immigration sentiment is advocated and 
justified as a reasonable position in the public debate. 
In order to study the grassroots level of justification discourses 
for anti-immigration advocacy, the three discussion board threads 
analyzed are selected from the same time period as the electoral 
programmes. One of the threads dates four months after the PS 
electoral victory of 2008, the second dates two months before the 
2011 elections, and the discussions in the third thread takes place 
one month after these elections. In addition to being situated at this 
critical junction, the selection of the threads is subjected to addi-
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tional considerations discussed in the chapter 3.1. 
The subsections illustrate all the discourses identified in each 
thread until the saturation point is reached and continue to quote 
some of the most illuminating posts and discuss the articulations 
within in more detail. 
The tables in the beginning of each subsection illustrate the rel-
ative frequency (in percentages) of different narratives with which 
the discussants seek to justify their anti-immigration arguments 
and deny racism in their intentions and goals. The narratives are di-
vided into four main types, depending on whether the justification 
seeking to insulate anti-immigration advocacy from the critique of 
being racist invokes the “Rights of the majority,” “Immigrants as 
the Other,” “Economic redistribution” or “Norms of the public dis-
course.” Many of the posts employ multiple justificatory discourses, 
often also belonging in several types of justification. This is why the 
combined count of justificatory discourses (n) is greater than the 
total number of posts in each of the three discussion board threads 
analyzed.
The following analysis is divided into three subsections, each 
covering one thread of discussion board debate. Each subsection 
discusses the division of the types of discursive justifications for an-
ti-immigration advocacy and illustrates the function of the particu-
lar discourses by quoting the posts that indicate how the discussants 
in practice formulate the justifications in their posts. Following 
each discussion board excerpt, the justificatory narratives employed 
within are indicated in square brackets.20 
The neo-populist advocates’ right to freedom of speech: 
“[The Minister of Finance] Katainen demands an open discus-
sion also on problems related to immigration”  
(Mölsä 2009 February 19th, thread saturated at 168/396 posts).
A few months after the municipal elections of 2008 that marked 
the beginning of the steep rise in the electoral success of the PS, 
20 For more detailed illustration of the justificatory discourses and their types are co-
ded for the purposes of analysis, see Appendix C: Operationalization of the Justifica-
tion Types and Discourses in Chapter 5.
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the Minister of Finance, Jyrki Katainen, acknowledged the validity 
of some of the concerns that were regarded in the public debate as 
immigration-related by calling for an “open discussion.” Diagram 1 
(below) indicates how anti-immigration advocacy is being justified 
in this online debate.
Diagram 1. Frequencies of the narrative justification given for  
anti-immigration advocacy in the first online debate (Mölsä 2009).
Within this debate, the proponents of anti-immigration politics 
commonly argue that the public debate is marked by taboos that 
need to be broken in order to achieve an open public debate. Almost 
half of all the justifications given for anti-immigration advocacy 
pertain to what the discussants consider to be distorted norms of 
the public debate. This type of justification claims that it has not 
been possible to critically examine immigration-related phenomena 
in public and voice what the discussants consider genuine and legit-
imate concerns. According to this narrative, this is why presenting 
“immigration critique” as something not marked by racism, subjects 
the discussant to the risk of being considered a racist. As such, pre-
senting arguments for anti-immigration advocacy vests a discussant 
with a courageous and unselfish speaker position. Such position, the 
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narrative goes, deserves respect and, therefore, arguments from such 
a position deserve a role in public debate, even if the critique does 
not always meet its mark. This type of meta-narrative is commonly 
used to justify the position of anti-immigration advocacy regardless 
of the actual arguments employed.
The following excerpt manifests several of the most prominent 
narratives through which economic redistribution and the norms of 
the public debate are employed as justification for anti-immigration 
advocacy:  
A simple opening towards the direction of an honest and 
open discussion […] would entail admitting that so-called 
humanitarian immigration is an expense, that is, an item of 
expenditure for taxpayers. Once this is a crystal clear fact for 
everybody, we can discuss mainly about how big an expen-
diture this is and how we can affect its magnitude. – alias 
“malmilainen” [coded narratives: open debate; taxpayer 
perspective; welfare state macro-level].
This argument justifies anti-immigration advocacy by asserting 
that the fact that the officials have not acknowledged humanitarian 
immigration as an expense for taxpayers means that immigration is 
not “honestly and openly” discussed in public. This narrative seeks 
to appeal to its audience’s common sense by referring to the expens-
es caused by immigration as “a crystal clear fact.” It also implies that 
it would be simple to remedy the public debate on immigration by 
forcing all the discussants to present their immigration-related ar-
guments from the perspective of how the state allocates its resourc-
es vis-à-vis immigration. Another common avenue of justification 
links the economic considerations to assertions of how immigrant 
groups behave, often seeking to carefully insulate the stereotypic 
characterizations of immigrant cultures from the accusations of be-
ing racist by reducing the question to purely an economic one:
I think that this is not about race, culture or religion but 
rather about a topic as dreary as money. […] The immigrants 
do not integrate well enough. So we would need more money. 
We have only a couple of options. a) We regulate the number 
immigrants so that we may focus more resources per indi-
vidual. b) We gather more resources (money) for example by 
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raising taxes. Not many people are willing to do that. – alias 
“ kauku” [coded narratives: “this is not racism”; scarcity 
of resources; immigrant behaviour; taxpayer perspective]. 
This argument begins by justifying anti-immigration advocacy 
with explicit speaker positioning narrative that distances the dis-
cussant from typical starting points of xenophobic arguments, such 
as concerns for race, culture and religion (van Dijk 1992). Rath-
er, to the extent that rising taxes are not what the majority wants 
and nobody can deny that resources are limited, the (unsupported) 
acknowledgement that immigrants do not integrate well enough 
results in the conclusion that anti-immigration politics is needed. 
A common justification for political advocacy of anti-immigration 
policy measures (Bader 2005, 350–351), also employed here, is that 
since all-inclusive policies are not feasible and immigrants “obvi-
ously” have a weaker claim to common resources than does the au-
tochthonous population, it must be illogical to publicly reprehend 
advocating exclusionary policies.
The reductive quantification of issues of immigration as merely 
questions of economic resources – as is done in posts by “malmilain-
en” and “kauku” is dependent on two narratives of implicit fact con-
structions. The first one is that the immigrants are not “well enough 
integrated” (with few attempts to actually define what counts for 
well enough integration), and the second one is that integrative 
measures are as efficient as can be, and that only increasing the vol-
ume of public spending can facilitate “better integration.”
Both assumptions construct national identity and integration as 
unproblematic and unquestionable ends. However, it is interesting 
to note that the concepts are, although undefined, typically con-
nected to justifications that present national identity primarily as 
an instrumental good, allowing the pursuit of a sustainable, ide-
al welfare state. The prevalence of this welfare idealizing narrative 
goes against the Muddean understanding of national identity as a 
primary populist goal in itself (Mudde 2007, 119–120, 258). This 
is because the narrative entails that the advocacy for anti-immigra-
tion policies is justified as a means to fight the solidarity-corroding 
effect that supposedly reduces the willingness to pay taxes and thus 
threatens the sustainability of the welfare state (for a more detailed 
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discussion on the allegedly immigration-induced “solidarity corrod-
ing effect,” see Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 11–12). 
Diagram 1 also indicates that the use of welfare economy per-
taining justifications is much more accentuated in this thread than 
nativist justifications (for a nuanced discussion on nativist versus in-
strumentalist variants of nationalism, see Fetzer 2000). Of course, 
this is not to say that the narratives would not be motivated by eth-
nocentric perceptions. Below is a particularly lucid example of such 
imaginative use of reductive quantification in the construction of 
welfare state macro-level considerations that supposedly justify an-
ti-immigration advocacy:
When we bring 10 incomers to be supported, 1 of them will 
get employed who (maybe) supports himself, while the other 9 
are covered from tax revenues. With about 70% likelihood, 
this individual must be educated all the way from the alpha-
bet, and it is pretty certain that he will accumulate expenses 
from the health service etc. as much as a Finn does […] (let’s 
be optimistic and say that the expenses incurred for kinder-
garten, interpretation, bureaucracy, etc. are 0 euro.) So we 
end up with a calculation that one of these ten becomes a net 
producer in 33 years and the other 9 never. – alias Jäynääjä 
[coded narratives: immigrant behaviour; welfare abusing 
immigrants; welfare state macro-level].
As Jäynääjä’s post reveals, narrative constructions of “economic 
realities” can take on a life of their own. It is evident that the “cal-
culations” presented constitute little more than prejudiced figments 
of the contributor’s imagination. What is remarkable, nevertheless, 
is that debaters do construct the welfare economy pertinent justi-
fications for anti-immigration advocacy seemingly out of thin air. 
This testifies for a strong conviction present on the grassroots level 
debates that there is great normative, justificatory potential in pre-
senting anti-immigration advocacy as benign and “merely” motivat-
ed by welfare economic considerations, and that the narratives built 
on economic justification can transcend the pejorative assumptions 
of immigrant cultures as a worthless burden. 
The less common narratives of justification in this debate – par-
ticularly the ones coded as “rights of the majority” – are hardly 
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ever evoked on their own, and are usually employed to support nar-
ratives constructed around economic redistribution and norms of 
public debate:
One would not think that wanting to keep Finland Finnish 
is somehow an anti-immigrant comment? Or do you think 
that Finland should become, for instance, an Islamic state, 
so that [immigrants] could feel themselves “ integrated”? [I]
t is hard to understand why cherishing the Finnish culture 
and habits should be somehow a racist activity against people 
who have come here from other cultures? – alias “Jugi [coded 
narratives: reaffirming our ways; open debate; “this is not 
racism”].
Here the opposition to immigration is first justified on the basis 
of the concern for the cultural rights of the majority. However, a 
denial of a racist intention quickly follows the hyperbolic straw man 
of the “extreme tolerant” position (as in the position that Finland 
should become an Islamic state). Such justificatory narratives typi-
cally employ the logic that since many of the nativist anti-immigra-
tion arguments are not really about immigrants themselves (as the 
proposed justification instead seeks to present a legitimate concern 
for “the Finnish culture”), it follows that such arguments should not 
be possible to be defined as racist in the public debate.
The general implication behind the proliferate racism denying 
narratives in this debate is that as long as the discussants do not re-
fer to explicitly racist goals when supporting anti-immigration pol-
icies, their political agenda should not be considered racist, either 
(van Dijk 1992, 94). Indeed, many neo-populist discussants seek to 
present the critique of xenophobia issued against them as strategic 
intervention by their political opponents, who are resorting to unfair 
use ad hominem argumentation. The online advocates of neo-pop-
ulism hold the position that as long as reaching racist outcomes 
cannot be shown to be the reason why they advocate anti-immi-
gration measures in the first place, labelling the advocates as racists 
is an ad hominem accusation that cannot be accepted in a healthy 
public debate. What is remarkable in the justificatory narratives for 
neo-populist welfare nationalism is the overarching focus of racism 
as solely as a question of personal motivation. The neo-populist on-
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line discussants very rarely discuss whether the implementation of 
the actual policies they are advocating – aiming “to keep Finland 
Finnish,” for instance – might be likely to carry racist outcomes.
The welfare economic subject matter on the neo-populist 
political agenda: “The Perussuomalaiset would relocate unem-
ployed immigrants in the peripheries” 
(Helsingin Sanomat 2011a February 25th: thread saturated at 
75/241 posts).
This online debate takes place two years later than the previous 
thread examined, less than three months prior to the Finnish parlia-
mentary elections of April 2011. The news article debated here uses 
a significantly more critical tone towards the neo-populist advocates 
in comparison to the news article in the debated in the first ana-
lyzed thread, which originated from the Minister of Finance’s nod 
towards the electoral success of the PS. This thread debates a spe-
cific policy proposal – as presented in the PS electoral programme 
– of accommodating the unemployed immigrants in regions where 
housing expenses are lower. Diagram 2 (next page) illustrates that 
here the justifications for anti-immigration advocacy mostly employ 
narratives related to economic redistribution, these being almost 
twice as frequent as the second and third most common types of 
narratives Norms of public debate or Immigrants as the Other.
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Diagram 2. Frequencies of the narrative justification given for anti-immigra-
tion advocacy in the second online debate (Helsingin Sanomat 2011a).
As this debate originates from the merits of a particular anti-im-
migration policy measure – presented as an economic remedy to an 
immigration-related problem by a party soaring in the polls – the 
discussants are keen to appeal to “economic logic” and “pragma-
tism.” This way the neo-populist advocates seek to present their an-
ti-immigration agenda as belonging in a “mundane” social political 
debate that conceptualizes the public economy behind the measures 
of welfare redistribution in terms of a zero-sum game, similar to the 
approach in the PS programmes. The general thrust of the justifica-
tory narratives employed this debate is illustrated by quoting posts 
by aliases “Public PC” and “Riitu S”:
I guess the immigrants are allowed to reside wherever they 
please, as long as they cover the expenses themselves. As long 
as society pays for the accommodation of the immigrant, 
he shouldn’t have anything to complain about the location 
where society finds an apartment for him. – alias “Public 
PC” [coded narratives: welfare state macro-level; taxpayer 
perspective; “this is not racism”].
110
THE TRUE COLORS OF FINNISH WELFARE NATIONALISM
In employing the economic redistribution narrative, the dis-
cussants justify anti-immigration advocacy through the reductive 
quantification of complex welfare issues. Many background as-
sumptions of how welfare redistribution works are left implicit, but 
nevertheless presented as “obviously” internalized by the other rea-
sonable discussants. Firstly, the fulfilment of any socially enabling 
function for economic redistribution is never articulated as grounds 
for deciding whether the advocacy for an anti-immigration policy 
measure is justifiable. This is remarkable in a welfare state context, 
where the raison d’ être for redistributions has commonly been un-
derstood in terms of a more or less positive understanding of free-
dom, whereby redistributing monies allows people to have a greater 
deal of independence than they would have without such redistribu-
tion (Esping-Andersen 1990, 3).
Secondly, there is an underlying supposition – commonly linked 
to liberal regimes of welfare in the academic discussion (as defined 
in the typology of Esping-Andersen 1990, 26–27) – that the ben-
eficiaries of redistribution should have no say concerning their sat-
isfaction in the outcome of redistributive policies. This supposition 
manifests itself lucidly in the excerpt from the post by “Riitu S”:
They are being put in the most inexpensive place possible until 
they can support themselves. […] [T]hey reside in the cheapest 
possible place and immediately when they support themselves, 
they can freely choose their domicile. Logical, right? – alias 
“Riitu S” [coded narratives: welfare state macro-level; tax-
payer perspective].
It is remarkable that the justification of anti-immigration poli-
cy of regional restrictions for housing subsidies for immigrants as 
merely “logical” omits any discussion concerning the welfare na-
tionalist logic according to which Finns are implicitly perceived as 
entitled to the favorable treatment of having regionally unbound 
access to housing subsidies. 
Even the articulations that seek to justify anti-immigration ad-
vocacy by presenting immigrants as the Other most commonly con-
struct this Otherness in economic terms, arguing that immigrants 
live in a way that threatens to excessively strain the resources. In-
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deed, these economically based narratives of othering are commonly 
employed in conjunction with the (counterfactual) assertion accord-
ing to which the autochthonous population’s use of welfare resourc-
es is mostly insignificant in comparison to that of immigrants:
One can move to Helsinki or any other place once one can 
pay for the costs of one’s own accommodation. I think this is 
quite logical, and although a Finnish social bum can move to 
a rental apartment of any city this is relatively insignificant, 
in comparison to the fact that almost all of the humanitarian 
immigration is like this. – alias “ jebbe21” [coded narratives: 
welfare state macro-level; welfare abusing immigrants; im-
migrant behaviour].
Moreover, the economy-related anti-immigration narratives of-
ten imply – and sometimes even explicitly argue – that welfare re-
sources used by immigrants are actually abused. In the excerpt from 
“jebbe21”’s post (above), this type of justification for anti-immi-
gration advocacy is sought by presenting “a Finnish social bum” as 
the closest point of comparison for humanitarian immigrants in the 
debate on housing subsidies. 
Othering comparisons between immigrants and the autochtho-
nous population can also be employed for the purposes of construct-
ing the narrative in which immigrants are portrayed as challenging 
the majority’s entitlement to scarce welfare resources. For the pur-
pose of justifying anti-immigration advocacy, these comparisons 
often seek to reinforce the discursive link between the purported 
nature of immigrants and the “realities” of economic redistribution:
In Finland, people emphasize equality in everything, also 
incl. equality between refugees and the Finnish citizens in 
every possible respect. […] Actually, the truth to the matter 
is such that the economic situation of a refugee can be eas-
ily shown to be better than that of a poor, Finnish person. 
[…] Situating [refugees] to peripheries has the added benefit 
of preventing the concentration of [refugee] accommodation, 
urban decay, in many cases. – alias “Iivari Tahko” [cod-
ed narratives: “this is not racism”; scarcity of resources; 
majority’s entitlement; immigrant behaviour; welfare state 
macro-level].
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This justification of anti-immigration advocacy moves on multi-
ple discursive levels. First the discussant seeks to pre-empt any ac-
cusation of racism by employing a national self-categorization (Bil-
lig 1987, 70–73), which presents Finns as people, who emphasize 
equality between refugees and the autochthonous population “in 
every possible respect.” By the virtue of being a Finn, who greatly 
values equality, he then points to the inequality in the asserted fact 
that the poor Finns are supposedly worse off in their own country 
than refugees, who are claiming the (housing) resources the poor 
Finns used to be entitled to.
Anti-immigration policy measures – such as placing refugees on 
the periphery – are being justified by using narratives that combine 
discourses of scarcity and the denial of racism. A typical narrative 
of this kind presents the measures as a way for the majority to rem-
edy the unfair loss of their privileged entitlement to scarce welfare 
goods. Additionally, the anti-immigration policies tend to be pre-
sented as having the ability to address the macro-level solidarity 
corroding challenges that the heterogenizing welfare state is often 
portrayed as facing (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 11–12). The issue 
of urban decay is an example of the kind of a problem that discus-
sants are keen to link to immigration and immigrant behaviour, 
thus arguably justifying the advocacy for anti-immigration mea-
sures for countering the problem. 
The analysis of this thread of online debate underlines the im-
portant role of a selective linking of anecdotal evidence and macro-
economic observations in narratives that are able to present legiti-
mate concerns for maintaining livelihood in Finland as “economic 
facts” about immigration. Such a construction of facts allows for the 
employing various narratives in which immigration plays a signifi-
cant role in the accentuation of the pertinent problems surrounding 
the welfare state, eventually justifying the advocacy for anti-immi-
gration measures as a simple, effective and socially justifiable means 
to tackle several contemporary political challenges the welfare state 
is facing.
 
Contesting the neo-populist collective identity with the public 
critique of racism and xenophobia: “President Halonen urges 
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the government to oppose racism” 
(Silfverberg 2011 May 28th: thread saturated at 137/265 posts)
The news article based on President Halonen’s plea against rac-
ism, discussed in this thread, was published only three months after 
the second online debate analyzed here took place. In the mean-
time, however, the parliamentary elections of 2011 were held, which 
radically changed the atmosphere for the public debate on immigra-
tion. The electoral result translated the promising polls into a major 
victory for the PS (as indicated in the graph 1 in the chapter 1.1). 
This meant that the neo-populist concerns for immigration could 
be expected to be on the governmental agenda, especially seeing as 
the formation of the government coalition was still on-going until 
late June. Against this background, it may be surprising to note, as 
diagram 3 (below) indicates, that the posts justifying anti-immi-
gration advocacy with narratives on economic redistribution were 
significantly less common than the ones using other justificatory 
resources.  
Diagram 3. Frequencies of the narrative justification given for anti-immigra-
tion advocacy in the third online debate (Silfverberg 2011).
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One way to address this shift in the use of justificatory narratives 
between the two threads of online debates in 2011 would be to note 
that by participating in the domestic political debate by condemn-
ing racism, the president clearly put the advocates of anti-immi-
gration politics on the defensive stance. Moreover, the fact that the 
anti-immigration-oriented political agenda had already succeeded 
in prevailing in the elections can help explain why the discussants 
may have experienced less of a need to rearticulate the perceived 
(economic) assets of their political agenda. The common neo-pop-
ulist discourse that emphasized the importance of having immigra-
tion issues feature high on the political agenda is significantly less 
pronounced in the debate analyzed here. It is likely that because the 
electoral result already manifested notable public support for these 
concerns, more imminent goals – most commonly related to the 
perception of a tarnished public image of neo-populist advocates in 
the public debate – can be identified in the justificatory narratives 
employed in this debate. 
The neo-populists’ focus on their public image can be observed 
here in the proliferation of narratives that seek to discursively re-
position anti-immigration advocacy in a way that allows insulating 
it from the public critique. Another observation pointing to this 
conclusion can be found in the fact that the most common narrative 
employed in this debate – “this is not racism” – has a much greater 
lead respective to the second most frequent justificatory narrative 
(4,6 pp) than the difference between the most common and second 
most common narratives employed in the first (0,0 pp) and the sec-
ond (0,9 pp) online debates analyzed.
It seems that in this instance of online debate, the ball is thrown 
back to the neo-populists as the supporters of the new major polit-
ical player. This seems to be interpreted by anti-immigration advo-
cates as entailing the responsibility to narrate how they cannot be 
racists as they themselves can be presented as suffering from a vari-
ety of arguably immigration-related phenomena. This interpretation 
is supported by the dominance of the victimized narratives pertain-
ing to the rights of the majority, which were the least common type 
of justification in the earlier threads. 
Indeed, this debate introduces two new and highly frequent nar-
ratives of justification, both of which are closely connected together 
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and also commonly linked to the most frequent narrative of “this 
is not racism.” Firstly, many discussants construct the supposedly 
extensive debate on the difficulties the immigrants face as one per-
taining to a relatively insignificant societal issue, but nevertheless 
“crowding out” (Banting and Kymlicka 2006, 10–11) the concerns 
the Finns would like to put on the political agenda. This common, 
zero-sum conceptualization of immigration-related issue saliency in 
a public debate is generally employed for the purposes of asserting, 
in accordance with a  “welfare chauvinist” logic, that the pre-exist-
ing, natural and proper dominance of “our concerns” is now being 
taken over by a focus on immigrants’ concerns (Rydgren 2006, 52). 
The Finnish way of juxtaposing “deserving” and “undeserving” re-
cipients of welfare benefits (Kangas 2000, 417) is exemplified in the 
excerpt below:
In the country unemployment is increasing, treatment of the 
elderly and the sick is overlooked [...]. And what might our 
opinion leader [President Halonen] be doing? Venting her 
points on racism […] which is not a problem in our country, 
as opposed to the lack of food and employment […] Halonen 
and other politicians should focus on removing these. – alias 
“eri maailmassako” [coded narratives: displacing majori-
ty’s concerns; “this is not racism”; scarcity of goods; ma-
jority’s entitlement].
The narratives painting the picture of scarce resources and dis-
placed majority are commonly employed in conjunction with vari-
ous denials of racism, as this allows the discussants to present their 
indifference or hostility towards the immigrant claims-making as 
not rooted in racism, but rather in the majority’s (sense of ) dearth 
of resources and recognition. Linking these narratives serves to con-
struct a legitimate speaker position for neo-populists that is con-
cerned that the rising salience of the questions of racism threatens 
to displace other important societal issues that the neo-populists are 
trying to underline. 
This displacement narrative is also linked to the narrative of the 
vilified majority, in order to construct the position of the majority 
– represented by the neo-populists – as the victim, whose anti-im-
migration advocacy should be seen as nothing but the struggle for 
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its own recognition and survival. Together these narratives suggest 
that addressing the concerns of minorities in public and political 
debates is excessive in its current form, which only serves to mar-
ginalize the members of the majority group (for an account of sim-
ilar economy-emphasizing narratives employed in anti-immigration 
rhetoric, see Fetzer 2000). This is best illustrated in the following, 
particularly rich excerpt that employs a great variety of justificato-
ry resources, making a case of unfair public treatment against the 
people with intersecting markers of gender, age cohort, ethnic and 
moral majority: 
Particularly hetero men with family experience themselves as 
being discriminated against. They are the self-evidence that 
is left under the feet of minority groups. Media visibility is 
given several times a day to [. . .] minorities. Immigrants and 
language minorities. No one says anything about the wellbe-
ing or the societal importance of an ordinary, white, hetero 
taxpayer or that of an unemployed male. Why? […] Is it re-
ally so [. . .] important to discuss what is not happening to or 
done for minorities in their own opinion – rather than discuss 
what should be done according to the majority who main-
tains, finances and builds society? – alias “Sosiaalityömies” 
[coded narratives: reaffirming our ways; vilified majority; 
displacing majority’s concerns; scarcity of goods; majori-
ty’s entitlement; open debate]. 
What becomes clear in the excerpt by “Sosiaalityömies” – whose 
very alias embodies an authoritative speaker positioning as “social 
working man” – is that the self-proclaimed majority’s (experience 
of ) marginalization is what justifies anti-immigration advocacy, and 
that the diminishing access to material welfare resources is only 
one facet of this marginalization. The combination of justificatory 
resources constructed by “Sosiaalityömies” presents “the minorities 
and their sympathizers” as taking a prominent role in the public 
debate and in the media, thereby pushing the majority away from 
the central position in the public exchange of ideas that the majority 
should – “obviously” – rightfully occupy. 
The main thrust of the justifications given for anti-immigration 
advocacy in the last online debate analyzed is that immigration is 
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currently discussed from the wrong angle according to the grass-
roots level neo-populists. The narrative emphasizes that by focus-
ing on minorities in general – and immigrants in particular – the 
norms of “tolerance” within public debate serve to vilify the ma-
jority and displace their concerns. The oppositional narrative sit-
uates neo-populists as the counterpoise for what they label as the 
ultra-liberal political elite, justifying the political advocacy for the 
former by narrating their aims in defensive terms. The neo-populists 
are presented, accordingly, as advocates for a benign and temper-
ate political movement, only seeking to draw attention back to the 
majority’s concerns and to address the problems that immigration 
arguably causes to the welfare state and the just economic redistri-
bution within it.
Harnessing Welfare Nationalist Narratives  
in Neo-Populist Political Mobilization
Regimes of social policy typically seek to assess how compelling 
a need an individual is facing as the basis for redistributing wel-
fare accordingly (Goodin 1988, 27–50). Research on the political 
sociology of welfare redistribution suggests, however, that the per-
ceived legitimacy of these redistributions among the population 
is commonly challenged by presenting an apparently meritocratic 
calculus for evaluating who is entitled to getting his or her need 
compensated from public funds (see, for example, Von Oorschot 
2000; Kangas 2000, 5–6). Indeed, even though the personal mo-
tivations for advocating immigrants’ disentitlement are commonly 
understood to have their roots in fears and anxieties regarding the 
cultural Other (for the Finnish context of such advocacy, see, for 
example, Puuronen 2011), the narrative analysis carried out in this 
chapter suggests that advocates of anti-immigration politics rarely 
articulate these motivations in the narratives employed in the pub-
lic debate. One reason for rather narrating the public advocacy for 
anti-immigration measures in meritocratic terms can be linked to 
neo-populist strategic social action; their advocates understand that 
presenting explicitly xenophobic motives for exclusionary policies 
would greatly undermine the public justifiability of neo-populist 
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politics (van Dijk 1992, 94). 
The analysis carried out in this chapter corroborate this body of 
research. The results indicate that many of the most common public 
narratives seeking to justify an advocacy for exclusionary welfare 
nationalism in the neo-populist political agenda do indeed return 
to the ancient Aesopian themes of desert and entitlement to resourc-
es from the common pool. As a justification for their exclusionary 
immigration policies, the neo-populists consistently employ welfare 
nationalist narratives for delineating the boundary between those 
who can and cannot be trusted to work for the common good. How-
ever, these narratives are much less explicit regarding the nature of 
the “national we” whom these goods are supposedly common to. 
Instead, the neo-populists construct the category of “the entitled” 
in negative terms. The welfare nationalist policy measures for immi-
grant disentitlement to equal recognition and redistribution are jus-
tified in various narratives that present the normative juxtapositions 
based on ethnic and cultural stereotypes simply as “common sense” 
distinctions between the “deserving” and “undeserving” poor. 
Rather than focusing on the personal motivation behind 
neo-populist advocates’ anti-immigration attitudes, I have illustrat-
ed in this chapter how neo-populists employ various, public justifi-
catory narratives for an anti-immigration oriented political agenda 
both on the level of partisan manifestos and in grassroots level on-
line debates. The analyses of both levels of neo-populist advocacy 
reveal a significant commonality between the discourses employed 
in the electoral programmes and on the discussion boards. There is 
a clear transference between the narratives employed in the PS elec-
toral programmes and in the discussion board debates. Neo-populist 
advocates within both arenas of public debate employ welfare na-
tionalist interpretations of the challenges the welfare state is facing. 
Conceptualizing immigration as an easily quantifiable “extra” strain 
on “our” welfare system, neo-populists downplay the questions of 
social justice issued against their anti-immigration measures with 
narratives that draw from a sense economic necessity and justify 
the welfare nationalist political agenda as prudently parsimonious 
social policy for distributing welfare in times of economic distress. 
The broad strokes concerning the political themes that feature 
in the electoral programmes are markedly similar between the PS 
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programmes of 2008 and 2011. Indeed, even the SD programme of 
2010 prioritizes the issues of labour migration, refugees and social 
solidarity. The analysis conducted here suggests, however, that the 
narratives with which the PS operationalizes these themes for the 
purposes of political mobilization have changed in time, drawing 
significantly more from macroeconomic narratives of justification 
in 2011 than in 2008. 
Concerning the issue of labour, the 2008 programme bears a 
closer resemblance to the SD programme in the sense that both 
emphasize the pernicious effect that an influx of inexpensive labour 
force would carry for the blue-collared working-class. In the 2011 
programme, however, the PS appears to reach for middle class con-
stituencies by focusing instead on the increased public spending 
caused by the burden of non-working immigrants. 
Both the 2008 and 2011 programmes, unlike the SD programme, 
problematize practice of receiving asylum seekers by emphasizing 
the increased expenses covered by taxpayers’ monies. In the earlier 
programme, however, the PS suggests that by helping refugees in 
their countries of origin Finland could receive less asylum seekers – 
a practice that the SD programme also advocates, albeit justifying 
this with the endeavor of protecting the Swedish culture from exter-
nal influences. The PS also proposes that the state should “adjust” 
the volume of Finland’s refugee quota in their 2011 programme, but 
only with regard to “general economic development.” 
The common concern for national solidarity and communality 
– featuring highly in each of the three programmes – is justified 
in the SD programme through a narrative that emphasizes nativist 
focus for maintaining a homogeneous Swedish culture. In compar-
ison, in the PS programmes, the importance of national solidarity 
is often qualified with an instrumentalist, tax-populist justification. 
This narrative idealizes the capabilities of the welfare state prior to 
the influx of immigrants, emphasizing that it is first and foremost 
the heterogenization of the societal value-base that threatens to di-
minish the willingness pay the taxes needed to finance the regime 
an encompassing regime for welfare redistribution. 
These themes feature also in the online arena of grassroots level 
debate, although the narratives appear to develop along a timescale 
similar to the ones used in the electoral programmes. In 2008, the 
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neo-populist advocates are keen on defending their right to bring 
“immigration critical” themes to the political agenda, justifying the 
neo-populist advocacy against their critics with narratives drawing 
from freedom of speech. In 2011, the concern for the freedom of 
speech is less prominent, with the discussants focusing the subject 
matter of immigration politics through welfare economic justifica-
tory narratives that are very similar to the ones in the programmes. 
What is particularly interesting in the online debate taking place 
after the parliamentary elections is the repeated manifestation of a 
victimized narrative that reifies the figure of the normal Finn – a 
vanilla member of the majority or “the white hetero male,” who is 
unfairly treated as persona non grata in the public debate. This vic-
timized narrative juxtaposes the detached flowery-hatted member 
of elite who controls the mass media and with it “the Finnish peo-
ple.” Indeed, something of a resonant neo-populist collective iden-
tity appears to start forming in the proliferating narrative, whereby 
the grassroots level advocates consistently position themselves as the 
protagonists of the “ordinary people” – the silenced pariahs, who 
must suffer the unfounded accusations of being racists in order to 
save the welfare state from immigration. In the final chapter of em-
pirical analysis, I proceed to explore this post-2011 consolidation of 
the neo-populist collective identity in more detail.
121
6: SCANDALIZED UNDERDOGS OR XENOPHOBIC SATIRISTS? CONSOLIDATION 
OF A NEO-POPULIST COLLECTIVE IDENTITY IN MEDIATIZED CONTESTATIONS
6 
 
Scandalized Underdogs of  
Xenophobic  Sat ir is t s?  Consolidat ion  
of  a  Neo-Populis t  Collec t ive Ident it y  
in  Mediat ized Contestat ions 
In the previous chapters, I first analyzed the high political narratives 
in the early 2000s that marked the emergence of welfare nationalist 
interpretations of the impact of immigration upon welfare solidar-
ity. I then proceeded to examine how these narratives were opera-
tionalized in neo-populist political mobilization towards the end of 
the decade. This last empirical chapter continues the dissertation’s 
scrutiny of the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy. Here the 
research object shifts from the subject matter of welfare nationalist 
politics to the mediatized contestations concerning the legitimacy of 
neo-populist advocacy.  The chapter illustrates how the discussants 
taking part in two impassionate debates within mainstream and 
sphericule arenas of public debate collectively construct stories with 
oppositional subject positionings of neo-populist advocacy, employ-
ing what I in my analysis identify as delegitimizing and legitimizing 
narratives. Furthermore, I analyze how these narrative contestations 
over the legitimacy of the neo-populist political agenda and public 
presence catalyze the consolidation of neo-populism as a resonant 
category of collective identity.
The shift in the analytical focus from welfare nationalism to 
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neo-populist subject positioning in this chapter reflects some of the 
recent developments in the Finnish political climate regarding the 
neo-populist political activism. Once the immigration-related issues 
on the welfare nationalist political agenda had been extensively de-
bated in public for several years around the electoral victories of the 
Perussuomalaiset party in 2008 and 2011, the most salient political 
contestations in the mainstream media started to revolve around 
the critical assessments concerning the emergent neo-populist col-
lective identity. Rather than continuing to evaluate the merits and 
shortcomings of the welfare nationalist political agenda, editorials 
and interviews of the politicians and academics alike began to ex-
amine in more detail how neo-populists present themselves in the 
public eye. Social media and tabloid journalism, in particular, were 
able to unearth several blunders by political actors affiliated to the 
Perussuomalaiset party, some of which eventually became framed as 
frontpage scandals by the more established, traditional media out-
lets. 
These developments took place in the aftermath of the electoral 
victory of 2011, which was dubbed widely in the media as “Jytky” 
– a colloquial term coined by the party leader Timo Soini connot-
ing a grand explosion. With the proliferation of the critical media 
exposure, some neo-populist advocates, especially those close to the 
party apparatus, grew increasingly concerned with securing the in-
stitutional persistence of Perussuomalaiset in the day-to-day politics 
in the future to come. Acutely aware of the other parties’ endeavors 
to capitalize on the persistent elements of neo-populist radicalism 
and to mobilize their constituencies with a more moderate stance 
concerning salient issues on the welfare nationalist political agenda, 
some of the leading figures in the neo-populist party apparatus be-
came ill at ease with the steady succession of one mediatized scandal 
after another. 
The neo-populist grassroots level collectivity, too, faced the 
challenge of carefully distancing itself from the delegitimizing 
scandal narratives – commonly presented in the mainstream media 
as manifestations of explicit racism and xenophobia in the core of 
neo-populist politics. These discussants were particularly animated 
in the online arenas of public debate and endeavored to position 
themselves as the authentic protagonists of welfare nationalism. In 
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their rhetoric, they juxtaposed the position of authentic advocates 
with the category of “misguided individuals” in the neo-populist 
movement who were harming the true neo-populist cause with their 
public blunders. In the following, I identify these endeavors as legit-
imizing subject positioning narratives that construct neo-populism 
as an emergent and resonant collectivity whose “true identity” their 
political opponents are willfully seeking to distort and delegitimize 
in the scandalizing “witch-hunts” organized by the “elite-controlled 
media.” 
In the two-stage analysis presented in this chapter, I examine 
online debates over the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy. Ac-
cordingly, as described in greater detail in Chapter 3, the first stage 
of the analysis constitutes a thematic analysis of the online data col-
lected by reviewing two different online sources.  As an example of a 
mainstream arena, where people of different opinions can be expect-
ed to take part and where some form of moderation occurs, I chose 
the discussion board maintained by the leading news daily Helsingin 
Sanomat [HS]. As an example of a neo-populist sphericule, I chose 
the Hommaforum [Homma]. Homma is not officially linked to the 
Perussuomalaiset party, but is widely regarded as Finland’s largest 
“immigration critical” discussion forum with some 9200 registered 
users and 1.7 million comments posted since it was founded in Jan-
uary 2009 by the most active discussants in Jussi Halla-aho’s [Perus-
suomalaiset MP since 2011] online blog. The presentation of the re-
sults of the thematic analysis in this chapter proceeds by identifying 
the themes around which the most salient narrative contestations on 
the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy are emerging between cer-
tain delegitimizing and legitimizing subject positioning narratives, 
as well as some of the most interesting general features concerning 
how these narratives manifest in the two arenas.
For the second, in-depth stage of the analysis, I chose to focus 
on two particularly heated online debates that developed around 
the front-page media coverage on sequences of events that the main-
stream media framed as neo-populist scandals. The aim of the anal-
ysis of these two ‘scandals’ is to explore the emergent mediatized 
contestations over the legitimacy of the neo-populist agenda. The 
debates to be analyzed in this chapter occurred in 2012 and 2013, 
revolving around the question of whether the actions of two new-
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ly elected MPs for the Perussuomalaiset, Jussi Halla-aho and James 
Hirvisaari, should be considered to undermine the legitimacy of the 
neo-populist collectivity and political agenda. 
I first briefly describe the subject matter in the two “scan-
dal events” that both feature allegations of racism and xenopho-
bia against a Perussuomalaiset MP. I then describe how I compiled 
four pairs of what I term “oppositional public stories” (OPS) for 
the purposes of conducting an in-depth analysis of the dynamics of 
narrative contestation in these debates. Finally, before entering this 
detailed narrative analysis of the OPS pairs, I highlight some of the 
findings of a thematic analysis of the online debate data on which 
the compilation of the OPS pairs is based. 
I conclude this chapter with comparative discussion on the re-
sults of the narrative analysis of these oppositional public stories, 
evaluating how the narratives they employ are reproducing, de-
lineating and consolidating a sense of resonant collective identity 
among the online collectivity of neo-populist advocates.  
The Halla-aho and Hirvisaari “Scandals” as the Source of Nar-
rative Contestations in the Oppositional Public Stories21
Chronologically the first one of the “scandal” debates, although an-
alyzed in the second and fourth OPS pairs, resulted from online 
reactions to two newspaper articles published by Helsingin Sanomat 
in June 2012. The articles cover an ongoing court case involving the 
two hate crime convictions of the newly-elected Perussuomalaiset 
MP Jussi Halla-aho. The first article (Helsingin Sanomat 2012a) 
reports the final act in a series of events that began in June 2008, 
when Halla-aho – at the time a newly elected member of Helsinki 
City Council – described Islam in his online blog as “pedophile 
religion”, further elaborating his position by characterizing Somalis 
21 As mentioned above, the second stage of the analysis focuses on the narrative 
contestations on the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy. These contestations are exa-
mined in the first stage of analysis on a more general level in the next subsection of 
this chapter. The contestations were identified in the data with the help of the thematic 
analysis by operationalizing the most frequently coded narratives in the data into four 
pairs of collectively produced oppositional public stories (OPS) by employing narrative 
analysis of public stories (Feldman and Almqvist 2011). The discussion on the data 
collection as well as on the methodology of narrative analysis of public stories can be 
found in the chapter 3.
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as criminals and parasites: 
[R]obbing bypassers and parasitizing with taxpayers’ monies 
is a national, perhaps even a genetic, characteristic of Somalis 
(quoted in the minutes of Korkein oikeus 2012, transla-
tion NP). 
 
Halla-aho stood for trial on charges of ethnic agitation and breach 
of the sanctity of religion. The former charges was dismissed first in 
Helsinki District Court and then in the Finnish Court of Appeal, 
but in June 2012 HS reported that the Finnish Supreme Court had 
found Halla-aho guilty on both charges and sentenced him to pay a 
fine of 400 euros. Throughout the legal process there was great me-
dia attention, during which the Perussuomalaiset leader Timo Soini 
told the media that any convicted members would be removed from 
the party (Iltasanomat 2009), but after the conviction by the Su-
preme Court, Soini told that Halla-aho has been punished enough 
and could continue in the party (Helsingin Sanomat 2012c).
The second news story article that HS published discusses the 
issue of satire in Halla-aho’s line of defense against both the le-
gal charges and public critique in the media (Helsingin Sanomat 
2012b). The article points out that the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged in the final resolution that Halla-aho’s passage was indeed 
written as satire, since the formulation of the Halla-aho’s passage 
was copied from an earlier article by the newspaper Kaleva which 
stated that in Finland “[d]runken killing is a national, perhaps even 
a genetic, characteristic” (Kaleva 2008).
The second “scandal” debate, the one focusing on the actions of 
the Perussuomalaiset MP James Hirvisaari, was also spurred by two 
newspaper articles. The first one reports the scandal which emerged 
in September 2013 when Hirvisaari invited his personal friend, the 
far right activist Seppo Lehto, as a guest to the Finnish House of 
Parliament. During the visit, Hirvisaari took a picture of Lehto 
making a nazi-salute in front of the building and posted the picture 
on his Facebook wall (Helsingin Sanomat 2013a). In the second 
article (Helsingin Sanomat 2013b), Hirvisaari defends his actions 
as nothing but a ribald joke, referring to Lehto as “super-humorist” 
and suggesting that those who took offense from the pictures must 
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be remarkably uptight individuals. After these statements, Soini re-
moved Hirvisaari from the parliamentary group of Perussuomalaiset.
In the later part of the chapter, I analyze these two cases through 
oppositional public stories, as in both cases the legitimacy of 
neo-populist advocacy was called into question and defended. Two 
of the OPS pairs (1 and 3) are compiled by using posts from Hir-
visaari debates, and other two (2 and 4) are from Halla-aho debates. 
The first public story in each of the four pairs is compiled from those 
HS posts that employ a particularly frequent delegitimizing narra-
tive. The second public story in each of the four OPS pairs is com-
piled from a likewise frequent, but legitimizing counter-narrative 
that seeks to confront the delegitimizing storyline by reinterpreting 
the scandal case and positioning the role of neo-populist advocates 
favorably in the story. 
Considering that very few of the posts in Homma were coded 
as employing a delegitimizing narrative without any legitimizing 
component (3%), the four delegitimizing stories are constructed ex-
clusively from the posts submitted in the mainstream arena. How-
ever, since discussants in both HS and Homma employ narratives 
that clearly seek to legitimize neo-populist advocacy (39% and 31% 
respectively), two of the legitimizing stories (in OPS 1 and 2) are 
compiled from HS posts and the other two (in OPS 3 and 4) from 
Homma posts (see table 1). 
Oppositional public stories 
on limits of acceptable 
humor, all stories compiled 
from the mainstream arena 
(HS)
Oppositional public stories on 
political accountability,  
legitimizing stories compiled 
from the sphericule arena 
(Homma)
The Hirvisaari 
Case
 OPS pair 1: 
“Why must neo-populists’ 
jokes be taken seriously?”
OPS pair 3: 
“Are only neo-populists their 
brothers’ keepers?”
The Halla-aho 
Case
OPS pair 2: 
“Neo-populist satire: Inciting 
racial hatred or exercising 
freedom of speech?”
OPS pair 4:
“The system is certainly  
rigged – but for or against 
neo-populists?”
Table 1: Four OPS pairs manifesting the most salient narrative  
contestations in the data and emerging between the discussants’  
most commonly employed delegitimizing and legitimizing narratives. 
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In the analysis of the narrative contestations illustrated in by the 
OPS pairs, I place a particular focus on juxtaposing subject posi-
tionings and constructions of enemy categories, emphasizing how 
strategic social action in various arenas of public debate may al-
low neo-populist discussants to build a resonant collective identity 
through legitimizing reinterpretations of the scandal publicity and 
critical media exposure. However, before proceeding with the nar-
rative analysis of the oppositional public stories, I first present some 
of the most interesting general features concerning the narrative 
contestations in the overall data that as mentioned above guided 
the process for selecting the posts around which the OPS pairs are 
constructed. 
Is the High Prevalence of Legitimizing Narratives an Indicator of 
the Consolidation of Neo-Populist Sense of Collectivity? 
One of the most decisive findings in the narrative analysis of the 
scandal debate data is that the discussants are very keen on debating 
the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy. In six out of ten posts (or 
in 259 posts in the fifth data set of 429 posts) the discussant em-
ploys a subject positioning narrative that addresses the legitimacy 
of neo-populist advocacy. This pool of 259 posts is also the source 
of the posts used for compiling the OPS pairs because the purpose 
of the narrative analysis is to illustrate how the contestations on the 
legitimacy of neo-populism serve to consolidate a collective self-un-
derstanding of neo-populist advocacy. 
Another notable finding concerning the scandal debates is that 
even though most of the data is collected from the HS discussion 
boards – a mainstream arena where discussants with all kinds of 
political allegiances debate – the posts that seek to legitimize the 
neo-populist advocacy are twice as common as the posts that em-
ploy delegitimizing narratives (chart 1).   
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Chart 1. The distribution of narrative approaches  
to neo-populist legitimacy in the overall data of 429 posts.
One of the first questions to ask is why should the majority of 
the discussants feel the need to express support for the neo-populists 
who are being critiqued for a Nazi salute in the parliament house 
and the hate crime conviction of a Perussuomalaiset MPs? There are 
several possible explanatory avenues that are common to all of the 
whole body of the data that can address the high relative frequency 
of legitimizing narratives, and at least three distinct avenues can be 
corroborated with the narrative analysis of the data. 
Firstly, it is important to emphasize that the subject position 
that is being positioned favorably by the legitimizing narratives is 
not necessarily that of the Perussuomalaiset politician as the object 
of the scandal. Rather, many discussants employ narratives that 
do condemn the scandalous acts as such, but also express identi-
fication with and support for the neo-populist collectivity and its 
political goals. These discussants typically narrate the scandals as 
illustrations of problems in something else than in the neo-populist 
collective. Such narratives most commonly either distance them-
selves from the scandalized individual as the single rotten apple to 
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be purged from the neo-populist ranks [coded: legitimizing, he is 
not one of us] or by suggesting that the intensity of the scandal pub-
licity points to a conspiracy instigated by their political opponents 
and elitist media [coded: legitimizing, others like to bully us, game 
is rigged against us]. 
Hesari [Helsingin Sanomat] does not make screaming head-
lines if a physically handicapped person bumbles around with 
a wheelchair. Out patients and people in need of mental care 
are equal citizens and they, too, have the right to visit the 
parliament house. Why should their blunders be turned into 
scandal news so that the MP who has invited such a person 
– as well as the MPs party – are stigmatized? [coded: legit-
imizing, others like to bully us, poor mental patient, no 
neopopulist responsibility, this is a minor thing] (Hom-
maforum 2013, l. 319–320).   
Incredibly crude decision by the “Supreme” Court […]. This 
severely erodes trust in the Finnish legal system. There has not 
been an equally politicized and personified witch hunt in our 
country since the grimmest years of Finlandization. [coded: 
legitimizing, game is rigged against us] (Helsingin Sano-
mat 2012a, l. 828–832).
These excerpts exemplify the online debates analyzed within 
both arenas and in both scandal cases. They both suggest that even 
when the actual scandalous act may be regarded as condemnable by 
the discussant employing one of the legitimizing narratives, these 
discussants commonly seek to narrate a victimized subject position. 
This position is further supported by the narratives that relativize 
the importance of the scandal event itself or the media attention 
revolving around it. Both posts employ narratives typical to posts 
coded as legitimizing neo-populist advocacy also to the extent that 
they construct a sense of ill will against the neo-populists in the me-
dia or in the judicial system, suggesting that this animosity against 
them is the primary reason why neo-populist scandals emerge.
The second potential explanatory avenue to account for the prev-
alence of the legitimizing narratives emphasizes the source of the 
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data. About one third (160 posts) of all of the posts in the data 
originate from the neo-populist affiliated sphericule arena, Homma-
forum. There the support for neo-populism is much stronger than in 
the mainstream arena, Helsingin Sanomat discussion boards. The 
distribution of the narrative approaches to neo-populist legitimacy 
between the different arenas indicates that the discussants on Hom-
ma are, unsurprisingly, much less inclined to employ delegitimizing 
narratives than the discussants on the HS discussion boards (charts 
2 and 3). What is interesting, however, is that the legitimizing nar-
ratives are even more common in HS than in Homma. 
Chart 2. The distribution of narrative approaches to the legitimacy of 
neo-populist advocacy in the 269 posts collected from HS discussion boards. 
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Chart 3. The distribution of narrative approaches to the legitimacy of 
neo-populist advocacy in the 160 posts collected from the Hommaforum.
The high frequency of legitimizing narratives in the posts sub-
mitted to the mainstream arena debates suggests that the neo-pop-
ulist collectivity is driven by the need to justify and legitimize their 
reference group to mainstream audiences. Since we can assume that 
the average discussant in HS is generally less likely to express sup-
port for the neo-populists than the average user of Homma, the 
result suggests two features in the neo-populist advocacy. On the 
one hand, the high frequency of legitimizing narratives in HS sug-
gests that here neo-populist advocates are coming from their own 
sphericule arena to HS because they are particularly motivated to 
challenge in mainstream publicity what they regard as delegitimiz-
ing scandal narratives of their collectivity. On the other hand, these 
finding can be interpreted so that also those mainstream discussants 
with a smaller of degree of sympathy for neo-populism are encour-
aged to employ narratives that legitimize neo-populism when there 
is already a heated and polarized debate going on.  
Finally, the high frequency of legitimizing narratives in the over-
all data can be explained party through the observation that the two 
scandal articles spurring the online debates already employ several 
delegitimizing narratives themselves. This gives some of the oth-
erwise potential discussants less incentive to submit posts in cases 
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where they would end up merely rearticulating much of the content 
in the delegitimizing narratives already presented in the articles. 
Conversely, those discussants who find themselves disagreeing with 
the manner in which the articles present neo-populism are more 
prone submit posts that employ legitimizing narratives. Those who 
are most strongly driven to participate in the debates, therefore, are 
the discussants who want to narrate some degree of legitimization 
for neo-populism. For these discussants, the scandals are commonly 
interpreted as challenging not only the perpetrators and their acts, 
but also unfairly delegitimizing their own reference group in the 
mainstream media. The strong intensity and an intimate sense of 
outrage that is commonly present in the posts coded as legitimizing 
neo-populist advocacy points to a strong and deep sense of personal 
involvement with the neo-populist collectivity whose legitimacy the 
scandal framings taking place in the mainstream arena is consid-
ered to undermine. 
Goddammit! Now even a silent man gets so pissed off. Here 
we’ve got ourselves two serious knuckleheads. First Hirvisaari 
invites a retard to wave around and is then surprised when 
Hesari capitalizes on this opportunity […] to score a 6-nil 
victory […]. My head hurts, it hurts like a motherf***er. 
[coded: legitimizing, goes against neopopulist cause, he is 
not one of us] (Hommaforum 2013, l. 233–243).
The Green women now got what they wanted. Let the cele-
bration and exultation commence in Käpylä [a posh district 
in Helsinki with strong support for the populists’ political op-
ponents]. For the rest of us, this is a day of shame and sorrow, 
because this is only the first step towards the utopia of the 
green khmers. [coded: legitimizing, others like to bully us, 
freedom of speech threatened, game is rigged against us] 
(Helsingin Sanomat 2012a, l. 597–599).
Having discussed some of the most important findings common 
to the legitimizing narratives in the data, in the next sub-section I 
explore some of the most common themes that are present in the 
narrative contestations of neo-populist legitimacy.
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In terms of the thematic features of common to the scandal de-
bates, two are particularly prevalent. More than two thirds (180) 
of the 259 posts that address the legitimacy of neo-populist advo-
cacy discuss either the limits of acceptable humor in political rhetoric 
[coded narratives: unacceptable even as a joke, you shouldn’t take it 
literally, freedom of speech threatened] or on the accountability for 
political scandals [coded narratives: it’s the party’s fault, he is not one 
of us, game is rigged against us] (chart 4).
 
Chart 4. Themes invoked in the 259 posts that address  
the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy in the two arenas.
One of the reasons for the prevalence of these two themes in the 
scandal debates is related to the similarities in how the scandals are 
framed in the news articles. Both of the scandals were frontpage 
news in subsequent years, and both scandals are personified in a 
Perussuomalaiset MP. Both of the scandalized subjects have been 
earlier convicted of a hate crime, and both react to the critical media 
exposure with justificatory narratives seeking position their role in 
the center of the scandal publicity as that of a humorist (like Hir-
visaari) or a satirist (as Halla-aho). 
The relative proportion of posts employing legitimizing narra-
tives varies only within four percentage points between the themes, 
being consistently about 50% more common than posts construct-
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ing delegitimizing narratives. The fact both themes appear equal-
ly fruitful for supporting or challenging neo-populism renders the 
analysis of the oppositional narratives within the same theme par-
ticularly fruitful. This is also why the oppositional stories within 
each of the OPS pair pertain to the same thematic topic; pairs 1 and 
2 pertain to narrative contestation on the limits of acceptable hu-
mor, whereas pairs 3 and 4 are compiled from posts with narratives 
that invoke the theme of political accountability. 
Oppositional public stories on limits of humor 
The first pair of oppositional public stories analyzed here is recon-
structed from the posts presented in the Hirvisaari debate solely with-
in the mainstream arena. Here the contestation develops between the 
posts employing the delegitimizing “unacceptable even as a joke” nar-
rative and the legitimizing “you shouldn’t take it literally” narrative: 
The most common of all individual narratives employed in the 
data is the delegitimizing narrative coded as “unacceptable even as 
a joke”, manifesting in almost one fifth of the posts concerning the 
legitimacy of the neo-populist advocacy (46 / 259).  These posts 
seek to challenge the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy by recon-
structing and appealing to norms that should regulate the use of 
humor in political rhetoric. By postulating a set of norms that de-
lineate acceptable behavior for a politician and asserting that these 
norms have been violated, this narrative positions certain instances 
of right-wing populist advocacy as publicly condemnable. 
OPS pair 1 (Hirvisaari): “Why must neo-populists’ jokes be tak-
en seriously?” 
1a: Delegitimizing storyline (compiled from the 14 HS posts22 
employing the most frequent delegitimizing narrative in the data, 
coded as “unacceptable even as a joke”):
22 The Appendix E includes the graph that illustrates the frequencies of the coded 
narratives in the data, and presents an exhaustive listing of those original posts in the 
data from which each of the eight public stories are compiled.
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Who are these retarded guys, anyway?! James Hirvisaari has 
been caught performing acts like this earlier. An important 
characteristic of any responsible adult, let alone an MP, is 
that one does not make the same mistake again, but learns 
from his own mistakes and from others’ as well. Apparent-
ly the persus [members of the Perussuomalaiset party] do 
neither. 
Indeed, Seppo Lehto had long since made his sympathy for 
fascist ideology completely clear for everybody through nu-
merous performances like this idiotic Nazi salute. Humorous 
or not, such performances do not belong anywhere, least of all 
in the Finnish parliament. Besides, even if Lehto would have 
acted flawlessly in the parliament – with a tie on and every-
thing – inviting him into the Parliament house in the first 
place would’ve been absolutely tasteless and an illustration of 
awful judgment.
Really, this is the third strike for the Perussuomalaiset. This 
also shows that the political agenda of the party has never 
been about anything else than bad humor – and surprisingly 
often Nazi-related at that. Indeed, the closest parallels for the 
populists’ “political humor” can be found from the campaign-
ing of the extreme right Golden Dawn party in Greece. The 
Greeks soon grew tired with humor that involves Hitler and 
Mussolini masks in political campaigning. And now we’ve 
had enough of these jokes in Finland, too.
In this delegitimizing public story, neo-populist advocacy is 
challenged by the observation that for some reason, the option to 
defend their blunders as jokes or sarcasm has been employed almost 
exclusively by advocates of neo-populist politics. The main delegiti-
mizing thrust is not in the unacceptable humor by Hirvisaari him-
self, but rather in the populists’ unacceptable incapability to follow 
the norms of common decency. After all, a good politician should 
be held fully responsible for his or her actions, humor included, 
but prominent proponents of neo-populist politics apparently can-
not. The limit of acceptable humor is crossed, the discussants argue, 
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when anything that the neo-populists say might or might not be a 
joke, depending on who asks or whether the ensuing media atten-
tion is considered to benefit the neo-populists or not.
The legitimizing story seeks to reposition right-wing populist 
advocacy favorably by constructing humor and satire as exception-
al devices in political rhetoric that allow otherwise condemnable 
breaches to be considered acceptable behavior. Posts employing this 
narrative form a public story where the legitimacy of neo-populism 
is defended by emphasizing how humorous or satirical intent should 
invalidate any reason to interpret the event in question as scandal or 
to position “serious neo-populism” as the scapegoat.
1b: Legitimizing storyline (compiled from the 10 HS posts em-
ploying the legitimizing counter-narrative coded as “you shouldn’t 
take it literally”):
Seppo Lehto is known to a large number of people for his 
quirky sense of humor, and his past attempts to agitate and 
provoke. We should judge these actions accordingly, as noth-
ing more or less than a poor joke, also taking into account 
that Lehto is obviously not in full command of his faculties.
In any case, what individual, borderline insane “ folk artist” 
posts in social media is inconsequential to serious politics, es-
pecially considering that Finland is facing much more acute 
dilemmas of elite totalitarianism and misguided religion of 
tolerance. These problems that neo-populists are trying to 
point out are real. It is quite regrettable that it is so hard 
to receive media attention for neo-populist remedies to these 
real problems when everyone and his dog is only talking about 
instances of asinine humor. 
But perhaps by resorting to the means of questionable humor 
we may yet succeed in bringing some real political issues to 
the fore as well.
This legitimizing public story in the first oppositional pair of 
the Hirvisaari scandal seeks to insulate neo-populism from this cri-
tique by denouncing the public focus on neo-populist humor. The 
discussants debating in support of the neo-populists argue that peo-
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ple should understand that humor is something completely distinct 
from neo-populist politics. Instead they suggest that politicians in 
general – and the advocates of neo-populism in particular – should 
be evaluated solely on the basis of how they relate to “real problems” 
in serious arenas, and not how some individuals behave in infor-
mal arenas of social media. At the same time, these discussants are 
supporting the use of humorous hyperboles as a means justified by 
welfare nationalist political goals that are considered to otherwise 
receive too little media attention. 
The narrative contestation emerging in this OPS pair pertains to 
the question of how serious we should consider the implications of 
political humor to be. In the delegitimizing story, the discussants 
argue that neo-populist politics manifests in and is defined by the 
limits to which the neo-populists are willing to take political humor 
in order to advance their political goals. Some political performanc-
es are considered simply unacceptable – irrespective of whether the 
neo-populists regard them as merely jokes. The legitimizing story 
challenges this critique by presenting the neo-populist collectivity 
as deserving to be only defined by their underlying political agenda. 
Even when the discussants concede that neo-populist humor may be 
strategic and political in the sense that it facilitates more visibility in 
the mainstream media, they maintain that neo-populist advocacy 
cannot be meaningfully evaluated by focusing on what takes place 
outside the “serious” arenas of traditional politics.
OPS pair 2 (Halla-aho): “Neo-populist satire: Inciting racial ha-
tred or exercising freedom of speech?”
The limits of acceptable humor are debated in a quite different 
manner in the online discussions of the Halla-aho scandal. This 
is partly because very few discussants employing legitimizing nar-
ratives seek to renounce Halla-aho’s satire or distance themselves 
from its subject matter, but rather seek to reinterpret the role of 
neo-populists in this narrative contestation in more favorable terms. 
While the delegitimizing storyline is reconstructed from the posts 
employing the same “unacceptable even as a joke” narrative as in 
the previous Hirvisaari OPS, it does not focus on challenging the 
neo-populists’ poor judgment in the use of satirical registers of po-
litical articulation. Rather, the story emphasizes the deplorable soci-
138
THE TRUE COLORS OF FINNISH WELFARE NATIONALISM
etal implications that Finland could face by allowing neo-populists 
to make satirical expressions that denigrate members of ethnic mi-
norities. 
2a: Delegitimizing storyline (compiled from the 16 HS posts 
employing the most frequent delegitimizing narrative in the data, 
coded as “unacceptable even as a joke”):
 Freedom of speech is not anarchy in any constitution-
al state. In countries such as Sweden or the USA, an MP 
writing something like this would have already resigned. Un-
fortunately, this seems not to be the case here in the Western 
Russia, with an underdeveloped culture of civilized public 
debate. 
It should be self-evident that one is allowed to make derogato-
ry comments of Finns, but not on a group of 50 asylum seek-
ers, because the critique of the latter group is directly linked 
to the relatively few individual members of that group. We 
humans have not turned so good that ethnic purges could not 
happen like in Nazi Germany. 
Possessing a PhD degree, Halla-aho is quite learned in ad-
vancing his political agenda with statistics that purposefully 
lead people astray. These totally made up conjectures about 
human genetics – without any scientific evidence – are not 
constructive criticism on immigration politics by any mea-
sure. Even Halla-aho’s tone and expressions are just as de-
rogatory as with any hate propaganda. The articulations that 
neo-populists are defending as sarcasm are nothing but balo-
ney and crude racism that we cannot ignore. 
Whereas the delegitimizing storyline in the previous Hirvisaari 
case portrayed the neo-populist collectivity as giving a political 
home for a bunch of loonies whose actions they can conveniently 
resign from as “humor”, the public story above paints a picture of 
neo-populist satire as an insidious device for deliberate propaga-
tion of ethnic hatred. The legitimizing storyline in the second OPS 
pair does not explicitly argue against the latter characterization, but 
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rather seeks to take the contestation to a different level of abstrac-
tion by positioning the neo-populist collectivity as the victimized 
protagonist of everyone’s equal right to free speech. 
2b: Legitimizing storyline (compiled from the 29 HS posts em-
ploying the legitimizing counter-narrative coded as “freedom of 
speech threatened”):
This is a grim day for the freedom of speech. The right to 
free expression, including the right to write in poor taste, is 
understood in other Western countries as the cornerstone of a 
stable democracy. I’m not sure if this will ever be understood 
here in the Western Russia, where the judicial system has now 
taken one step towards recognizing a god as part of our legal 
norms. This process of gradually running down the welfare 
state is going to be painful, and the right to issue political 
critique in public will be among its first victims. 
Halla-aho’s writings pose a provocative question to the politi-
cal elite: are all religious and ethnic groups treated the same in 
Finland? The politics of race underlying the Supreme Court’s 
verdict indicates they are not. If I were to criticize Scientol-
ogy, can one not say that it is a criminal sham? Or must one 
just beat around to bush to remain politically correct? And 
then people wonder why politicians never say anything clearly.
The Finnish people are united against this verdict, because it 
can see how the very statute on hate speech is a form of tyranny 
that allows the persecution of any dissenters. But even though 
the verdict outlaws critical opinions, it does not change how 
people think – it just hides them from the public eye. Indeed, 
it was exactly this kind of enforcement of political correctness 
– quarantining a large group of people outside of public de-
bate – that gave the Perussuomalaiset their massive electoral 
victory of 2011. 
So, all you who are ready to fight for freedom of speech – take 
arms! You others, be welcome in North Korea and Sharia. 
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This legitimizing story interprets the verdict as one further piece 
of evidence that neo-populist advocacy is needed to protect the eth-
nic Finns. In this story, the discussants underline how the neo-pop-
ulist anti-immigration political agenda not only protects the materi-
al wellbeing of the autochthonous population but also their political 
and social rights. The story makes use of “nationalized liberal rheto-
ric” by arguing that freedom of speech is challenged by multicultur-
alist legislation and unequal judicial practices (for a more detailed 
discussion on the uses “nationalised liberal rhetoric” by Nordic 
right-wing populists, see Keskinen 2012, 263). The story depicts 
the opposition to multiculturalist immigration politics as the only 
way for countering the developments challenging the freedom of 
speech and the liberalist set of political and social rights in Finland. 
The story makes wide use of militant expressions that position the 
neo-populists as the vigilant avant-garde with a wide mandate to 
protect the rights of the ordinary people and who will not hesitate 
to speak up when their country is being sold out by the elites.
Oppositional narratives on political accountability 
The second prominent theme in the debates pertains to the issue of 
who should be held accountable for the emergence of the scandal 
event and its social and political consequences. Like the limits of 
humor theme, the political accountability theme is also common 
to more than one fourth of the posts debating the legitimacy of 
neo-populist advocacy in the data. As this theme invoked particu-
larly commonly in the legitimizing narratives within Homma, both 
of the legitimizing storylines are compiled from this sphericule are-
na, while delegitimizing ones originate the mainstream arena. 
The third story pair is geared around the second most common 
delegitimizing narrative “it’s the party’s fault,” which positions the 
Perussuomalaiset party and the neo-populist collectivity as jointly 
responsible for all political action its members may enter into. 
OPS pair 3 (Hirvisaari): “Are only neo-populists their brothers’ 
keepers?”
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3a: Delegitimizing storyline (compiled from the 23 HS posts 
employing the second most frequent delegitimizing narrative in the 
data, coded as “it’s the party’s fault”):
It is scary to see how many people only get excited about per-
formances like this. They are the reason why the radicals all 
around Europe are seated on the extreme right in parliament. 
These people really do believe that Soini is an honest politi-
cian and that the Perussuomalaiset is not a Nazi party. I 
guess they also regard “sieg heil” as nothing but a dignified 
salute. With such a strong faith in the populist cause, these 
people should be able to move mountains and walk on water. 
Of course, the real reason for all these scandals is money. Hir-
visaari, for instance, brings a lot of valuable votes for the 
Perussuomalaiset party and the votes give them seven million 
euros worth of party subsidies. It is Soini [the party leader] 
who decides when there is more harm than benefit in having 
a person like Hirvisaari in the party. This is why we would 
need an explicit stance from Soini, but of course he is trying 
to avoid his responsibility. But that’s just logical behavior 
from their opportunist leader, under whom the anti-immi-
gration people are both reaching for extremist vote while still 
trying to flirt with the media. Even the populists should find 
some kind of a spine.
As it stands, there is really no reason for anyone to conduct a 
smear campaign against the Perussuomalaiset. They appear 
to be running that campaign against themselves on a weekly 
basis. The rate at which these “ individual occurrences” are 
emerging indicates that these scandals are not just coinciden-
tal poor jokes, but that the whole bunch is nothing but a joke.
This storyline juxtaposes two delegitimizing neo-populist sub-
ject positions. On the one hand, it presents the neo-populist collec-
tivity as zealous throng and controlled by the party’s leading dem-
agogues. On the other hand, the neo-populist elite are portrayed as 
Janus-faced political strategists and turncoats, who never shirk away 
from a dirty trick in order to maximize the vote for the party. The 
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story also ridicules the naivety of the apologist neo-populist collec-
tivity for trying to deny their collective responsibility, which should 
be obvious to all but the most deeply brainwashed people.
The legitimizing storyline, compiled from the posts coded as 
“goes against neopopulist cause” seeks to distance the neo-popu-
list collectivity from the scandalous event. By reifying an idealized 
neo-populist collectivity as true to the welfare nationalist politi-
cal agenda for saving the welfare state, the discussants contributing 
to this story place the political responsibility for any unacceptable 
behavior within their ranks on misguided individuals. They also 
suggest that the neo-populists’ missteps, sometimes real but often 
imaginary, are keenly forged into weapons to be used against them 
by their political opponents connected to the elite-controlled media.
3b: Legitimizing storyline (compiled from the 31 Homma posts 
employing the legitimizing counter-narrative coded as “goes against 
the neopopulist cause”):
The Perussuomalaiset should be embraced as the only patri-
otic party that represents the working class in the spirit of the 
veterans of our wars. It is inconsequential if some individu-
al extremists among us have Nazi sympathies, because every 
party has its extremists. There is no reason to believe that any 
scandalous views would be widely shared by the responsible 
people, who have been working really hard for years in the po-
litical arena in order to save the Finland from its catastrophic 
politics of immigration. 
The worst thing is not that a mental outpatient like Lehto 
performs a Nazi salute anywhere. What is much worse is that 
this makes any flowery-hat lady [politically active women re-
garded as “pro migration”] look smarter than us. This way 
they can reduce any serious argument against immigration 
into hypocritical lamentation about “those horrible populist 
racists.” 
Why can’t some people see how Hirvisaari is putting his every 
effort in his attempts to demolish our credibility? And Seppo 
Lehto is the guy who did his very best to prevent the immi-
gration critics from getting into the parliament in the 2007 
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elections. Everyone should understand by now that immigra-
tion critique is not some joke for weird performance artists 
like Lehto to make fun of. These guys are both certainly agents 
in the service of the green-leftist faction. Let’s throw these 
fucking snitches out of our party NOW! Once Soini does this, 
we are in the safe waters again.
This passionate story for legitimizing neo-populism constructs 
two categories of enemies, one internal and one external to the true 
neo-populist cause. The internal enemies, the double agents and the 
mentally challenged individuals, are juxtaposed with the figure of a 
true, hard-working neo-populists advocate. The former are present-
ed as undermining the endeavors through which the true neo-pop-
ulists seek to reach public acceptance as serious proponents of the 
welfare nationalist political agenda for opposing immigration. The 
other enemy category is constructed around the image of an ul-
traliberal, urban female artist, who is constantly looking for ways 
to undermine the honest, neo-populist working-class, heterosexual 
male with underhand media maneuvers (for similar observations 
and more detailed analysis on the gendered metaphoric language 
employed in right-wing populist rhetoric, see Norocel 2013). By 
putting the blame for the creation of the scandal frame in the main-
stream media on a specific enemy figure, this legitimizing storyline 
produces an alternative narrative for reinterpreting why neo-pop-
ulist advocacy is being delegitimized in public, while redeeming 
the neo-populists from the responsibility of being associated with a 
person making a Nazi salute in the parliament. 
 
OPS pair 4 (Halla-aho): “The system is certainly rigged – but for 
or against neo-populists?”
The most common delegitimizing narrative employed in the Hal-
la-aho debates, coded “we must oppose racism” depicts neo-popu-
lists oblivious to the human suffering their racist outbursts facili-
tate. The storyline compiled from this narrative also challenges the 
neo-populist attempts to monopolize the narratives defining the 
Finnish culture by pointing out that the judicial system is part of 
that culture even when it convicts a neo-populist. The discussants 
contributing to this storyline suggest that the neo-populists raging 
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against the verdict of the Supreme Court are being instrumentalist 
and selfish when they disdain the due legal process as un-Finnish. 
Delegitimizing storyline (compiled from the 20 HS posts em-
ploying the delegitimizing narrative coded as “we must oppose rac-
ism”):
Our western history has indicated that there are always peo-
ple among us who try to preserve their own sense of self by 
subjugating others. After all, it’s not so long since Finns them-
selves were regarded as these others, amounting to the greatest 
threat for the purity of the Swedish race. The thing is, those 
that the law against hate speech is intended to protect are real 
human beings, flesh and blood – not any god or culture. Peo-
ple – just like Somalis, who Halla-aho has previously charac-
terized as “the human scum of the African Horn.” 
Considering that the populists have been overjoyed when MPs 
from other parties have been convicted or scandalized, by any 
logic the persus should be delighted with this verdict. Besides, 
the Supreme Court is taking a distinctly conservative stand 
here when it tries to preserve the Finnish national culture of 
dignified register of political critique. 
But no – the right-wing populists seem to confuse freedom of 
speech with the notion that politicians should be free from 
any responsibility over what they say. They also advocate for 
harsh punishments for criminals, but seek to challenge the 
whole judicial system them when one of theirs is found guilty 
of hate speech. I dare you, name just one PS politician who 
has not experienced a witch hunt or miscarriage of justice. 
This kind of denial of racism is the most irresponsible position 
towards freedom of speech one can imagine. 
By pointing to the neo-populist way of advocating stricter en-
forcement of laws for immigrants while refusing to be subjected 
to such laws themselves, the delegitimizing public story empha-
sizes how the neo-populists’ strategic adoption of the role of the 
victim creates a sense among the neo-populist advocates that they 
should be above the law. Indeed, the legitimizing storyline picks up 
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this victimized position, seeking to illustrate why hate speech laws 
are biased and unfair, and should not command the respect of the 
neo-populists or the Finnish people. 
Legitimizing storyline (compiled from the 15 Homma posts em-
ploying the legitimizing counter-narrative coded as “game is rigged 
against us”):
Well, now we know what you are allowed by the law to say 
about Finns in a widely circulating newspaper such as Kale-
va, but not about Somalis in a private online blog. And this 
is how has been with the immigrants in Finland. If someone 
was to defecate in a collection bag of a Finnish congregation 
or to throw the Bible around, the sacristan would just quietly 
clean up the mess and no one would ever hear about this in 
public. But I urge you: go proudly and take a dump on the 
stairs of a mosque and you will be taken to court for compro-
mising the national security!  
This incomprehensible verdict and the double-standard that 
it invokes by protecting the immigrants better than the Finns 
in our own country make it evident that the deeply politi-
cized judicial institutions are fully controlled by the openly 
anti-Finn factions of the Green-Left.  I just wonder if the 
reason why reaching the verdict took so long isn’t somehow re-
lated to the upcoming 2015 parliamentary elections for which 
they needed a convenient political stage trial? 
Every cloud has a silver lining, though. After observing such 
an explicit bias against us, at least no one can deny the dou-
ble standard against us anymore. We just have to take it like 
Galilei took the Inquisition’s persecution. 
Although the legitimizing story does not seek to distance 
neo-populist advocacy the subject of the scandal as is the case with 
Hirvisaari storylines, both of the Homma stories are ripe with con-
struction of enemy categories. The Halla-aho story further adds 
the judicial system to the list of enemies who conspire against the 
neo-populists and – by extension – against “the persecuted Finnish 
majority.” Facing unequal treatment from all sides, the discussants 
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supporting the neo-populist collectivity in this story urge each oth-
er to remain defiant, as they believe to have very little to lose. Per-
haps, the story goes, if the neo-populists as a collectivity engage 
in the practice of breaching the biased and unfair laws aiming at 
protection of minorities, they may be able to make more people re-
alize the supposedly preferential treatment of immigrants and join 
the neo-populists in protecting the interests of the autochthonous 
population. 
Conclusion
In the previous chapters, I examined the narratives produced by 
neo-populist advocates during the electoral breakthrough phase. I 
illustrated how the public support for and acceptability of neo-pop-
ulism was commonly assessed in terms of what kinds of goals its 
advocates claim to adhere to, thereby allowing them to consistently 
feature in the mediatized debates by discussing their welfare nation-
alist political agenda. 
In the context of the post-2011 institutional persistence phase of 
the Perussuomalaiset party, examined in this chapter, the neo-pop-
ulists have been decreasingly able to set the terms of their exposure 
in the media. As a result of critical media attention, culminating in 
the scandal-framed news articles, the focus of the narrative contes-
tations concerning the neo-populist advocacy has shifted away from 
the legitimacy of their welfare nationalist “immigration critical” 
political agenda to the legitimacy of actions taken by neo-populist 
politicians. 
This kind of shift in the subject matter of the public debate con-
cerning a maturing neo-populist party and its political constitu-
ency is not particular to Finland, but reflects the developments in 
the challenges that right-wing populism has earlier encountered in 
other European countries. While some these challenges vary greatly 
in different national contexts, there are certain similarities in how 
those challenges develop in relation to the maturity of the populist 
political organization. In particular (as discussed in more detail in 
the chapter 2.3), the transition from the phase of electoral “break-
through” into the phase of institutional “persistence” commonly 
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leads to situation, where the position of a radical alternative to tra-
ditional parties is no longer considered to attract requisite levels of 
media attention or popular support (Schain, Zolberg and Hossay 
2002, 3–17). 
An important and highly mediatized challenge brought about 
by this transition pertains to the endeavors of “the radical alter-
native” (such as the neo-populist welfare nationalism) to produce 
salient public narratives for presenting itself as a respectable and se-
rious political actor. Once bad publicity is no longer good publicity, 
but rather a challenge to the institutional persistence of a populist 
movement (Ellinas 2010, 206–207), successfully developing subject 
positioning narratives for legitimizing neo-populism in the public 
debate becomes an important priority for the discussants. 
In this chapter, I have illustrated how the neo-populists’ partici-
pation in this impassionate public debate in Finland has commonly 
required them to construct defensive and justificatory subject po-
sitioning narratives to mitigate and reinterpret the impact of criti-
cal media exposure and the delegitimizing narratives proliferating 
in the online arena. I have pursued the main research objective of 
this empirical chapter by employing narrative analysis of four pairs 
of oppositional public stories – compiled from the most common 
delegitimizing and legitimizing narratives of neo-populist advoca-
cy from two online arenas of public debate. Through this analysis, 
I have been able underline how polarization of the public opin-
ion through narrative contestation between distinct pro and anti 
neo-populist public stories has served to consolidate a neo-populist 
self-understanding and a sense of collectivity as a resonant collective 
identity.
One of the main dynamics through which these narrative contes-
tations can facilitate a sense of neo-populist collectivity is related to 
the fact that the two neo-populist scandal cases analyzed – both re-
ceiving the extremely salient front-page exposure in the mainstream 
media – revolve around political performances that the neo-popu-
list discussants have been keen to frame as “satirical” or “humorous” 
action. This is hardly a coincidence. Rather, the prominence of this 
framing can be conceptualized through the  “programmatic flex-
ibility” that is commonly considered to characterize neo-populist 
politics (Ellinas 2010, 74). By narrating their political performances 
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through the frame of humor or satire, the Perussuomalaiset MPs ren-
der their mobilization narratives open to several possible interpre-
tations, allowing the neo-populists to seek political support from a 
wide range of different factions within their heterogeneous political 
constituency. 
The narrative analysis indicates, however, that this feature of im-
preciseness is also commonly operationalized in the delegitimizing 
public stories. Each of the four stories that challenge the legitimacy 
of neo-populist advocacy point out that neo-populists are not ad-
hering to some of the most important norms of acceptable humor 
in political rhetoric, but insist on performing fascist gestures and 
making racist or xenophobic remarks in public. The delegitimiz-
ing public stories also challenge the political accountability in the 
neo-populist practice of resorting to satirical political rhetoric – re-
gardless of the acceptability of the humor per se – on the account 
that it makes harder for anyone to differentiate “jokes” from those 
public articulations that the neo-populists are willing to actually 
stand behind. 
In the legitimizing storylines – such as the ones criticizing the 
Hirvisaari case – the discussants juxtapose humorous acts with se-
rious political performances. They maintain that former should not 
be subjected to the kind of scrutiny in public as the latter, but that 
the neo-populists should be allowed to simply resign from the per-
formances if they are deemed in public as “bad jokes.” These stories 
consider the authors of delegitimizing narratives to unfairly criticiz-
ing the neo-populist collectivity, suggesting that the fair treatment 
of neo-populism in public would require that the performances that 
their advocates frame as jokes can only be laughed at or not laughed 
at, but never taken seriously. From the fact that the limits of accept-
able humor are nevertheless invoked in the public debate against the 
neo-populist advocates, the legitimizing storyline suggests that the 
critics are deliberately hitting the neo-populist collectivity below 
the belt by insisting that it is important what is done by some “mis-
guided poor sod affiliated to neo-populists.” As such, this legitimiz-
ing storyline narrates a victimized sense of collective neo-populist 
identity, concluding that “they” are obviously out to get “us.” 
In Halla-aho’s case, the delegitimizing storylines further chal-
lenge neo-populism by suggesting that the instances of neo-populist 
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satire are not just failed attempts at humor, but are deliberately de-
vised to instill racist and xenophobic attitudes in the public for the 
purpose of mobilizing less-informed people to support neo-populist 
politics. 
The legitimizing story launched against this critique reproduces 
a sense on neo-populist collective identity around narratives that 
seek to operationalize anti-establishment attitudes considered com-
mon among neo-populist advocates (Schedler 1996, 303). Rather 
than entering in a deliberative exchange with the delegitimizing sto-
ry by debating the proliferation of racism as a possible outcome of 
using racialized stereotypes in Halla-aho’s “satire,” the neo-populist 
discussants position themselves as descendants of “Galileo Galilei,” 
facing a “contemporary Inquisition” in the form in the Finnish Su-
preme Court. This storyline further juxtaposes “the Finnish people” 
– represented by the neo-populists who are willing to be convicted 
in order to protect the freedom of speech – with the tyrannical grey 
eminence of the political elite. 
In addition to reinforcing anti-establishment attitudes, the le-
gitimizing public stories can be also seen as manifestations of the 
neo-populist collective identity-work based narratives that reify cer-
tain specific enemy categories (Canovan 2005, 74–76; Caiani, della 
Porta and Wagemann 2012, 110). Two such enemy categories – an 
internal and an external one – feature particularly prominently in 
the legitimizing stories. 
The internal enemy is invoked particularly often in Hirvisaari’s 
case. It consists of “snitches,” regarded as purposefully playing into 
the hands of the political opponents of neo-populism, and “retards” 
who are indirectly undermining “the cause” by performing any acts 
that can turn the public opinion against them. The external one is 
commonly referred to as “the Green-Left faction,” the puppeteer 
pulling strings in the mainstream media and responsible for polit-
icizing the judicial system. The members of this faction, often em-
bodied in the seemingly harmless symbolic figure of a “lady wearing 
a flowery hat”, are thought to be motivated by the joint effort of 
turning Finland into a multiculturalist dystopia to be eventually led 
by these ruthless “Green Khmers.” 
The two arch-enemies are not only narrated as the political op-
ponents of the neo-populist collectivity. Rather, considering that 
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the “true advocates” of neo-populism are representing the mono-
lithic category of “the Finnish people” at large, their enemies are 
portrayed as “despicable creatures lashing out against hardworking 
Finns in their own country.”
In addition to the explicit subject matter in the legitimizing nar-
ratives, the consolidation of neo-populist collective identity is also 
facilitated by implicit features in the public stories that manifest the 
“emotionalizing logic of media populism” (Mudde 2007, 249–251). 
The strong emotional attachment to the “true neo-populist cause” 
is reinforced in the debates through frequent use of exclamations 
marks, capital letters, obscenities and militant metaphorical lan-
guage, and these emotional appeals are often employed to encourage 
the discussants and their audience to join the neo-populists ranks. 
These appeals typically narrate the available positions vis-à-vis the 
neo-populist collectivity as reduced into the dichotomy: “Either 
take arms and fight with us for the freedom of speech NOW!, or go 
live in a shithole like North Korea embracing Sharia!” 
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7 Result s: 
  
Consolidat ion of  Neo-Populis t  
Advocacy in  Public  Debate through 
Welfare  Nat ionalis t  Nar rat ives  on the 
Poli t ics  of  Immigrat ion
In this dissertation, I have set out to explore the increasing presence 
of neo-populist and welfare nationalist narratives in Finnish public 
debate during the 2000s. While the development of this analytical 
narrative has been a highly progressive endeavor, with the collection 
and coding of each data set informing the subsequent delineations 
of focus for the empirical analysis, two primary research aims have 
persisted from the very beginning of this process and guided the 
progressive research design for this dissertation monograph.
First of all, in order to complement the existing body of research 
literature for explaining the increasing support for neo-populist 
welfare nationalism and “immigration critique,” I have sought to 
analyze the subject matter of welfare nationalist narratives for mo-
bilizing new constituencies and justifying neo-populist advocacy in 
various arenas of public debate. In order to achieve this, I first looked 
into the emergent welfare nationalist rhetoric in the high political 
arena, prior to the political breakthrough of the neo-populist Perus-
suomalaiset party. I was able to identify four key narratives through 
which the political control of immigration was framed as one of 
the most important issues for supporting an idealized construction 
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of the encompassing welfare state against its globalized challenges. 
I then proceeded to explore how this foundational welfare nation-
alist meta-narrative was operationalized in the highly successful 
neo-populist political mobilization, both at the party political level 
of electoral programmes and in grassroots level online discussions.
By the time I started to analyze the material collected from the 
period after the electoral breakthrough the Perussuomalaiset party, 
I encountered more opportunities for pursuing the second research 
aim of illustrating the neo-populist narrative agency and the stra-
tegic social action for promoting neo-populism in the mainstream 
public sphere. I began to notice a pattern structuring the narratives 
with which neo-populist advocacy began to consolidate in the pub-
lic debate. While the pre-populist narratives of welfare nationalism 
were all about the subject matter of the immigration-oriented politi-
cal agenda, the mobilization narratives incorporated more and more 
elements, or building blocks, of neo-populist collective identity that 
were articulated in the interstices of the welfare nationalist political 
agenda. Once the focus of the empirical analysis shifted towards the 
less formal arenas of public debate in chapters 5 and 6, the narra-
tives employed in the data appeared to be decreasingly defined by 
articulations of policy-level approaches to the perceived ailments of 
the welfare state. Especially in the social media and the online fora, 
the narratives pertained increasingly to those welfare state pertinent 
norms and values that the neo-populist advocates employ when po-
sitioning themselves as the representatives of the reified category of 
“the Finnish people.” 
By the virtue of having conducted an extensive, multidisciplinary 
literature review, I was able to advance both research aims simulta-
neously by operationalizing them into three distinct research ques-
tions that could be pursued with specific analytical lenses extrapo-
lated from the body of research literature. By triangulating between 
the lenses of nationalist boundary-drawing, welfare state idealization 
and strategic neo-populist social action, I chose to pursue the aims 
of this doctoral study through an analytical narrative built around 
three distinct research questions:
1. How do welfare nationalist narratives operationalize the nation-
alist, blue-and-white conceptualizations of “the nation” and “the 
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people”? What kinds of narratives link these concepts to the poli-
tics of immigration and delineate an exclusionary set of criteria for 
belonging to the Finnish national community? 
2. How are idealized reinterpretations concerning the legacy of the 
welfare state narrated as the foundation of the welfare nationalist 
political agenda? What kind of public understanding of welfare sol-
idarity do these mediatized neo-populist narratives promote?
3. How do the neo-populist advocates facilitate salient media expo-
sure for their political presence in various arenas of public debate? 
How do they seek to make use of this exposure and consolidate 
support from heterogeneous political constituencies into a resonant 
neo-populist collective identity? 
The following subsections of this chapter discuss the findings 
in the empirical part of this dissertation. As the empirical chap-
ters each examine different facets of the phenomena that all three 
research questions pertain to, I chose not to summarize my results 
chapter by chapter. Instead, in following subsections I construct a 
synthesizing discussion that answers each of the research questions 
with the results from the empirical analysis. 
7.1 Narrating the Importance of Immigration Politics  
through Welfare Nationalist Boundary-Work 
The first decisive results from the empirical analysis pertain to the 
data collected from the period I have reconstructed as the first of 
critical turning points in the consolidation of neo-populist advoca-
cy (for more detailed discussion on the critical turning points, see 
chapter 3.2). The point of departure in the analytical narrative ad-
vanced in this study is that common features in the articulation of 
welfare nationalism first manifested in the political rhetoric as part 
of the politicization of the role of the welfare state in the management 
of immigration during the early 2000s. 
Facing challenges in the maintenance of the universalist welfare 
state in the globalized era, the Perussuomalaiset – together with doz-
ens of MPs across the party political spectrum of the Finnish parlia-
ment – sought to secure public profile as resourceful politicians by 
presenting themselves as authors of prudent immigration legislation 
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through which globalized challenges can be tackled. By narrating 
several potential immigration-related challenges, the parliamentar-
ians sought to draw attention to the importance of their own work 
in the development of the Aliens Act of 2004, thereby emphasizing 
the necessity of a heightened role of the state in the management 
and control of immigration. 
This early statist narrative was picked up by the Perussuomalaiset 
party during the second turning point, neo-populist mainstreaming 
of the welfare nationalist political agenda, in the end of the first de-
cade of the 2000s. By presenting immigration as one of the most 
pressing socio-political challenges for the welfare state – one that 
politicians have not yet dared to tackle properly – the neo-populists 
were able to position themselves as the blue-and-white alternative to 
the old parties. Rallying around the welfare state as the symbol of 
national pride – and the reason why it is like “winning the jackpot 
in a lottery” to be born in Finland – the neo-populists sought to 
downplay their associations to nationalist radicalism and present 
a mainstreamed version of welfare nationalist politics. Narrating 
welfare nationalism as the neo-populist set of tools for tackling 
problems of immigration that the other parties have not dared to 
address properly, the neo-populists could position themselves as the 
representatives of the interests of “the normal Finnish people.” 
It must be noted, though, that the parliamentarians in the high 
political arena who emphasized the state’s role in immigration control 
employed statist narratives to reach highly divergent conclusions and 
normative assessments concerning immigration to Finland. Some of 
the addresses to the parliament floor that sought to establish guide-
lines for the legislative process interpreted immigration as a dire 
challenge while others conceptualized immigration as an exceptional 
opportunity for the Finnish welfare state. Regardless of whether the 
MPs related to immigration primarily as an untapped labour resource 
or a socio-political item of expenditure, their addresses commonly 
employed instrumentalist narratives that emphasized its potential ma-
terial implications, the costs and the gains of immigration. Very few 
exact figures featured in the instrumentalist narratives, however, and 
the costs and gains were instead quantified with imprecise expressions 
and adjectives. This feature of the early instrumentalist narratives was 
also adopted in neo-populist narratives of political mobilization. 
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While occasionally marked by the hope of reaping great econom-
ic gains through successful implementation of immigration politics 
in the future, the early instrumentalist narratives commonly priori-
tized the prevention of the ill-effects of immigration. This emphasis 
was justified by referring to the notion that Finland had only very 
recently become a country of immigration, arguably rendering the 
Finnish welfare state highly fragile during the period of transition 
from a relatively homogeneous monoculture to a diverse society. 
A shared concern for the future of the country was most explic-
itly assessed with regard to accentuation of the economic hurdles 
for financing the welfare redistributions at the core of the welfare 
state. The emphasis on prudent management of welfare spending 
commonly manifested in the immigration debates as demands for 
stricter mechanisms for assessing the need of asylum. The prolifera-
tion of these demands contributed significantly to the conflation of 
the categories of the immigrant and the asylum seeker. When im-
migration in general was narrated as an item of expenditure for the 
welfare state, immigrants were perceived in dichotomizing terms 
in the high political arena. On the one hand, there were the im-
migrants in legitimate distress, and on the other, there were the 
“welfare shoppers” and those who submitted bogus applications for 
asylum. By promising the public to be stringent with the taxpayers’ 
monies by preventing economic redistribution to the “undeserving” 
immigrants, the MPs in the high political arena in the beginning 
of the 2000s and the neo-populist during the 2011 elections alike 
positioned themselves as important proponents of policy solutions. 
Without them, the inflow of aspirant immigrants to Finland could 
excessively burden the public spending and deteriorate the position 
of the Finnish people. 
There is one important commonality related to the way in which 
“the Finnish people” is invoked in immigration debates analyzed 
in the first two critical turning points and during the third one 
– mediatized catalysis of neo-populist identity-work – examined in 
the final empirical chapter. In each of the five data sets, welfare 
nationalist and neo-populist narratives frequently use the ambig-
uous term “Finns.” In Finnish, this term denotes both the group 
consisting of ethnic Finns only as well as the civic community of 
Finnish citizens. The narrative analysis advanced in three chapters 
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suggests that this ambiguity is often intentional in the immigra-
tion debates. It allows discussants to simultaneously appeal to more 
radical constituencies with a strong ethno-nationalist “Finns first” 
agenda, and the majority of moderate civic republicans who were 
prepared to accept the extension of universalist politics of welfare 
redistribution to immigrants and other ethnic minorities (if only 
on arguably “culture blind” terms). In the data collected from the 
scandal debates, the neo-populist online discussants further oper-
ationalized this category in narratives that juxtapose “the real peo-
ple” with the corrupt political elite and the unpatriotic opponents 
of the neo-populist advocates. This conceptualization of the people 
was employed commonly in the public stories seeking to legitimate 
neo-populist advocacy against its critics, suggesting that those who 
do not consider neo-populists as their representatives do not belong 
in the great majority of patriotic Finnish people.
While the costs and gains approach and the concern for the 
future of the welfare state permeated much of the early immigra-
tion debates across the party political spectrum, there was much 
variation in mechanisms through which immigration was narrated 
as a particularly significant challenge for the welfare state in the 
early high political debates. In addition to the direct costs of im-
migration, many politicians – especially the right-wing conserva-
tives – were also concerned with the implications of immigration 
to the sense of national solidarity among the people. By suggesting 
that the heterogenization of the Finnish society is largely immi-
gration-induced, conservatives were able to narrate their political 
agenda as based on common Finnish values, thereby reinforcing an 
exclusionary conceptualization concerning the boundaries of be-
longing to the national community. 
In neo-populist political mobilization of the welfare national-
ist political agenda, much of the nationalist boundary-work and 
the emphasis on civic solidarity were, however, justified through 
instrumentalist narratives. For example, the outspoken rationale 
given for assimilating immigrants into “the Finnish culture” in the 
Perussuomalaiset electoral programme was that the bonds of soli-
darity among the citizens of the same nation are instrumental in 
maintaining the people’s willingness to pay taxes and preserve the 
welfare state as the crown jewel of healthy national pride. In the 
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next subsection, I discuss in more detail how this idealized legacy of 
an empowering and ubiquitous welfare state is invoked as the rally-
ing point of welfare nationalist politics and neo-populist collective 
identity.   
7.2 The Idealized Legacy of the Welfare State as the Narrative  
Justification for Exclusionary Conceptualizations of Solidarity
In the early high political debates, one of the most common narra-
tives for justifying the state’s heightened role in the management of 
immigration pertained to the Finnish tradition of consensual deci-
sion-making. Many of the MPs and the public officials participating 
in the legislative process of the Aliens Act of 2004 emphasized that 
the existing practices for hearing minorities guarantee the fairness 
of the process and its outcome. Some of the discussants, however, 
pointed out that even though it is occasionally not feasible to im-
plement minority views expressed in the hearing process and in the 
dissenting voices in the parliament, the process remains legitimate. 
After all, isn’t this the very democratic process in which legislation 
has “always” been developed in Finland? The notion that Finland 
would have to change some of its practices to guarantee pluralist 
power sharing in order to accommodate the diverse needs emerging 
from the heterogenization of civil society was only rarely raised, and 
summarily dismissed, in the high political arena during the early 
2000s. 
Instead, the debates were marked by a strong belief in the ideal-
ized capabilities of the Nordic welfare state for ensuring universalist 
distribution of welfare and fair arbitration between diverse inter-
ests. Moreover, these redistributive capabilities were presented in 
the mainstream arenas of political debated as primarily challenged 
by developments external to the Finnish welfare state; most signifi-
cantly by globalization, immigration and the alleged evidence of the 
irresponsible politics of multiculturalism for managing them in sev-
eral poorer countries in EU with higher levels of immigration. To 
the extent that the immigrant voice is not apparent in the outcome 
of the Finnish political process, the consensualist narrative runs, 
this is only due to immigrants’ collective position as a political mi-
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nority. This should not be a considered a problem in the democratic 
process, since every Finn finds himself once in a while in political 
minority. Some discussants even argued that the Finnish parliament 
could “do the right thing” in its immigration policy more if it were 
less concerned with “doing things right.” By suggesting that the 
procedural requirements to protect minorities are often superfluous 
in an exemplary democratic country such as Finland, the consen-
sualist narrative reinforces trust in the encompassing and potent 
welfare state as idealized national project (Wickström 2013, 55). 
This kind of welfare state idealization is also employed in statist 
narratives that call for increased control over immigration. There is, 
however, a distinct difference in how welfare state idealization was 
operationalized in the early high political debates and the neo-pop-
ulist mobilization of welfare nationalist political agenda. As op-
posed to the later neo-populist narratives of exclusionary welfare 
nationalism, for many discussants in the high political arena the 
explicit point of departure in their calls for heightened political con-
trol of immigration was not that immigration is necessarily a great 
threat for the welfare state. Rather, the main rationale for increasing 
political control over immigration was that even if immigration is 
not a substantial problem in Finland, the state should still be vest-
ed with immigration-related policy instruments, because with them 
the welfare state is able to greatly improve the quality of life of im-
migrants and the autochthonous population alike.
When neo-populists first began to secure votes from Finnish 
middle class constituencies, one of the first hurdles they encoun-
tered related to their profile that was tarnished in public by vari-
ous delegitimizing narratives associating the neo-populist advocates 
with racism, xenophobia and political radicalism. Operationalizing 
an idealized belief in the capabilities of the welfare state in their mo-
bilization rhetoric, the neo-populists could present a mainstreamed 
version of their exclusionary political agenda to the public eye. 
As the proponents of this emerging welfare nationalism, the 
neo-populist advocates talked extensively about money – and the 
challenges in financing the welfare economy in particular. Rather 
than arguing that the welfare state should maintain national unity, 
like the Sverigedemokraterna did in Sweden at the time, the Perus-
suomalaiset party turned the argument around in their electoral 
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programmes in 2008 and 2011. Having identified a growing insecu-
rity in the public debate concerning the future of the welfare state 
in a globalized era, the Perussuomalaiset argued that a sense of joint 
purpose and national solidarity was essential in the endeavors to 
save “our” welfare state. Their problem narrative concerning immi-
gration was that it increases the heterogeneity of values in Finland 
and that this erosion of a common value base threatens the public 
support for welfare spending
Implicit in this problem narrative was an idealized conceptu-
alization concerning the legacy of the welfare state. According to 
it, the welfare state – before the introduction of immigration and 
globalization – was forged by the singular will of the Finnish peo-
ple and was by that virtue able to redistribute resources equally to 
among the citizens. Obviously, assessing the contemporary welfare 
state against this excessively high, reified standard inflates any of 
its real or imaginary flaws, imperfections and challenges. This gave 
the Perussuomalaiset an excellent position to argue from the oppo-
sition. By arguing that the political elite has failed in its task as the 
caretaker of the welfare state, the neo-populist insistence on stricter 
immigration policy could be narrated as “the simple remedy” that 
has hitherto remained untested only due to the timidity, political 
correctness and corruption in the old parties. 
Using the preservation of the welfare state as the justification for 
their political agenda also allowed neo-populists to conceptualize 
national solidarity in exclusionary terms, but insulate themselves 
from the critique of nurturing racists or xenophobes among their 
ranks. Both the PS party elite and the grassroots level online discus-
sants systematically dismissed such accusations by narrating their 
political goals with regard to the welfare economy. They asserted 
that even though the costs of immigration have been deliberately 
hidden from the public, by cutting the excess in these costs – in-
duced by the bogus asylum seekers and welfare abusers – the wel-
fare state’s days of glory can be restored. When this is eventually 
achieved by the neo-populists with a political mandate from the 
Finnish people, and the economic burden on the welfare state is 
eased, Finland would once again be perfectly prepared to cater the 
needs of the deserving poor – also including the refugees who have 
been driven to this country due to a “real distress.” 
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During the third critical turning point, marked by the medi-
atized challenging of neo-populist advocacy, the key contestations 
revolve around the legitimacy of the neo-populist collectivity rather 
the welfare nationalist political agenda. Even so, the legitimizing 
public stories of neo-populist advocacy commonly invoke the ideal-
ized legacy of the welfare state as the justification for their provoc-
ative outbursts in the media, arguing that their laudable welfare 
nationalist cause should justify occasional resorts to questionable 
means by the Perussuomalaiset. For example, the use of inappropri-
ate jokes is defended by neo-populists as means of securing public 
exposure for the purpose of raising awareness among “the Finns” on 
the “real problems” haunting the welfare state. Moreover, some of 
the most common enemy categories are constructed by positioning 
the political opponents of neo-populism – such as the pro-immigra-
tion “Green Khmers” – as proponents of a “multiculturalist perver-
sion of the welfare state.” 
7.3 Strategic Social Action in the Consolidation of Neo-Populism 
as a Resonant Collective Identity in the Public Sphere 
In the chapter 2.3, I discussed strategic social action in detail 
with reference to the sociological theory of fields. In the empirical 
analysis, this strategic social action manifests most lucidly in the 
neo-populist mobilization based on loosely defined and constantly 
evolving welfare nationalist political goals. Indeed, the social skill 
required for instilling a sense of collective identity across a markedly 
heterogeneous constituency is in making these goals open-ended 
enough to justify a wide range of narratives that can be strategically 
tailored for specific arenas of public debate. (Fligstein and McAdam 
2012, 47–48). This kind of social skill is particularly important for 
the chameleonic neo-populist collectivity whose ideological core is 
in a perpetual state of flux (Taggart 2000, 4, 117).  
Strategic neo-populist social action, the analytical lens most heavi-
ly influenced by these considerations is mostly used in the narrative 
analysis of third critical turning point, the mediatized catalysis of 
neo-populist identity-work. In hindsight, however, interesting mani-
festations of strategic social action can also be found in earlier phases 
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of the consolidation of neo-populist advocacy. For instance, instead 
of interpreting the neo-populists’ emphasis on welfare economy as 
rational pursuit of a fixed political goal, the welfare nationalist nar-
ratives can be interpreted as opportunistic operationalizations of an 
open-ended agenda for political mobilization. This interpretation 
finds support in the empirical analysis of the high political arena, 
where welfare nationalist mobilization only took off after the polit-
icization of “the immigration question” by MPs across the political 
spectrum. This served to create a niche for political movement with 
the political agenda where immigration politics features as a priority 
for the development of social policy in Finland. Responding to an 
increasing sense of precariousness in public debate with the promise 
to save the welfare state with heightened measures for controlling 
guaranteed the advocates of welfare nationalism salient exposure in 
the media well in the early 2000s, contributing to the first political 
victory for the Perussuomalaiset in the 2008 municipal elections.
One of the most decisive exercises in strategic social action – fa-
cilitating salient and constant exposure in the media – can be traced 
back to the profuse denials of racism during second critical turning 
point when the neo-populist advocates sought to mainstream their 
welfare nationalist political agenda prior to the 2011 parliamentary 
elections. In this kind of a situation, the textbook example of ratio-
nal political action by advocates of a traditional political movement 
with a fixed goal would have been to clearly articulate their position 
on the explicit issues on their political agenda, and only respond 
their to critics as curtly as possible. The neo-populist grassroots level 
advocates, however, did the very opposite thing. They only alluded 
to the specifics of their political agenda in a vague and abstract 
manner, while being particularly keen on debating the accusations 
of racism. 
Although the most vocal accusations of racism pertained to the 
exclusionary and unequal elements on the welfare nationalist po-
litical agenda, the neo-populist discussants employed justificatory 
narratives that exemplified the personalizing and emotionalizing 
logic of media populism (Mudde 2007, 249–251). As illustrated in 
the fifth chapter, the most common narratives with which neo-pop-
ulists participated in public debate pertained to various ways of de-
nying racism, underlining their personally felt outrage at being crit-
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icized. They further insisted that the accusations of racism against 
neo-populist advocates challenge the most basic right to free polit-
ical expression in Finland. At the same, time the discussants, who 
mostly debated the racist motivation behind their “immigration 
critique,” also lamented the sad state of public debate based on the 
observation that most of the discussion pertains to the discussion 
itself and its participants, rather than what they suggested was the 
actual beef, immigration policy. 
From the perspective of strategic social action, there is nothing 
illogical in this behavior by the neo-populist advocates. Taking into 
account the short attention span, particularly in the tabloid media, 
it would have been an onerous task to consistently feature in the 
headlines by relying solely on the relatively simple narratives for 
justifying the necessity of welfare nationalist revision of immigra-
tion politics. On the other hand, with the perpetual proliferation of 
impassionate emotional contestations, the neo-populists succeeded 
in securing stable exposure in the mainstream media. The prolonged 
exposure in the mainstream media also allowed the neo-populists to 
communicate their message to those constituencies who have been 
traditionally hard to reach with conventional means by the tradi-
tional parties, particularly the abstainers and the dot.net generation 
who are disproportionally and increasingly represented in the Pe-
russuomalaiset electorate (Rahkonen 2011, 434; Vaalitutkimuskon-
sortio 2012).
Being able to secure political support from several heterogeneous 
constituencies at once is one of most desirable outcomes for a po-
litical movement. While traditional parties often seek this outcome 
by rushing to the middle, the neo-populists operationalized their 
open-ended politics of exclusionary welfare nationalism with a two-
pronged strategy. For example, narrating immigration control as the 
panacea for the ailing welfare state, the Finnish neo-populists were 
able to play two hands at the same time. On the one hand, they 
suggested that with strict control of immigration, the net-benefi-
ciaries of welfare redistribution – particularly among the poor and 
in the working class constituencies – could avoid being cut out as 
a result of increased public spending on immigration. This kind of 
argumentation was very common in the 2008 electoral programme 
of the Perussuomalaiset party. In their 2011 programme, however, 
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the neo-populists sought also to accommodate the middle classes 
by suggesting that by stopping “the uncontrolled flows of immigra-
tion”, the neo-populists could save taxpayers’ monies to a significant 
degree. As very few exact figures were available for the neo-populists 
to support this interpretation, they sought to place the blame for 
this on public officials and corrupt politicians, who are afraid to 
reveal the exact costs of immigration.
Another important operationalization of this two-pronged strat-
egy can be found in the recent proliferation of neo-populist use of 
political “satire” for managing their public image (Pyrhönen 2014). 
This is made particularly lucid in the two high-profile political scan-
dals examined in the last empirical chapter. Conventional political 
parties are typically wary of welcoming people with criminal con-
victions or associated with political radicalism. The Perussuomal-
aiset party, however, has sought to make use of the mediatized con-
testations concerning such people among their ranks by renouncing 
their actions, while nevertheless accepting new similar people into 
the party ranks, guaranteeing the steady flow of scandal publicity. 
This practice, complemented with the strategy of framing the pre-
carious public performances, ensures that the radical portion of the 
neo-populist advocates knows that their views are at least tacitly 
represented in the Perussuomalaiset party, while the moderates are 
happy to witness “the spine” and “strong political leadership” in the 
occasional expulsions of such people from the neo-populist ranks. 
The critical media exposure, most lucidly exemplified in the con-
tested scandal debates concerning two Perussuomalaiset MPs, also 
facilitates a victimized sense of collective identity. The consolidation 
of victimized sense of collectivity is advanced most forcefully with-
in the hermetic sphericules of social media. Reinterpreting the im-
plications of daily headlines from a neo-populist point of view, the 
advocates – confronted with delegitimizing narratives of public cri-
tique – commonly position themselves as champions of the nation 
whose satire is deliberately misrepresented in the media. Among the 
most common of these victimized self-depictions is the figure of the 
underdog in the media war, facing the ruthless political elite and 
that of the selfless pariah, willing to sacrifice himself in order to save 
the welfare state for the future generations. 
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8 Conclusions: 
  
Rethinking the Role  of  Welfare  
Nat ionalis t  Nar rat ives  in  the  
Mediat ized Consolidat ion of  the 
Neo-Populis t  Collec t ivit y
As a researcher, one of the primary motivations for undertaking 
this doctoral research project was academic curiosity concerning 
the advocacy for the so-called “immigration critical” movement. 
From very early stages of this project, it was clear that I would have 
to craft an interdisciplinary research design, and employ analytical 
tools from various research traditions, most importantly from polit-
ical sociology, political science and media studies, in order to meet 
the research aims set out in this doctoral study. 
In the literature review I conducted, I learned a lot from the 
existing research traditions on neo-populism and nationalist right-
wing radicalism, particularly concerning the explanatory avenues 
emphasizing the personal motivations and the political opportunity 
structures behind the rise of these movements. Some of the most 
concrete dimensions of their public presence, most importantly per-
taining to the neo-populist narratives for mobilizing new constitu-
encies and presenting their political agenda with socially acceptable 
framings, appeared to be understudied – a lacuna I hoped to remedy 
in this dissertation.
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During the literature review, I encountered something of a par-
adox that I was particularly keen to examine as the first task in 
filling gaps in the compound academic literature I am referring to 
as “critical nationalism studies.” Namely, if the role of economy is 
really only secondary in the political agenda of radical right-wing 
parties (Mudde 2007, 119–120), how is it that the “immigration 
critical” movement and its neo-populist advocates have managed to 
disproportionately shift the focus in Finnish immigration debate to 
questions of economic costs and gains (Keskinen, Rastas and Tuori 
2009b, 8)? Obviously, by trying to answer this question, I encoun-
tered several others that were not addressed in the existing literature 
either. Have the Finnish neo-populists purposefully sought to shift 
the focus of the public debate towards the questions of welfare econ-
omy – and are they happy with this outcome – or is it an unwanted 
consequence of some other important factors at play? And if the lat-
ter, what are these factors, and to what extent are they particular to 
the Finnish context? Based on the literature review, I decided to em-
ploy three distinct analytical lenses in this study in order to tackle 
these questions from different angles, triangulating between several 
relevant approaches to neo-populism and welfare nationalism.
Employing the lens of welfare state idealization as the point of 
departure for analyzing the narratives of early welfare nationalism, I 
soon discovered that exclusionary conceptualizations solidarity were 
not introduced into public debate by neo-populists. Rather, they 
were reappropriated by neo-populists from the political rhetoric al-
ready present in the high political arena well before their successful 
political mobilization in the second half of the first decade of 2000s. 
The instrumentalist narratives – emphasizing economic necessities 
and the lack of political alternatives for diminishing public spend-
ing – were first employed by neo-liberal and right-wing politicians 
in the traditional parties. Although these parties initially considered 
questions of immigration as something of a minor footnote in the 
process for restructuring the Finnish welfare state in the globalized 
era, by employing these narratives they nevertheless inadvertently 
helped to create a niche for neo-populist politicization of immigra-
tion through welfare nationalist mobilization narratives. 
Using the ubiquitous fear for the future of the welfare state with-
in the civil society as the seedbed for mobilizing their constituen-
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cies, the neo-populists were the first to position themselves as sav-
iors of the welfare state with their anti-establishment opposition to 
immigration politics as the panacea for the welfare state’s globalized 
challenges. This seedbed and the political opportunity structures it 
entails were not built by the neo-populists alone. During the early 
2000s, the established parties had already framed the challenge of 
immigration as economic in nature, and one bearing important im-
plications for the future prospects of the welfare state. The neo-pop-
ulists were able to justify their endeavors to further politicize “the 
immigration question” and present the exclusionary elements on 
their welfare nationalist political agenda for the mainstream audi-
ences as part of mundane political debate on welfare economy.
Does the strategic nature of reasons for employing welfare na-
tionalist narratives in the neo-populist political mobilization sug-
gest that the economic considerations are secondary to their “core 
ideology”, as some political scientist have suggested? Cas Mudde 
– having provocatively named a chapter in his book “It’s not the 
economy, stupid!” – admits that since his empirical material does 
not cover any of the so-called Nordic welfare states and that the 
applicability of his conclusion in these contexts should be regarded 
as a hypothesis to be tested (2007, 5). Accordingly, on the basis of 
the results of the empirical analysis in this study, I argue that the 
narratives consolidating a neo-populist collective identity in con-
temporary Finland necessitate some degree of reassessment of Mud-
de’s hypothesis. 
This argument finds some support also in existing literature. 
Firstly, the significance of the welfare economy discourse for jus-
tifying a right-wing populist agenda appears accentuated in the 
context where an overarching, consensual support for the welfare 
state exists across a multiparty system and voters (Hemerijk 2002, 
175). This makes it difficult for any political actor to mobilize large 
constituencies by advocating a substantive restructuring of welfare 
spending in general, and gives considerable justificatory potential 
to the narratives that present the sustainability of the welfare state 
a core value. Once people are increasingly mobilized through such 
economic narratives – even if they are only strategic to begin with 
– it becomes harder for neo-populist advocates to position welfare 
nationalism as anything else but a neo-populist core value.
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Secondly, Mudde bases his hypothesis (2007, 135) on previous 
research indicating that when electorates consist of “groups with 
opposing economic interests (objectively defined),” it is taken for 
granted that economy is largely a secondary issue (see, for example, 
Evans 2005; Ivarslaten 2005). It is possible to challenge the extent 
to which this is applicable in the Nordic context that is marked by 
a relatively encompassing welfare system. Under such a compara-
tively universalist system, the economic interests between classes 
are considered to coincide to a greater degree, since a significant 
portion of the population belongs simultaneously both in financers 
and net-beneficiaries of the welfare system (Esping-Andersen 1990, 
22–23, 68–69). Therefore, Nordic political actors in general – and 
neo-populists in particular – can play two hands at once. On the 
one hand, they can appeal to the blue-collared working class that re-
gards itself as net-losers of globalization in general and immigration 
in particular promising to increase or at least maintain the welfare 
spending channelled to them as a result of taking off some other 
extra burden through policy measures. On the other hand, the same 
political actors can reach middle class constituencies by justifying 
the very same anti-immigration policies with reference to tax cuts 
that these policies supposedly allow. 
The argument here is that once the number of people entitled 
to various welfare redistributions is decreased by enacting less im-
migrant-inclusive social policies, the amount of taxpayers’ money 
needed for funding the welfare system can then supposedly be re-
duced, thus enabling tax cuts. Moreover, even the beneficiaries of 
the welfare redistribution are more likely to perceive such tax cuts as 
advantageous within a system where the welfare benefits are subject 
to taxes (as is the case in Finland and Sweden, and unlike in the 
United Kingdom, for instance). These arguments for the heightened 
role of welfare economy rhetoric find further support in the fact that 
neo-populists in Finland were able to rapidly expanding their sup-
port among the middle classes, who traditionally emphasize con-
siderations for the economy when aligning themselves politically 
(Rahkonen 2011).
The empirical analysis in this study nevertheless indicates that 
neo-populists – even when constructing an economic justification 
of anti-immigration politics – rarely feel the need to present any 
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concrete, causal mechanisms through which the implementation of 
anti-immigration measures they propose would remedy the prob-
lems attributed to immigration. As long as substantial arguments 
against the alleged welfare economic advantages for implementing 
stricter immigration policy find low saliency in the media, neo-pop-
ulists can reach moderate and mainstream constituencies with wel-
fare nationalist narratives that downplay the ethno-cultural and 
xenophobic logic inherent in their opposition to immigration and 
multiculturalism. 
The relatively low impact of economic arguments against welfare 
nationalism in public debate is not due to a lack of research on the 
subject. Indeed, several studies indicate that it is highly unlikely 
that implementing anti-immigration policies would either alleviate 
the issues welfare states are currently experiencing or help the au-
tochthonous population in any significant way (see, for example, 
Sarvimäki 2010, 286; Creutz-Kämppi, Helander and Pyrhönen 
2011). Even so, neo-populists’ use of welfare nationalist narrative 
justifications for their anti-immigration agenda is not commonly 
challenged in terms of the factual accuracy of their assertions. In-
stead, the public critique against neo-populism is more commonly 
based on delegitimizing narratives that, quite correctly, underline 
the racist and xenophobic consequences of exclusionary welfare na-
tionalism. Consequently, the neo-populist have remained quite suc-
cessful in employing – largely untenable – welfare nationalist narra-
tives that seek to justify anti-immigration and anti-multiculturalist 
policies as an economically necessary for protect the continuing re-
distribution of welfare to the autochthonous population. The lack of 
visibility of economic critique against welfare nationalism in public 
debate facilitates the internalization of narratives that construct im-
migration and multiculturalism as the prime causes for the various 
globalization and heterogenization-related economic and cultural 
challenges. 
As many of these are challenges that Finns (as well as immi-
grants) indeed commonly face, many neo-populists perceive their 
critics’ emphasis on racism and xenophobia as belittling their au-
thentic and valid concerns. This problem is further accentuated by 
the fact that their critics – unlike neo-populists themselves – do not 
present alternative, simple solutions for the complex challenges the 
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welfare state is facing (mostly because such simple solutions do not 
exist). Employing narratives that seek to further emotionalize and 
personalize the public critique, the Finnish neo-populists tend to re-
interpret any public critique as unjustly and inaccurately presenting 
their concerns as motivated by a racialized, ideological conviction, 
thereby allegedly “vilifying the majority in its own country.” 
As I have illustrated in the last chapter of empirical analysis, 
such narratives that promote a victimized self-understanding have 
become particularly proliferate and powerful in hermetic online 
sphericules. In the mediatized contestations of the legitimacy of 
neo-populist advocacy, the subject positionings of the underdog, 
the pariah and the tragic hero gradually took on a life of their own, 
proliferating in public stories that still continue to consolidate a 
victimized collective identity among the neo-populists.
The dilemma is that both the Perussuomalaiset politicians and 
grassroots level neo-populist advocates only employ vague and im-
precise narratives for articulating the causal mechanisms through 
which “immigration critical” policy measures could supposedly 
benefit the Finnish welfare state. Together with the neo-populist 
endeavors to personalize and emotionalize the public debate on im-
migration, it has become increasingly difficult and time-consuming 
to expose these policy measures as unjust and inefficient with sub-
stantial arguments in the hectic and heavily competed media space. 
At the same time, the abstractness of the welfare nationalist polit-
ical agenda allows neo-populists to operationalize many real and 
commonly shared concerns – from the erosion of national solidarity 
to the future of the welfare state – present these globalized chal-
lenges as the outcome of the allegedly immigration-induced heter-
ogenization of the civil society. This furnishes neo-populism and its 
welfare nationalist political agenda with a semblance of non-racially 
motivated core that can be operationalized in public to muster sup-
port even amongst moderate new constituencies. As a consequence 
– notwithstanding the overwhelming empirical evidence pointing 
to anti-immigration policies’ inherently racializing and inequalizing 
outcomes – much of the advocacy for the mainstreamed variant of 
neo-populism appears to be motivated and mobilized by a genuine 
belief in the necessity to resort to neo-populists in an attempt to 
save the welfare state. 
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With the Perussuomalaiset in the government since this spring, an 
important avenue for future research lies in assessing how neo-pop-
ulist narratives continue to develop in the institutional persistence 
phase of the party. After all, they have already endorsed the auster-
ity measures that cut welfare redistributions to the poor and caved 
in to the demands to finance the Euro crisis with taxpayers’ mon-
ies. It would be particularly interesting to analyze if and how the 
neo-populist advocates able to continue to extend welfare nation-
alist narratives to justify their responsibility for actions to its het-
erogeneous constituency and whether the ever increasing pressure 
on the welfare state translate to even more support for exclusionary 
policy measures against immigration.
The recent developments might also provide more opportunities 
to publicly challenge neo-populist narratives for justifying welfare 
nationalist “immigration critique.” One way to achieve this would 
be to complement the current focus on xenophobia and racism in the 
delegitimizing public stories in two ways. To begin with, it would 
be important that public discussants start countering the personal-
ization and emotionalization in public debate on immigration. By 
calmly focusing on the dearth of projected positive outcomes from 
the exclusionary welfare nationalist political agenda, it is possible 
to advance two separate goals. Firstly, this undermines the moral 
resource the neo-populists find in their ability to present themselves 
as the brave victims, selflessly championing the cause of the silent 
majority and carrying the unjustly issued stigma of a racist. Second-
ly, the focus on concrete political outcomes also creates room for 
employing narratives that illustrate how the unjust and exclusion-
ary outcomes – resulting from the implementation of neo-populist 
political agenda – would actually diminish the role the welfare state 
can take in empowering its citizens and denizens at large. 
Finally, there is a distinct need to acknowledge that the concerns 
for the welfare state are valid and can have a prominent role in 
the public debate, even in conjunction with questions of immigra-
tion. This makes it possible to address and illustrate the inefficien-
cy of anti-immigration measures in tackling issues of welfare that 
are presented as justifying anti-immigration advocacy. This entails 
emphasizing that there are very few positive developments that can 
be expected from the implementation of anti-immigration policies. 
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With a joint effort to make it perfectly clear that the globalized 
challenges the welfare state faces are indeed a real and common con-
cern to all Finnish citizens and resident non-Finns alike, it is possi-
ble to make it more difficult for neo-populists to place the blame for 
these concerns to the immigrant Other and other readily available 
scapegoats. 
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Appendix A:  The Exhaust ive  
Lis t ing of  All  the Data Analyzed
Description of the data  
set and its subsets  
in chronological order:
Year(s) 
of origin 
of the 
data:
Year(s) 
of col-
lection 
of the 
data:
Data 
analy-
zed in 
chapter
Background documents and memoranda used or 
produced by the Ministries in preparatory process of 
the Finnish Aliens Act of 2004:
A. Application for continued funding for the research 
project “Haastattelututkimus maahanmuuttajien 
työhönpääsymahdollisuuksista. Erityiskohtee-
na Suomessa asuvat Euroopan ulkopuolelta 
tulevat maahanmuutajat ja työnantajat (dnro 
361/832/98TM)” (Interview Study on the Employ-
ment Prospects of Immigrants), ordered by the 
Ministry of Labour (Institute of Migration 1999)
B. Memorandum produced by the Aliens Act 
task force for a general overview concerning the 
statements collected from the NGOs and various 
branches of government during hearing process 
of Aliens Act (“Yleinen yhteenveto ulkomaalaisla-
kityöryhmän mietinnostä annetuista lausunnoista”)
C. Early minutes of the parliamentary plenary ses-
sion on the revision of the Aliens Act (PTK 40/2003 
vp.)
D. Motion for an alternative revision of the Act, pro-
posed by the Left Alliance MP Esko-Juhani Tennilä 
(LA 163/2003 vp.)
E. Memorandum of the Administrative parliamentary 
committee concerning the governmental bill on the 
Aliens Act and related Acts (HaVM 4/2004 vp.)
F. Interview with the Legislative Councellor Jorma 
Kantola, the public official in the Ministry of Interior 
responsible for the preparatory process
G. The Memorandum of the Parliamentary Adminis-
trative Committee (HaVM 4/2003 vp.)
H. The General Overview of the Statements Concer-
ning The Aliens Act Memorandum
1999 
A
2002
B
2003 
C,D,G,H
2004
E
2008
F
2008
-
2010
4
D
at
a 
se
t 
1
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Minutes of the parliamentary debates on the Aliens 
Act of 2004 and the Integration Act of 2002:
A. Follow-up debate on the Governmental Report 
on the Implementation of the Integration Act in VNS 
5/2002 vp. (PTK 195/2002 vp.)
B. Preliminary debate on the governmental proposal 
of the Aliens Act (PTK 40/2003 vp.)
C. Preliminary debate on the supplementary govern-
mental proposal on the Aliens Act (PTK 99/2003 
vp.)
D.Preliminary debate on the alternative motion 
by the Left Alliance concerning the revision of the 
Aliens Act (PTK 16/2004 vp.)
E. General debate on the revision of Aliens Act (PTK 
39/2004 vp.)
F. Comprehensive debate on the revision of Aliens 
Act (45/2004 vp.) 
2002 
A
2003 
B,C
2004 
D,E
2008
-
2010
4
Electoral manifestos of the Finnish Perussuomalaiset 
party for the municipal elections of 2008 and the 
parliamentary elections of 2011 and of the Swedish 
Sverigedemokraterna party for the parliamentary 
elections of 2010:
A. “Kunnallisvaaliohjelma 2008. Äänestäjän Asialla.”
B. ”99 Föreslag För Ett Bättre Sverige. Sverigede-
mokraternas Kontrakt Med Väljarna 2010-2014.”
C. ”Suomalaiselle Sopivin. Perussuomalaiset R.p.:n 
Eduskuntavaaliohjelma.”
2008 
A
2010 
B 
2011 
C
2011 5
D
at
a 
se
t 
3
D
at
a 
se
t 
2
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Three exceptionally debated threads on anti-immi-
gration politics, based online discussions of three 
news articles published near the elections of 2008 
and 2011 within the moderated discussion board of 
Finland’s largest daily newspaper Helsingin Sanomat:
A. Katainen vaatii avointa keskustelua myös 
maahanmuuton ongelmista ([The Minister of Fi-
nance] Katainen demands an open discussion also on 
problems related to immigration) (Mölsä 2009). 168 
out of 396 posts included in the subset.
B. Perussuomalaiset sijoittaisivat työttömät 
maahanmuuttajat syrjäseuduille (“Perussuomalaiset 
would relocate unemployed immigrants in the peri-
pheries”) (Helsingin Sanomat 2011a).
75/241 posts included.
C. Presidentti Halonen vaatii hallitukselta rasismin 
vastustamista (“President Halonen urges the govern-
ment to oppose racism”) (Silfverberg 2011). 137/265 
posts included. 
2009 
A 
2011 
B,C
2011 5
D
at
a 
se
t 
4
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Six online debate threads revolving around HS news 
articles on the political scandals concerning two 
Perussuomalaiset MPs. Each of the four mainstream 
arena threads (A, B, D & E) is the follow-up debate 
based on the titular news article published in HS. 
Both of the sphericule arena threads (C & F) are the 
most proliferate Homma debates on the two political 
scandals. The six threads are:
A. ”KKO tuomitsi Halla-ahon myös kiihottamises-
ta kansanryhmää vastaan” (The Supreme Court 
convicted Halla-aho also on the charges of inciting 
racial hatred) (Helsingin Sanomat 2013a). 80 out of 
110 posts included in the subset.
B. ”Maallikko ei ymmärrä Halla-ahon tuomiota” 
(Helsingin Sanomat 2013a). 80/110 posts included.
C. ”2012-06-08 KKO tuomitsi Halla-ahon myös 
kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan” (Hommafo-
rum 2012). 80/2718 posts included.
D. ”Kansanedustaja Hirvisaaren vieras teki nat-
si-tervehdyksiä eduskunnassa” (Helsingin Sanomat 
2013a). 80/80 posts included.
E. ”Hirvisaari: ’Valitan jos jollakulla pipo kiristää’” 
(Helsingin Sanomat 2013a). 29/29 posts included.
F. ”2013-10-03 HS: Hirvisaaren vieras teki natsi-
tervehdyksen eduskunnassa” (Helsingin Sanomat 
2013a) 80/1158 posts included.
2012 
(A-C) 
2013 
(D-F)
2014 6
D
at
a 
se
t 
5
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Appendix B:  
Or iginal  Quotat ions  
f rom the Par l iamentar y  Debates  
on the Aliens Ac t  of  2004
a) [R]ajat ylittävän muuttoliikkeen lisääntymisen myönteiset puolet oli  
hyödynnettävä ja samalla oli saatava siihen liittyvät haittavaikutukset niin  
pieniksi kuin mahdollista. […] Hallitus on pitänyt tärkeänä, että esitys  
ulkomaalaislaiksi saatetaan edellä mainituin perustein ja kuten alussa  
totesin eduskunnan käsiteltäväksi pikaisesti.
b) Uudistuksen perimmäisenä tavoitteena on ollut löytää tasapainoinen  
kokonaisuus, jossa otetaan huomioon niin Suomen sisäinen turvallisuus kuin 
maahan tulevien ja maassa oleskelevien ulkomaalaisten oikeudetkin.
c) Joissain yhdistyksissä ollaan oltu tyytymättömiä Ulkomaalaislakiin ja on 
väitetty, että siinä ei ole huomioitu vähemmistöjen näkemyksiä, mutta se ei 
pidä paikkaansa. Kaikki esitetyt lausunnot on otettu huomioon valmistelussa. 
Mutta vähemmistön linjauksia ei ole helppo toteuttaa kun enemmistö on eri 
mieltä.
d) Lapsen etu on aina yksilöllinen ja sidottu lapsen kulloiseenkin elämänti-
lanteeseen. Lapsen etu tulee harkita kokonaisuudessaan ottaen huomioon  
mahdollisuuksien mukaan lapsen toivomukset, mielipiteet ja yksilölliset tar-
peet.
e) Mitä tulee siihen, onko Suomi aivan erillinen valtio [...] itse en usko tähän.
f ) Tämän eduskunnan keskeinen tehtävä, meidän pitää se muistaa, on  
huolehtiminen omista kansalaisista. Omista kansalaisistamme huolehtiminen 
edellyttää tietyissä tilanteissa, että me otamme tänne ja ilman muuta  
ulkomaalaisia työntekijöitä, pakolaisia, pidämme heistä huolen. Se kuuluu  
siihen kokonaisuuteen. Mutta kuten sanoin, ykkösasia on se, että me  
päätämme tässä salissa ennen kaikkea suomalaisten ihmisten ongelmista.
g) Suomella ja suomalaisilla on aina oikeus päättää siitä, keitä tänne tulee ja 
kuinka paljon. Se on meidän tehtävämme ja meidän oikeutemme tässä maassa, 
niin kuin turkkilaisilla Turkissa, niin kuin slovakeilla Slovakiassa ja ruotsalai-
silla Ruotsissa. Tämä on kansallinen kysymys.
h) eikä se ole Suomen edunkaan mukaista, että me pienen Viron  
parasta työvoimaa yrittäisimme houkutella tänne, vaan kyllä sen  
pitää olla siellä hoitamassa isänmaallisia velvoitteita.
i) Suomessa asuu tällä hetkellä noin 100 000 ulkomaalaista. Suomella  
onkin verrattain lyhyt maahanmuuttohistoria. Ehkä siitä johtuen emme osaa  
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vielä kunnolla tunnistaa ja hyödyntää maahanmuuttajien mukanaan tuomaa 
sosiaalista, kielellistä ja kulttuurista osaamista. Tämän olemassa olevan,  
mutta käyttämättömän voimavaran saaminen hyötykäyttöön palvelisi  
Suomea monella eri rintamalla.
j) Kunpa joku toisi sen luvun suoraan ja kertoisi sen totuuden, ketkä ovat  
todellisia pakolaisia ja ketkä ovat tulleet vain paremman uskon toivossa  
[po.”paremman elämän toivossa”? MW].
k) Mitä enemmän meillä on perusteettomasti turvapaikkaa hakevia henkilöitä,  
jotka ovat saapuneet maahamme pelkästään kokeilemaan sosiaaliturvaamme, 
sitä vähemmän meille jää resursseja ottaa vastaan niitä henkilöitä,  
jotka tosiasiassa olisivat turvapaikan tarpeessa.
l) On erittäin tärkeää toimia harmaata taloutta vastaan, koska väkisinkin,  
jos se päästetään kasvamaan,[...] niin se murentaa suomalaista työmoraalia,  
suomalaista etiikkaa, meidän käyttäytymistämme. Tämä tällainen varsin kor-
kea etiikka, että verot maksetaan ja sakot maksetaan [...] on syntynyt kuitenkin 
vuosisatojen kuluessa. Aika lyhyesti tällainen moraalietiikka voi myöskin 
heikentyä, jos sille tilaa annetaan.
m) Vaarana on, että hallitsematon maahanmuutto sotkee työmarkkinat  
ja työnantajat pääsevät käyttämään hyväkseen ulkomaalaisten  
hädänalaista asemaa. 
n) [J]os me osaamme oikein hoitaa tämän ulkomaalaispolitiikan, se myöskin 
estää meillä hyvin tehokkaasti rasismin eteenpäintuomista, joka nyt jo kytee 
[...] monissa paikoissa sillä tavalla piilossa ja ihmisten mielissä, mutta se ei tule 
esiin. Mehän olemme semmoista kansaa, että jupistaan ja jupistaan ja sitten 
mennään nurkan taakse ja annetaan muijalle ja lapsille selkään, kun puhutaan, 
että olisi tehnyt mieli sanoa siellä kokouksessa ja olisi pitänyt sanoa sille poru-
kalle kerrankin kunnon sanat, mutta kun ei kehdata sanoa, mennään nurkan 
taakse ja tehdään tämmöiset jutut. [...] [K]un tämä rasismi oikein kunnolla 
pääsee ryöpsähtämään, kuten Joensuussa yhdessä vaiheessa teki, kyllä se  
johtuu siitä, että sinne yhteen paikkakuntaan pakkautuu liikaa väkeä  
ja ihmiset kokevat, että he ovat nyt eriarvoisessa asemassa.
o) Kotouttamissuunnitelman tarkoituksena on antaa maahanmuuttajalle  
tosiasialliset mahdollisuudet oppia oman elämän hallinta ja saavuttaa taito  
ja kyky hankkia toimeentulo Suomessa.
p) Tuntuu vain, että erillisille viranomaisille, ministeriöille ja eri  
organisaatioille maahanmuuttajat ovat vain pakollisia olemassaolon objekteja, 
joita heidän täytyy ohjata taikka neuvoa, tehdä näitä suunnitelmia.
q) kansalais- ja maahanmuuttajärjestöille on annettava halutessaan  
mahdollisuus osallistua kunnan kotouttamisohjelman valmisteluun  
ja täytäntöönpanoon.
r) Työpaikka on aikuiselle pakolaiselle lähes ainoa tie päästä mukaan  
suomalaiseen elämänmenoon ja sopeutua uuteen kotimaahansa. [...]  
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opittaessa maan tavalle.
s) Odotusaikana maahanmuuttajat eivät välttämättä saa mitään tietoa suoma-
laisesta yhteiskunnasta. [...] ”Ihmiset kyllä lähtökohtaisesti haluavat kotoutua”.
t) Kotoutuminen on kansantaloudellisesti tärkeää, sillä työttömät  
maahanmuuttajat aiheuttavat yhteiskunnalle vain kuluja eivätkä maksa veroja.
u) [...] 20-vuotias nuori tuo Suomen kansantalouteen 850000 markkaa,  
koulutettu insinööri, lääkäri tai sairaanhoitaja noin 2,5 miljoonaa markkaa.
v) Työvoiman kokonaistarve on Etelä-Savon TE-keskuksen mukaan kaakkoises-
sa Suomessa vuoteen 2015 mennessä 75000 henkeä poistuman  
ja uusien tarpeiden korvaamiseksi.
w) Maahanmuuttajissa on niitä, jotka todella haluaisivat tehdä ammattiaan  
vastaavaa työtä ja joille työnhaku voisi lainsäädännöllisten muutosten avulla  
tulla helpommaksi [...]. Eli menetämme monia hyviä veronmaksajia.
x) Maahanmuuttajakoulutukseen käytetään vuodessa noin 30 miljoonaa euroa.
y) Kunnilla on aikaa syyskuun loppuun tehdä suunnitelma jokaiselle,  
joka ei omin avuin saa työtä. [...] Rahaa kunnille ei annettu. 
z) pakolaisilla taitaa harvemmin olla työkokemusta, jota täällä voisi soveltaa
aa) [...] pakolaisille turvataan tilapäinen oleskelu ja heidän paluunsa kotiin  
turvataan. Heistä ei tule kunnan asukkaita. 
bb) Lapsille järjestetään kouluopetusta äidinkielellä. “Lapset omaksuvat  
nopeasti vieraan kielen, ja se voi hankaloittaa heidän paluutaan kotimaahan” 
[...]. Aikuisille suomalaista yhteiskuntaa opetetaan juuri sen verran,  
että he tulevat täällä tilapäisesti toimeen. 
cc) Mikä maa ottaa meidät suomalaiset korkeastikoulutetut huippuosaavat 
työttömät elätettäväkseen? 
dd) Milloinkohan syntyisi aloite ja virasto siihen, että suomalaisille  
nuorille Suomessa tarjottaisiin koulutusta vastaavaa työtä? 
ee) Euroopan maahanmuuttajalähiöiden ongelmat halutaan estää Suomessa.
ff ) 1980-luvulla Suomessa oli kauhean vähän ulkomaalaisia. Tulijat olivat 
pieniä ryhmiä, eikä heistä koettu olevan sosioekonomista uhkaa. Laman aikaan 
tuli pelkoja, että heitä tulee niin hirveän paljon [...].
gg) Meidän tapamme ei ehkä ole ainoa oikea, mutta se on se,  
jota enemmistö suomalaisista haluaa maassa harjoittavan.
hh) Valtio voi tietyin edellytyksin päättää siitä,  
ketkä sen alueelle saavat asettua.
ii) Tilannetta ei ole helppo korjata, kun suomalaistenkin  
työttömyys on korkea, mutta lain mukaan pitää valita pätevin hakija.
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jj) Ymmärrän siis oikein hyvin, jos työnantaja on haluton palkkaamaan 
maahanmuuttajaa. Niin kauan kuin elämme markkinataloudessa, monelle  
yritykselle maahanmuuttaja on yksinkertaisesti suurempi riski  
kuin mahdollisuus.
kk) [...] muuttajalle laaditaan koulutusohjelmia. Ellei muuttaja halua  
osallistua niihin, hänen toimeentulotukensa pienenee asteittain. 
ll) [...] kotouttamislaki vaatiikin viisaasti saattamaan pakolaiset entistä  
monipuolisempaan vuorovaikutukseen suomalaisen yhteiskunnan kanssa. [...] 
Tulija sitoutuu vastikkeeksi saamastaan tuesta opiskelemaan maan kielen, 
täydentämään ammattitaitoaan ja hankkimaan muut Suomessa tarpeelliset  
tiedot pystyäkseen elättämään itsensä ja osallistumaan muuhun elämään. 
mm) Lähtökohdaksi on kotoutumisessa oivallettava, että maahanmuuttajat  
ovat osa Suomessa asuvaa väestöä ja samalla lailla keskenään erilaisia kuin 
muukin väestö.
nn) Tavoitteenahan on estää ennalta turvapaikkasäännöstemme ja  
sosiaaliturvamme väärinkäyttö. Pyritään tietysti siihen, että ne, jotka  
tarvitsevat suojaa, turvaa vainolta, he sitä Suomessa saavat, mutta ne,  
jotka pyrkivät väärinkäyttämään järjestelmäämme, heidät palautetaan  
mahdollisimman pian takaisin. […] Varsinainen ongelma näiden ihmisten  
kohdalla on tietysti näiden asianomaisten maiden vähemmistöpolitiikka […].
oo) Tilanne on se, että kun Suomeen tullaan, eletään meidän sääntöjemme 
mukaan. Täällä päiväkodeissa vietetään joulua ja kouluissa lauletaan suvivirret. 
Kun nämä ottaa huomioon eikä lähdetä näissä asioissa lipsumaan ja pellei-
lemään ja vaatimaan poikkeuksia, niin kaikille on täällä tilaa ja pystytään 
hoitamaan asiat.
pp) Hyvinvointivaltiomme luo pohjaa tasa-arvoiselle kohtelulle ja  
oikeudenmukaiselle yhteiskunnallemme, joka synnyttää turvallisuutta.  
Se vaatii silloin myös kansainvälistymistä väestömme osalta, jotta pysymme 
mukana muun maailman kansainvälistymisessä. […] Taloutemme heikentyessä 
tuloerojen kasvu edelleen kiihtyy ja luo turvallisuudesta käsitteen, joka koskee 
vain pientä etuoikeutettujen luokkaa, joille turvallisuus tarkoittaa lisää poliiseja 
ja vartijoita, lisää vankiloita ja suojamuureja […] ja lakeja, joilla voidaan  
suojautua huonompiosaisilta oman maamme kansalaisilta.
qq) Valiokunta on myös esittänyt mielestäni erittäin hyvin perusteltuja  
muutoksia, jotka eivät valitettavasti ole päässeet hallintovaliokunnan laatiman 
mietinnön sivuille saakka […]. […] Ihmettelenkin sitä, onko meillä vallitseva  
tapa, että mietinnön antava valiokunta ei kuitenkaan ota huomioon  
välttämättä lausuntoja niin, kuin olisi odotettavaa.
rr) Sanoin aikaisemmassa vastauspuheenvuorossani, että tätä asiaa  
ei tulisi dramatisoida millään tavalla ja kansalaisille ei tulisi antaa vääriä  
signaaleja hyvin herkästä asiasta. […] [O]n usein tärkeämpää tehdä  
oikeita asioita kuin asioita oikein.
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ss) Pitää muistaa sanonta: maassa maan tavalla, tai maasta pois.  
Tässä tapauksessa se tarkoittaa sitä, että kotouttaminen todella tapahtuu 
mahdollisimman joustavasti ja hyvästi, että tulija oppii uuden kielen ja löytää 
työpaikan ja työpaikan kautta rikollisuus pysyy pois. Toisaalta meidän ei pitäisi 
Suomen verovaroilla tukea heidän entistä kulttuuria kovin voimakkaasti sikäli, 
että niin pian kuin he vain suomalaistuvat, sitä äkempää he saavat hyväksyntää. 
[S]e on minun mielestäni tietynlaista rasismin rahoittamista. Niin kauan kuin 
he pysyvät erilaisina, on vaara joutua rasismin kohteeksi, mutta niin pian kuin 
he suomalaistuvat, jos tätä sanaa voi käyttää, niin pian he ovat tavallaan  
rasismin pelkojen ulkopuolella. Heille pitää antaa kyllä mahdollisuus  
kehittää ja vaalia omaa kulttuuriaan […].
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Appendix C:  
Operat ionalizat ion  
of  the Just if icat ion Types  
and Discourses in  Chapter  5
The four types of justification are indicated as italicized subhead-
ings in bold. The quotes that begin with an italicized claim crys-
tallize the content of the 11 discourses identified in the discussion 
board analysis. The codes of the discourses, also identified in the 
three tables are in bold inside parentheses. 
Economic redistribution
 ‘Influx of immigrants results in…
…taxpayer money to be misplaced.’(taxpayer money)
…the same amount of goods to be shared among greater number 
of people.’ (scarcity of goods)
…macro-level problems for the economic sustainability welfare 
state.’ (welfare state macro-level)
Rights of the majority
‘Recognizing immigrant cultures’ divergent needs facilitates the devel-
opment where…
…non-immigrant concerns lose the moral priority they deserve 
over immigrant ones.’ (majority’s entitlement)
…non-immigrant concerns lose their issue saliency in the media 
and in the political decision-making and can no longer be 
adequately heard.’ (displacing majority’s concerns)
…the majority’s concern for its culture and practices are vilified as 
racist.’ (vilified majority)
…the previously self-evident fact that our ways are better for us 
must be constantly reinstated in the public debate.’ (reaf-
firming our ways)
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Immigrants as the Other
‘We must oppose immigration and immigrant practices, because…
…immigrants and their habits cause all kinds of public distur-
bance.’ (immigrant behaviour)
…immigrants are being pampered by our welfare system and abuse 
it without remorse.’ (welfare-abusing immigrants)
Norms of the public debate
‘It’s perfectly ok to publicly advocate anti-immigration politics, be-
cause…
…our arguments against immigration cannot be linked to any 
kind of racism.’ (‘this is not racism’)
…only that way immigration-related societal problems get debated 
more openly and the debate becomes marked by a healthy, 
critical distance from the pro-tolerance dogmas.’(open de-
bate)
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Appendix D:  
An I l lust rat ion of  the Frequency  
of  the Nar rat ives  Coded  
in  the Data Set  5 
The distribution of the 469 narratives among the 17 codes in the 259 posts 
addressing the legitimacy of neo-populist advocacy (black: delegitimizing 
narrative (n=160), yellow: legitimizing narrative (n=309))
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Appendix E :  
The Or iginal  Post s  Used  
for  Compiling the Four  OPS pairs 
OPS pair 1 (Hirvisaari):  
“Why must neo-populists’ jokes be taken seriously?” 
Delegitimizing public story: unacceptable even as a joke
Aika pellejä. Ei pitäisi pilailla näillä asioilla, sillä pilailua kai tämä oli?
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:16 [ (225:225)] </ref>
Äärioikeiston kannattajajoukot lisääntyvät mm. Kokoomusnuorissa ja 
Perussuomalaisissa. Tuommoiset natsitervehdykset ovat hölmöläisten hommia mutta 
kabineteissa on astetta fiksumpaakin väkeä. Mutta eihän tämä kenellekään yllätyksenä voi 
tulla ?
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:30 [ (418:418)] </ref>
Seppo Lehto ei ole PS:n jäsen. Hirvisaarelta todella typerää vieraiden valintaa.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:32 [ (462:462)] </ref>
Kreikkalaiset kyllästyivät persujen kaltaisella ohjelmalla metelöineeseen Kultainen 
aamunkoitto-puolueeseen. Näkyi puolueella olevan vaalimateriaalissaan Hitler-ja Musso-
lini naamareita ja omalla etiketillä varustettuja viinapullojakin.
Millään ei voi ymmärtää Hirvisaaren menettelyä.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:35 [ (510:511)] </ref>
Kyseinen Seppo Lehto on törttöillyt tuolla tavalla jo vuosikausia, joten James joko on 
samaa mieltä Lehdon fasistiaatteista tai sitten on niin tyhmä ettei ole tajunnut kaverinsa 
olevan täysi natsi. Molemmat hyviä syitä olla kenties äänestämättä Jamesta seuraavissa 
vaaleissa?
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:41 [ (604:604)] </ref>
Tottahan toki melkein kaikilla on kokemusta siitä, miten vaikka joku juhliin kutsuttu 
henkilö on käyttäytynyt yllättäen ei-toivottavasti. Mutta kun herra S.L:n toiminnassa ei 
ole mitään yllättävää, hän on varsin tunnettu entiteetti, jota Hirvisaari kuvaili blogissaan 
2009 sanoin: ”superlahjakas kansannaurattaja ja kansantaiteilija” sekä ”profeetta”.
Herra S.L. vetää tilaisuuden tullen yhtä varmasti kättä suoraksi kuin aurinko nousee 
idästä.
Ja vaikka herra S.L olisi ollut kravatti päällä viimeisen päälle hienosti eduskunnassa, 
niin silti hänen kutsuminen sinne olisi ollut epämunaus.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:42 [ (616:619)] </ref>
Natsitervehdykset eivät kuulu millekään foorumille tässä maassa. Eivätkä ainakaan 
eduskuntaan!
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<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:53 [ (824:824)] </ref>
Pistetili tuli täyteen ” Asikkalan raikkaalla” eli Erkki James Hirvisaarella. Tunnettu 
äärioikeistolainen Seppo Lehto oli Hirvisaaren vieraana ja teki lehterillä antaumuksell-
isen natsitervehdyksen. Hirvisaarelle se merkitsee eduskuntauran päättymistä 2015, sillä 
yksinäisenä ei ole läpimenomahdollisuuksia. Pieni toivo voi olla, että kristilliset ottavat 
tämän helluntailaisen ”saarnamiehen” listoilleen.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:56 [ (880:880)] </ref>
Seppo Lehdon tempaukset ovat aina mauttomia ja outoja. Hänen omasta mielestään 
kaiketi saattavat olla humoristisia ja hauskoja. Hirvisaarelta oli harkitsematonta kutsua 
Lehto eduskuntaan. Tuo ei kuitenkaan missään tapauksessa ole riittävä syy niin radi-
kaaliin tekoon kuin Hirvisaaren erottamiseen puolueesta. Hirvisaari ei natsitervehdystä 
tehnyt, vaan sen teki Lehto.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:57 [ (890:890)] </ref>
Sitähän se on ollut tosiaan tuo perussuomalaisten politiikka, huonoa huumoria, 
ei mitään muuta. Pipo ei ole kiristänyt edes humalassa rikollisjengin kerhotiloissa eikä 
missään muuallakaan. 
Onneksi kun euroopan talousahdinko alkaa parin vuoden sisällä helpottamaan 
tämänkin puolueen populismille rakennettu pohja sulaa kokonaan pois. Muistoon jää 
vain kirkonhäpäisyvarkauksia, rukouskutsumölinöitä, populismia, natsihölmöilyjä ja 
seitsemän miljoonan puoluetuilla ostettu kerrostalo-osake Helsingin keskustassa.  
Sitähän voi sitten vuokrata vaikka mille tutuksi tulleelle sakille.
Pahin skenaario on tietysti, että nämä pääsevät valtaan ja rampauttamaan koko 
suomen pysyvästi.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:6 [ (88:92)] </ref>
Mitenkähän tuo persujen ”huumori” on aina natsiaiheista? Keksisivät välillä jotain 
muuta!
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:7 [ (105:105)] </ref>
Aika monilla pipo kiristää tässä maassa. Se on tulosta ”suvaitsevaisuudesta” -  
valtauskonnosta papistoineen. 
Ilman suvaitsevuutta meillä vallitsisi moraalittomien, vahvojen ja julmien mielivalta 
heikkojen, köyhien ja inhimillisten ylitse. 
Suomi kuitenkin on länsimainen demokratia, jossa JOKAISELLA on mahdollisuus 
opin ja sivistyksen kautta maksutta hankkia elämisen eväät miten pitkälle ja korkealle 
tahansa. Yhtä lailla jokaisella on lailliset keinot vaikuttaa.
Vastuullisen aikuisen tunnistaa siitä, ettei hän tee samaa virhettä toistamiseen ja että 
hän ottaa opikseen myös muiden virheistä. Miksi kukaan äänestää moukan tai rikollisen 
päättämään asioistaan? Vallan mukana tulee aina vastuu, jota kaikki eivät kykene kan-
tamaan kunnialla. Eivät nimittäin ymmärrä, mitä kunnia tarkoittaa.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:13 [ (210:215)] </ref>
Ihme veikkoja! Ei järki paljon päätä pakota. Ei ole ymmärrystä kehittynyt alakoulu-
astetta enemmän. Ymmärrys hoi! Äly älä jätä!
Hetkessä tuhotaan muitten ehkä fiksujenkin työ, kun ei osata käyttäytyä ihmisiksi.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:15 [ (256:257)] </ref>
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Ei tarvitsekaan erota heti ja yksin ja kaoottisesti. Kerro mikä muu puolue olisi yhtä 
eurokriittinen, jos ei kääpiöitä lasketa. EU-vastaisuuden ennustan kyllä kasvavan, kunhan 
ihmiset alkavat oikeasti näkemään, että Suomi ollaan menettämässä. Toistaiseksi vain 
Vihreä Liitto on ilmoittanut kannattavansa liittovaltiokehitystä, muilta puolueilta odot-
telen kovasti kannanottoja asiaan. Sillä aikaa totalitarismi alkaa hivuttautua sisään aina 
vain lujemmin ja lujemmin, ja se ei TOSIAANKAAN ole tulossa sitä kautta meille, että 
joku kylähullu vetää heilaamisperformanssia eduskunnassa. Se on vain mautonta, mutta 
ei se suurin vaara, joka meitä uhkaa, - se tulee tavallaan ihan toiselta suunnalta, ja sillä on 
kaikki valtamedia puolellaan.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:18 [ (324:324)] </ref>
 
Legitimizing public story: you shouldn’t take it literally
Rakennus sinällään muistuttaa kyllä natsien arkkitehtuuria ainakin ulkoapäin,ehkäpä 
tyyppi eläytyi liikaa päästyään pyhimpään sisälle ,on siellä muuten noita natseja nähty 
paljonkin ennen aikaan .Joku voi toki pitää nykyistäkin hallintoa natsimaisena ...
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:1 [ (62:62)]  </ref>
Huikeasti myös Jussi Halla-aho on saatu juttuun mukaan, kun tamperelainen oman 
vaalilistan viime kunnallisvaalien ehdokas S.L. on häntä päättänyt tukea nettisivullaan. 
Kyseessä oleva tamperelainen mies taitaa olla aika harmiton ja jopa vitsailijaksikin luon-
nehdittu, lukuunottamatta nettihäiriköintiä josta tuomiokin on tullut. Ihme kyllä se on, 
että Hirvisaari hänet haluaa eduskuntaan kutsua.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:10 [ (155:155)] </ref>
voe mualima sentään ! suomi tuntuu nykyisin olevan tilassa, jossa on natsi siellä ja 
toinen täällä. kohta tulee noottia simo vieseltaal instiTUUTILTA ja joku on oikedessa 
jonkun toisen kirjoituksia suomennettuaan ! alkaa mennä jo komiikan puolelle, ollaan 
ihan, kun ameriikassa !
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:23 [ (317:317)]  </ref>
Eikö nykyään pitäisi olla jo selvä, että sillä ei ole yhtään mitään väliä, mitä faceboo-
kissa on tai ei ole?
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:37 [ (534:534)]  </ref>
Joo, tästä ei kannata niin hirveästi provosoitua. Tässä S.L.:ssa on tietty huumorias-
pekti, jolle olen aika paljonkin hihitellyt. Vähän sellaista teekkarihuumorin tapaista... 
S.L. ei ole uhka kenellekään ja hänellä on oma kylähullun charminsa. Parempaa viihdettä 
S:n seuraaminen sitä paitsi on kuin salatut elämät.
Mikään rankaiseminen tässä ei ainakaan auta. Porukka, jonka sanavarastoon  
kuuluu ”suvaitsevaisto” ja mikä ”suvikset” ja jos oikein revitellään niin ”suvakki”, vain 
hullaantuvat tästä ja on ikävää katsoa kun kylähullua hakataan.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:38 [ (544:546)]  </ref>
Lahjakas provoilija tuo Lehto, kun taas pääsi lehtien etusivuille. 
Niin minäkin tuon tulkitsen.
Juttujen perusteella ilmeisesti kukaan ei ole nähnyt natsitervehdystä. Vasta Lehdon 
julkaistua kuvan tervehdys tuli julki ja ollaan loukkaatuneita.
Luulis ettei Hirvisaari arvannut vieraan tekevän natsitervehdyksen, ottavan siitä 
kuvan ja julkaisevan sen netissä.
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Hirvisaari pitää Lehdon saamaa tuomiota liian kovana. Minustakin se näyttää liian 
kovalta. Ovatko hänen juttunsa niin vaarallisia yhteiskunnalle? Mieshän ei vaikuta vaka-
vasti otettavalta.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:46 [ (687:694)]  </ref>
No no. Ei kannata repiä peliverkkareitaan Sepon takia.
Lehto paiskattiin aikoinaan vankilaan kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan. Se 
oli surullinen tapaus ja jäi kaihertamaan monen mieltä. Täytyi kylähulluun sillä tavalla 
käydä käsiksi... Niin petti pokka, että täytyy toistaitoinen vankilaan paiskata, ja sillä sit-
ten ilkkua. Kuin komeapaakin voittoa juhlia, että saipa selkäänsä, mitäs huuteli ja itsepä 
aloitti. Vaikka hyvin näkee että kaveri ei käy ihan kaikilla pytyillä, ja ei sovi ihan samalla 
tavalla häntä arvioida kuin täysipäisiä.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:52 [ (810:812)]  </ref>
Seppo Lehdon tempaukset ovat aina mauttomia ja outoja. Hänen omasta mielestään 
kaiketi saattavat olla humoristisia ja hauskoja. Hirvisaarelta oli harkitsematonta kutsua 
Lehto eduskuntaan. Tuo ei kuitenkaan missään tapauksessa ole riittävä syy niin radi-
kaaliin tekoon kuin Hirvisaaren erottamiseen puolueesta. Hirvisaari ei natsitervehdystä 
tehnyt, vaan sen teki Lehto.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:57 [ (890:890)]  </ref>
Aika monilla pipo kiristää tässä maassa. Se on tulosta ”suvaitsevaisuudesta” - val-
tauskonnosta papistoineen.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:3 [ (34:34)]  </ref>
Ei tarvitsekaan erota heti ja yksin ja kaoottisesti. Kerro mikä muu puolue olisi yhtä 
eurokriittinen, jos ei kääpiöitä lasketa. EU-vastaisuuden ennustan kyllä kasvavan, kunhan 
ihmiset alkavat oikeasti näkemään, että Suomi ollaan menettämässä. Toistaiseksi vain 
Vihreä Liitto on ilmoittanut kannattavansa liittovaltiokehitystä, muilta puolueilta odot-
telen kovasti kannanottoja asiaan. Sillä aikaa totalitarismi alkaa hivuttautua sisään aina 
vain lujemmin ja lujemmin, ja se ei TOSIAANKAAN ole tulossa sitä kautta meille, että 
joku kylähullu vetää heilaamisperformanssia eduskunnassa. Se on vain mautonta, mutta 
ei se suurin vaara, joka meitä uhkaa, - se tulee tavallaan ihan toiselta suunnalta, ja sillä on 
kaikki valtamedia puolellaan.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:18 [ (324:324)]  </ref>
OPS pair 2 (Halla-aho): “Neo-populist satire:  
Inciting racial hatred or exercising freedom of speech?”
Delegitimizing public story: unacceptable even as a joke
Minusta tämä oli ihan oikea tuomio. Eli aina ei kannata mennä julkisesti sanomaan 
tai kirjoittamaan asioita, mitä itse ajattelee. 
Osaltani ymmärrän, että Halla-ahon kommentin takana oli jotkin tilastolliset faktat 
esimerkiksi työttömyyden ja rikollisuuden osalta kyseisen väestöryhmän keskuudessa. 
Halla-aho käytti kuitenkin asian julkituomiseksi täysin tuulesta temmattuja päätelmiä ja 
väitteitä esimerkiksi ihmisten geeniperimästä. Eli nuo tuulesta temmatut kommentit oli-
vat selvästi kiihottamista kansanryhmää vastaan, koska väitteille ei ole olemassa minkään-
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laista tieteellistä näyttöä.
Minusta Suomen keskustelukulttuurissa on jo vuosia ollut se ongelma, että edes tilas-
tollisesti mitattavista maahanmuuttajiin liittyvistä asioista (työttömyydestä, rikollisuudes-
ta, koulutustasosta, sosiaalitukien määrästä, jne) ei ole voitu keskustella edes rakentavassa 
hengessä, ilman että keskustelut leimataan rasistiseksi. Tästä syystä Halla-ahon kaltaiset 
ihmiset monesti nostavat tällaisia ongelmia esiin vähemmän rakentavaan tyyliin. Itse en 
ole varma kumpi on parempi vaihtoehto, se että ongelmat kielletään ja niistä ei voi kes-
kustella, vai se että ongelmista keskustellaan Halla-ahon tyyliin.
Toisin sanoen, liian monen päättäjän on ollut Suomessa vaikeata tunnustaa, että 
meillä on ollut joidenkin väestöryhmien sopeutumisen osalta jonkinlaisia ongelmia, kun 
taas toiset väestöryhmät ovat sopeutuneet suorastaan loistavasti. Tämän lisäksi myös eri 
väestöryhmien sisällä sopeutuminen on vaihdellut merkittävästi, eli myös somalien jou-
kosta löytyy runsaasti Suomalaisen yhteiskuntaan hyvin sopeutuneita yksilöitä ja myös 
ongelmayksilöitä.
Tämä terveen keskusteluilmapiirin puuttuminen on ollut kaikkien osapuolien kann-
alta varsin huono juttu, sillä ongelmien ratkaisua on vaikea aloittaa, ellei ongelmien 
olemassa oloa ensin tunnusteta. Eihän alkoholismistakaan voi parantua, ellei henkilö 
ensin tunnusta, että hänellä on alkoholiongelma.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:13 [ (251:259)]  </ref>
Mikä takia pykälät kansansyhmää kiihottamista varten pitäisi kumota? Emme me 
ihmiset ole niin hyviksi muuttuneet, etteivätkö kansanmurhat voisi taas toistua. Minusta 
naiivi ajatus...
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:15 [ (295:295)]  </ref>
Nyt vähän suhteellisuudentajua kehiin. Minkä ihmeen takia sananvapauden piirissä 
pitäisi olla uskontojen haukkuminen ja etnisiä ryhmiä vastaan kiihottaminen? 
Niissä Halla-ahon kyseenomaisissa kirjoituksissa luki mm. että somaleilla on joitakin 
erittäin kielteisiä geneettisiä erityispiirteitä. Tällaiset kirjoitukset eivät ole mitään raken-
tavaa kritiikkiä maahanmuuttopolitiikasta vana täyttä humpuukia.
Ne joiden mielestä KKO nyt kieltää esimerkiksi uskontojen piirissä ilmenevän pedo-
filian käsittelyn pitäisi pysähtyä vähäksi aikaa miettimään omia mielipiteitään. Kummasti 
esimerkiksi YLE ja HS ovat onnistuneet uutisoimaan ja analysoimaan lestadiolaisliikkeen 
pedofilia-asioita asiallisesti ja ketään loukkaamatta ja tuomioita saamatta. 
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:25 [ (583:587)]  </ref>
Tuossa lausunnossa onkin aivan oleellinen ero Halla-ahon kommentteihin. Siinähän 
kohdistetaan kritiikin kärki sinne, mihin sen kuuluu osoittaa eli radikaaleihin islamistei-
hin.
Halla-aho sen sijaan lähtee teksteissään yksittäistapauksista ja laajentaa ne muutamin 
tieteelliseltä näyttävin - mutta ainoastaan siis siltä näyttävin - sanankääntein koskemaan 
kokonaisia kansanryhmiä, kansallisuuksia ja koko valtaisaa uskontoa. Lisäksi hän pudet-
telee tekstinsä lomassa näistä kansanryhmisä erilaisia halventamiseen tähtääviä ilmauksia.
Kokonaisuus on samanlainen kuin mikä tahansa vihapropaganda sellaista mennei-
syydessä ja nykyäänkin harjoittavissa poliittisissa kulttuureissa. Tuomio on aiheellinen. 
Sananvapaus oikeusvaltiossa ei ole anarkiaa.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:27 [ (621:625)]  </ref>
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Mielipiteiden ilmaisu ja uhkailu, panettelu ja solvaus ovat eri asioita. 
Ihminen joka ei kykene rakentavaan keskusteluun uhkailematta, panettelematta tai 
solvaamatta vastapuolta ei tule menestymään asiassaan
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:34 [ (729:731)]  </ref>
Mietippä mitä olisi tapahtunut jos vastaavan kirjoituksen olisi kirjoittanut kansan-
edustaja USA:ssa tai Ruotsissa? Em länsimaissa kansanedustaja olisi jo todennäköisesti 
eronnut, toisin kuin täällä länsi-Venäjällä, jossa sivistynyt keskustelukulttuuri on näkö-
jään lapsenkengissä.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:38 [ (798:798)]  </ref>
Oikea tuomio. Ei mennä takaisin toisen maailmansodan aikaisiin rotuoppeihin, 
eihän, Jussi. Suuri osa somalien ongelmista johtuu ennen kaikkea tiettyjen kantaväestön 
edustajien mustavalkoisista asenteista. Suurin osa täälläkin kommentoijista tuskin on 
ikinä edes tutustunut yhteenkään somaliin, ja asiantuntijatiedot tästä väestöryhmästä ote-
taan valikoivasti iltapäivälehtien lööpeistä. Kyllä hävettää olla suomalainen tänä päivänä.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:42 [ (862:862)]  </ref>
Persujen pitäisi nyt olla tyytyväisiä: KO on kulttuurikonservatiivinen ja se haluaa 
säilyttää suomalaiseen kulttuuriin kuuluvan arvokkaan ja asiallisen kielenkäytön ja asi-
oiden arvostelun.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:45 [ (914:914)]  </ref>
Kaikkien muiden poliitikkojen tuomioiden ja jopa syytteiden kohdalla persujen kan-
nattajat ja kansanedustajat ovat kilpaan ylistäneet Suomen oikeusjärjestelmää.
Ilmeisesti persut ajavat tässäkin asiassa kaksilla rattailla ja oikeus on väärässä vain 
kun itselle tulee tuomio. Ei se sivistyneessä maailmassa vain tuollainen lapsellisuus vetele, 
joko toimitaan lain mukaan tai myönnetään syyllisyys. Turha kenenkään on syyttää lakia 
sen jälkeen kun on sitä rikkonut ja tuomionsa saanut.
Jonkinlainen selkäranka pitäisi populistiltakin löytyä.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:48 [ (952:956)]  </ref>
-En tiedä maallikon ”silmästä”, mutta kyllä kai sen vähintään 99% kansalaisista 
ymmärtää, että nämä lait on tehty vähemmistöjen suojaksi.
Asia on itsestään selvä, kun tutkitaan lainvalmistelun taustaa, ihmisoikeussopimuksia 
ym. Kansallisuudesta puhuttaessa ei mainita erikseen persuille selkokielellä, että ”tämä 
koskee vähemmistöjä”, kun kaikki muutkin kohdat ovat selväsanaisesti vähemmistöjä 
koskevia.
Ylipäätään naurettavaa vaatia, että esim 50 henkilön turvapaikanhakijan ryhmää saisi 
solvata samalla tavalla kuin suomalaisia. Enemmistön solvaamiskielto vaatisi 500 000 
sensoria ja tuhat oikeudenkäyntiä päivässä.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:11 [ (214:218)]  </ref>
Salama ei liity tähän mitenkään, mutta Hitlerin Saksa ja keskitysleirit liittyvät.- 
Kun siis tutkii hieman sitä taustaa, miksi näitä kiihottamispykäliä ja uskonrauhanrik-
komispykäliä alettiin ottamaan käyttöön sodan jälkeen.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:16 [ (312:312)]  </ref>
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On oletettavaa että kriminaalipsykologit, kriminologit ja alkoholitutkijat saattavat 
olla samaa mieltä. Nuo ovat asioita joista on syytä puhua, mutta ne loukkaavat suomalai-
sen yhteisövapautta juoda viinaa, koska ja missä vaan. Tähän Halla-Aho kai perusti olet-
tamuksensa saada äänestäjiensä tuen, äänestäjiensä joiden minäkuvaa väite loukkaa. 
Perussuomalaisten kannattajakunta ei osanne keskustella siitä mikä on mielipide ja 
mikä tieteellinen tieto tai kokemustieto, jolle yhteiskunnallinen päätöksenteko pohjautuu.
Jos Halla-aho olisi esittänyt edes viitteen siihen, miksi hän väittää somaleilla olevan 
joitakin geneettisiä ominaisuuksia tai jos hän olisi esittänyt väitteensä tueksi verrokkiryh-
män somaliasta, niin teko olisi ollut keskustelua.
Muistettakoon että Halla-Aho on filosofian tohtori, joten hän tietää, miten tilastoja 
voi käyttää argumentoinnissa - siis toivottavasti tietää.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:17 [ (328:334)]  </ref>
Oh hoijaa. 
Suomalainen on enemmistö. Kaikki tästä poikkeavaa on vähemmistöä.
Siksi, koska enemmistöä on 99% kansasta ja 1 % vähemmistöä.
Keksikää jokin muu kiusaamisen kohde - vaikkapa vain alkoholismi, mutta aih, se on 
niin _yleistä_ ja melkein yksi piirre suomalaisissa - kaljan ihannoiminen - että harvemmin 
suomalainen tuntee, että häntä loukataan, sillä hän tietää, että maailmakin tietää, että 
suomalaiset juovat. Jos lähden tässä erottelemaan ketkä eivät juo alkoholia, niin siinä olisi 
yhdelle ihmiselle vähän vaikeuksia, koska mistä _erotan_ nyt ne alkoholia juovat? En 
mistään. En tiedä yhtikäs mistään kuka meistä suomalaisista juo ja kuka ei. 
Mutta annas olla kun ihoväriltään erilaista ruvetaan soimaamaan ja haukkumaan, 
että aivan kuin Suomessa ei olisi riittävästi jo rasismia, niin ei tämmöistä jaksa katsoa. 
Jopa me jotka emme juo alkoholia olemme turvassa alkoholismin syytökseltä, sillä 
enemmistö tietää, että enemmistö harvoin tarttuu puukkoon ja viinaan, mutta se, että 
vähemmistö, joka on muutenkin enemmistöstä poikkeavaa, lisätään vielä lisää ennak-
koluuloja kehiin viitaten heidän erilaisuuteen etnisesti, on raukkamaista rasismia.
Olen tyytyväinen KKO:n tuomioon, mutta olisi saanut antaa kovemman rangais-
tuksen. Suomea syydetään lepsuista rangaistuksista, että jos nyt sieltä Euroopan Ihmisoi-
keuden tuomareilta tulisi se kovempi rangaistus? Vaikkapa kovempi sakko € tai ehdoll-
inen? 
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:19 [ (376:388)]  </ref>
Halla-aho myös kyseenalaisti oikeuslaitoksen toiminnan ja piti KHO:n tuomiota vain 
joidenkin näkemyksinä. Samanlaista laillisen oikeusjärjestyksen häväisemistä on tehty 
lähinnä natsien ja vastaavien toimesta. Miten nyt lakia ja oikeuttaa huutavat perussuomal-
aiset eivät tajua tätä, tai ainakaan monet heistä? :)
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:22 [ (491:491)]  </ref>
Jos on 100 ihmistä, 99 suomalaista ja 1 somali ja sanotaan, että suomalaisissa on 
juoppoja - on 1/99 mahdollisuus että solvataan tiettyä henkilöä. Mutta jos sanotaan, että 
somalit ovat varkaita, ei liene vaikea yksilöidä ketä tarkoitetaan. Siinä se pieni ero.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:23 [ (504:504)]  </ref>
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No, siitä pääkirjoituksesta ei tullut sen kummempaa, koska hieman aiemmin oli ju-
lkaistu paljon mediassakin esiintynyt tutkimus, jossa esiteltiin tieteellistä pohjaa suoma-
laisten kännitappamisen mahdollisesta geenipohjaisesta alttiudesta (mm. Tiede-lehdessä 
oli juttua). 
Halla-aholla taas veti juttunsa ns. takapuolesta, joten tapauksilla eroa on kuin yöllä 
ja päivällä. Toisin sanoen Halla-aho veti tyhmiä ja tietämättömiä höplästä ja pääsee nyt 
leikkimään marttyyria.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:28 [ (643:644)]  </ref>
Legitimizing public story: freedom of speech threatened
Onko odotettavissa sakot jos sanon että Scientologia uskonto on rikollisten huijaus 
jolla kerätään rahat herkkäuskoisilta? Vai onko yksi uskonto pyhempi kuin muut koska 
vahtii etujaan tappokäskyillä? 
Vai onko se tyyli joka ratkaisee? Ja voin todeta että: ” On olemassa viitteitä mielipi-
teistä että tietyn amerikkalaissyntyisen elämänkatsomuksen menettelytavoissa olisi jotain 
joka ei ehkä sovi yhteen yleisesti hyväksyttyjen normien kanssa.”
Sitten tällaista kieltä harrastavat poliitikot vielä valittavat että heidät ymmärretään 
väärin.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:3 [ (71:75)]  </ref>
Vaikken ole Halla-Ahon kanssa juuri mistään smaa mieltä, olisin odottanut toisen-
laista oikeuden tuomiota. Toisaalta korkeimman oikeuden päätös on linjassaan aiemman 
pätöksen kanssa, jossa se nosti sharia lait suomalaisen lainsädännön yläpuoliseksi auktori-
teetiksi ns. poikalapsen silpomisjutussa. 
Suomalainen oikeuskäytäntö on ottanut askeleen kohti jumalan tunnustamista osaksi 
normistoamme. Tapamoraalin väitetty rapautuminen , on johtamassa jumaluskoisten 
vastaiskuun demokratiaa vastaan. Lainsäädäntövalta on siirtymässä eduskunnalta insti-
tuutioihin. 
En ole Halla-Ahon kanssa juuri mistään samaa mieltä. Änkyrämäinen vieraiden 
kansojen torjuminen ei ole mielekästä. Jonain päivänä uusi jääkausi nostaa maamme ylle 
kaksi kilometriä paksun jääkerroksen. Tuolloin me olemme maasta pakoon lähtevä kansa. 
Toivottavasti silloin ihmisten kulttuuri on muuttunut ihan päinvastaiskesi kuin Hal-
la-Aho edustaa.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:4 [ (97:101)]  </ref>
KKO:n tuomio antaa nyt peruskaavion, miten uskonrauhan rikkominen ja kiihot-
taminen on tuomittava. Tuomittakoon nyt myös kristinuskoa solvaavat ja kristittyjen 
vahingoittamiseen kiihottavat samalla tavalla!
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:7 [ (153:153)]  </ref>
KKO on tehnyt päätöksellään rotupolitiikkaa. Maahanmuuttoa ei saa lainvoimaisen 
päätöksen turvin arvostella edes faktatiedoilla. Muistettakoon, että Halla-aho ei kirjoita 
scriptaansa vatämällä hatusta, vaan hän pystyy perustelemaan jokaisen väittämänsä tilas-
toilla. Mielipiteet ovat asia erikseen, mutta ne ovatkin jokaisen henkilökohtaisia. KKO 
on niin täynnä sidonnaisuuksia ja rakenteellista korruptiota, että tälläistä päätöstä saattoi 
jopa odottaa.
Niille, jotka eivät ko. kirjoitusta ole lukeneet, niin Halla-aho toi esille kiistattomia 
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faktatietoja koraanista, jossa kerrotaan Mohammedin ja hänen HUOM! lapsivaimonsa 
elämästä. Koska koraania ei saa islamin mukaan kiistää miltään osin, teki Halla-aho 
loogisen päätelmän siitä, että Mohammed oli lapsista pitävä vanha mies=pedofiili. 
KKO:n mukaan asiallinen kritiikki on kiihottamista ja uskonrauhan rikkomista. 
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:8 [ (163:167)]  </ref>
Tämän tuomion valossa seuraava keskustelunaihe: ”Ruotsi ja USA haluavat internet-
julkaisuvapaudesta ihmisoikeuden” on suorastaan ironinen. Nuo pykälät kiihottamisesta 
kansanryhmää vastaan ja uskonrauhan rikkomisesta tulisi kumota mitä pikimmiten. En 
näe miten niitä voidaan mitenkään puolustella minkään oikeushyvän turvaamisella. Kylä 
Suomessa pitäisi ottaa käyttöön sananvapaus.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:9 [ (177:177)]  </ref>
Uskomaton tuomio, näin tehtiin yhdestä ihmisryhmästä tabu jota ei voi kritisoida.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:10 [ (188:188)]  </ref>
Rehellisyys/totuus on suomessa ollut jo vuosia katoava luonnonvara.
Rehellisestä ihmisestä ei pidetä, kun valheilla ja vääryyksillä asiat halutaan eteepäin 
viedä.
Minkälainen tilanne olisi ollut, jos jonkun muun puolueen edustaja olisi kyseisiä 
asioita maininnut ;)?
Voi Suomen kansalaisia, sananvapaus ja vapaus yleensäkkin :(.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:11 [ (223:229)]  </ref>
Korkeimman oikeuden ratkaisu tarkoittaa käytännössä sitä, että tietyntyyppinen 
asioiden julkinen käsittely ja pohdinta on tästedes ennakkotapauksen perusteella laitonta. 
Ratkaisu on erittäin vakava ja voimakas isku sananvapautta kohtaan täysin siitä riippu-
matta, onko Halla-ahon kanssa asioista samaa mieltä - itse en ole.
KO:n ratkaisu kiirehtii kyseisen lainkohdan muuttamistarvetta, koska nyt vahvistettu 
uskonnollisten tuntemusten erityissuoja on selkeästi kansalaisten tasa-arvoisuuden periaa-
tetta loukkaava. Sellaista pykälää tarvitaan ainoastaan pappisvaltaisissa maissa, Suomessa 
tarvetta ei ole.
Jussi Halla-ahon suhtautuminen maahanmuuttajiin on epäilemättä kielteinen, mutta 
ne kirjoitukset, joista nyt tuomio tuli, eivät olleet sananjulistusta vaan valtakoneistolle 
esitetty provosoiva kysymys siitä, kohdellaanko kaikkia väestö- ja näkemysryhmiä samalla 
tavalla. Korkein oikeus on nyt päättänyt, että ei kohdella.
Minusta KO:n ratkaisu on selkeästi Suomen perustuslain vastainen ja taannuttaa 
julkista keskustelua entistäkin varovaisemmaksi ja samalla heikentää myös asiallisen 
maahanmuuttokeskustelun käymistä. 
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:16 [ (333:339)]  </ref>
Köyhtyminen ja hyvinvointivaltion alasajaprosessi tulee olemaan kivulias.
Oikeus kritisoida on ensimmäisten uhrien joukossa.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:18 [ (370:372)]  </ref>
Hyvä päivää, kirvesvartta.
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Keskustellaan sateista...
POliittinen keskustelu on siis tyrehdytetty.
(Halla-aholla ja joillakin muillakin kirjoittajilla on ollut suoraan liitetiedostoja, 
mihin käsitys perustuu. Muhamedin ajoilta kertomuksia, mitä historia tai Koraani siitä 
kirjoittaa)
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:19 [ (407:410)]  </ref>
Eipä taida vaikuttaa mitään. Äänestäjien pitäisi ehkä reagoida asiaan seuraavissa 
vaaleissa. Mutta jos äänestäjät ovatkin Halla-ahon kanssa samaa mieltä ?
Siinä on sitten ihmettelemistä varsinkin niille, jotka ovat KO:n kanssa samaa mieltä. 
Korkeinkaan oikeus ei voi muuttaa ihmisten mieltä ja sitä mitä ihmiset ajattelevat. Tuo-
mio voi vain painaa mielipiteet piiloon.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:21 [ (461:463)]  </ref>
Länsimaissa on ymmärretty sananvapauden merkitys vakauden ja demokratian perus-
pilarina.
En tiedä ymmärretäänkö sitä täällä Länsivenäjällä koskaan.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:22 [ (531:532)]  </ref>
Uskomaton tuomio, näin tehtiin yhdestä ihmisryhmästä tabu jota ei voi kritisoida.
Sananvapauden musta päivä. 
Ellet ole huomannut, se on -nimen omaan- koko pointti. Suomalaiset syyllistyvät 
murhiin, raiskauksiin jne. Tämä on fakta. Mutta jos lähdet vättämään että ”Suomalaiset” 
ovat murhaajia ja raiskaajia niin kiihotat kansanryhmää vastaan. Ihmisryhmiä kokonai-
suudessan eivät istu minkään yksittäisen leiman alle, yksittäiset ihmiset sen sijaan voi olla 
vaikka mitäkin. 
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:24 [ (568:571)]  </ref>
Vihreät naiset saivat nyt mitä halusivat. Alkakoon Käpylässä juhla ja riemu. 
Meille muille tämä on häpeän ja murheen päivä, koska tämä on vasta alkua kohti vih-
reiden khmerien utopiaa. Halla-aho tuomittiin vanhan kiihotuspykälän mukaan, jonka 
muotoilivat sosiaalidemokraatit EU-kiimassaan 1990-luvun puolivälissä. Sen karumpi 
ja kammottavampi vihreä versio on ollut voimassa vasta vuoden, jolloin oikeusministeri 
Braxin kiristysehdotus kiihotuspykälään astui voimaan.
Kiihotuspykälä rikkoi jo alunperin sananvapautta, mutta nyt se on suorastaan tyran-
niaa. 
Nykyisessä muodossaan tämä rikoslain kohta (13.5.2011/511) antaa valtaapitäville 
mahdollisuuden vainonta kaikkia toisinajattelijoita heidän mielipiteidensä takia. 
.”Joka asettaa yleisön saataville... mielipiteen..,,jossa uhataan, panetellaan tai solvata-
an jotakin ryhmää ...uskonnon tai vakaumuksen perusteella.. on tuomittava” 
Tätähän vihreät khmerit ovat kaiken aikaa tavoitelleet, koska kompostiyhteiskunnan 
tieltä on raivattava väkivalloin ne, jotka eivät astu hyvällä vihreään paratiisiin. 
Vihreän lainsäädännön päässä kielletään kansalaisilta silmälasit ja poltetaan kirjat.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:26 [ (597:609)]  </ref>
Uskomatonta! 
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Voin vain suositella seuraavaa kirjaa ”oikeusoppineillemme”:
- Silenced: How Apostasy and Blasphemy Codes Are Choking Freedom Worldwide
Samaa mieltä
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:28 [ (635:640)]  </ref>
”Nyt vähän suhteellisuudentajua kehiin. Minkä ihmeen takia sananvapauden piirissä 
pitäisi olla uskontojen haukkuminen ja etnisiä ryhmiä vastaan kiihottaminen? ”
Entä miksi sananvapauden piiristä tulisi sulkea faktojen kertominen? 
”Ne joiden mielestä KKO nyt kieltää esimerkiksi uskontojen piirissä ilmenevän pedo-
filian käsittelyn pitäisi pysähtyä vähäksi aikaa miettimään omia mielipiteitään. Kummasti 
esimerkiksi YLE ja HS ovat onnistuneet uutisoimaan ja analysoimaan lestadiolaisliikkeen 
pedofilia-asioita asiallisesti ja ketään loukkaamatta ja tuomioita saamatta. ”
Kyse oli kristillisten herätysliikkeiden toiminnasta. Niiden pimeiden puolien tuom-
inen päivänvaloon on aivan oikein. Mutta miksi islam tulisi jättää kriittisen keskustelun 
ulkopuolelle? 
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:30 [ (669:675)]  </ref>
Tohtori Halla-aho tarvitsee nyt tukea.
Kaikki ne, jotka ovat valmiit taistelemaan sananvapauden ja kansanvallan puolesta 
vyöttäkööt kupeensa. Tämä ei jää tähän, me emme myy sananvapautta vihreiden ja vase-
mmiston likaiselle alttarille. 
Tohtori Halla-ahon tuomio on saatettava ihmisoikeus- ja sananvapausjärjestöjen 
tietoon kautta maailman. Tärkeintä on herättää Yhdysvaltain vapautta vaalivat yhteisöt ja 
muistuttaa millaisen maan kanssa he ovat ovat Suomessa tekemisissä.
Lähettäkkäämme tieto tästä päätöksestä kaikille sananvapauden ystäville ympäri 
maapallon pienintäkään järjestöä ja bloggaajaa unohtamatta. Muistakaamme viestittää 
tästä asiasta kaikille ja kaikkialla ketään unohtamatta. 
Korkeimman oikeuden päätöksestä on heti myös valitettava Euroopan ihmisoikeustu-
omioistuimeen. Varojen keräys oikeustoimia varten on aloitettava välittömästi.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:31 [ (685:693)]  </ref>
Tietyistä asioista ei siis saa puhua niiden oikeilla nimillä ja totuudenmukaisesti. 
Hyvästi vapaa Suomi.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:32 [ (703:703)]  </ref>
Korkein oikeus on lopullisesti menettänyt jonkun johdolla järkensä. Ensin se sekaan-
tuu lainsäätämiseen sallimalla yksityisen sakotuksen ja nyt se sekaantuu uskontoon ja 
mielipiteenvapauteen määräämällä rangaistuksia mielipiteestä, perustellusta mielipiteestä.
Welcome North Korea and Sharia meininkiähän tämä on aivan selvästi.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:33 [ (713:715)]  </ref>
Ei Halla-ahoa tämän takia kukaan politiikasta saa syrjään. Päinvastoin - kansa alkaa 
nyt havaita, että Tarja Halosen aikana Suomen oikeuslaitoksesta tuli sensuuritoimisto. 
Sananvapautta on nyt todella rajoitettu. Eduskunnassa lait säädetään ja muutosta lakeihin 
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tarvitaan, niin että tämä kyllä sataa persujen laariin. Veikkaan varsinkin Halla-aholle 
entistä suurempaa äänivyöryä seuraavissa vaaleissa. 
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:35 [ (744:744)]  </ref>
Korkein oikeus osoitti jälleen täydellisen irtaantumisensa todellisuudesta. Tällä tuo-
miolla saatetaa sensuuri voimaan.
Halla-Ahon mielipiteistä voidaan olla montaa mieltä, mutta tosiasia on, että hän 
referoi noissa asioissa suoraan Islamin uskon perusteoksiin. Kuka tahansa voi lukea samat 
asiat Muhammedin kertomuksista.
Ja korkein oikeus myös sensuroi tieteellisen kommentoininin perimäasiassa. Evoluutio 
on tieteessä tunnustettu asia ja sen perusteella on oikein väittää, että luonnossa tapahtuu 
sopeutumista ja se päätyy luonnonvalinnan kautta myös geeneihin.
Korkein oikeus sai nyt päätöksellään minut valitsemaan puolueen. Sensuuri ja suvait-
semattomuuspolitiikalle on tultava loppu!
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:41 [ (846:852)]  </ref>
Korkein oikeus on lähtenyt mielipidesensuurin linjoille. Valitettavaa koko kansakun-
nalle.
Halla-aho on kirjoittanut täyttä totta noista asioista. Suurin osa kansalaisista tunni-
staa ja hyväksyy sen. Kansalaiset ovat suuressa määrässä Halla-ahon tukena tätä vasten-
mielistä ja väärää tuomiota vastaan,
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:44 [ (884:886)]  </ref>
Sotket - kuten useimmat suomalaiset - kaksi perusoikeutta ja perusvapautta  
keskenään.
Yksityisen ihmisen kunnianluokkaus on rangaistava teko, eikä kenelläkään ole siihen 
nokan koputtamista. perustulain 10§:säsä on turvattu yksityisyyden suoja. Sitä ei voi 
toisella vapaudella, sananvapaudella, mielivaltaisesti loukata, vaikka myös sananvapaus on 
peustuslaissa turvattu sen 12 §:ssä..
Muutoin sanavapaudella ei ole tyyli- tai muotomääräyksiä - eikä mielipiteiden tarvitse 
olla tosia tai edes miellyttäviä.
Sitä vastoin uskonnot, ideologiat ja poliitiset aatteet ovat vapaissa demokratioissa 
vapaasti arvosteltavissa - tai anakin niiden tulee olla avoimen kritiikin piirissä. Myöskään 
kansanryhmät eivät tarvitse lain suojaa, vaikka yksityiset kansalaiset lain turvaa saavat-
kin.
Suomessa vihreät ja vasemmisto ovat rivosti loukanneet näitä periaatteita.
Rikoslain kiirhotuspykälä on viipymättä poistettava rikoslaista, koska se loukkaa 
länsimaisen sananvapauden pyhimpiä ja syvimpiä periaatteita. Luuletteko te hyväuskoiset, 
että vihreiden khmerien rajoitukset jäävät tähän. Tiedossa on tyrannia, jonka äärimmäi-
sen ankaria kulutus- ja käytössääntöjä valvovat vihreät korttelipoliisit ja vihreiden naisten 
kantelukomiteat.
Siinä yhteiskunnassa ei ole vääriä mielipiteitä.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:50 [ (993:1005)]  </ref>
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Halla-Ahon persoonaa/motiiveja sen kummemmin kommentoimatta myönnän ole-
vani tuomioon todella pettynyt. Mitään muuta uskontoa tai kansanryhmää ei suojella 
oikeuskäytännössä näin. Islamin erityisasema ei voi perustua siihen että sananvapaus (jon-
ka kaikki muut ryhmät kestävät ja joka on länsimaisen yhteiskunnan kulmakivi) loukkaa 
muslimeita.
Islam kieltää kaiken koraanin tulkinnan ja profeetan elämä on asetettu ikuisen jäl-
jittelyn kohteeksi. Tämä tarkoittaa myös seksin oikeuttamista 9-vuotiaan kanssa, minkä 
myös Islamin ns.oppineet ovat vahvistaneet. Mitä pedofilia on jos ei keski-ikäisen ja 
9-vuotiaan välistä sukupuoliyhteyttä? Vai saako tät enää edes ääneen ihmetellä ilman että 
syyllistyy rikokseen?
Tuomio ei vastaa suomalaisten vallitsevaa oikeustajua. Häpeä KKO:lle.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:51 [ (1043:1047)]  </ref>
Me olemme palanneet aikakoneella takaisin vuoteen 1966 (Hannu Salama, jos joku ei 
muista). Haluan sanoa kaksi asiaa:
- sananvapaus ei ole itsestäänselvyys. Sananvapauden puolesta on jatkuvasti taisteltava
- Suomi on menossa kovaa vauhtia takaisin Impivaaraan. Tätäkö äänestäjät todella 
halusivat?
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:4 [ (67:69)]  </ref>
Eipä nykymaailmassa enää pystytä ihmisiä ennakkosensuroimaan. Sensuurin päivät 
on netin myötä nähty. Jos seuraat maailman menoa niin kyllä se sananvapauden puut-
tuminen alkaa olla nykyään enemmän rangaistuksen pelko joka seuraa varomatonta 
puhetta kuin kyky hallita viestin kulkemista. Harvassa on enää ne maat joissa median 
kontrollilla viestin välittämistä pystytään estämään niinkuin 80-luvulla tai ennen sitä.
Minusta tässä tapauksessa ongelmana ei ole se etteikö yksilö olisi vastuussa sanoista-
an. Ongelma on se että ainakin minä ymmärsin tekstin kritiikkinä illmania vastaan, 
sekä kritiikkinä yhteiskunnallisen keskustelun tilaa, jossa vähemmistöistä ei voida puhua 
negatiiviseen sävyyn edes tilastojen kanssa sanoen että esittää ne omana mielipiteenään.
Kun yhteiskunnassa estetään tuollainen keskustelu, miten ongelmista voidaan keskus-
tella? Jättämällä ulkopuolelle kokonainen kansanosa joka kokee ongelman isompana kuin 
muu osa kansasta. Mielestäni juuri tämä käytös on suurin tekijä siinä että perussuoma-
laiset saivat jytkynsä. Vaikka täällä kestetään paljon nurisematta niin joskus tulee raja 
vastaan, pahoin pelkään että tällä tahdilla edessä on suurempi jytky tulevaisuudessa.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:27 [ (626:630)]  </ref>
Koska meillä ei ole perinteitä kovassa, mutta asiallisessa keskustelussa, meidän on hy-
väksyttävä erilaiset ylilyönnit - roiskuu, kun rapataan. Tätä kutsutaan harjoitteluksi, josta 
toivottavasti seuraa oppimista. Rujoudestaan huolimatta persut - ja Halla-oho - tekevät 
merkittävän palveluksen Suomelle pakottamalla keskustelua pois mukavuusalueelta.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:29 [ (733:733)]  </ref>
Suomessa uskonrauhan rikkomisesta voi saada rangaistuksen vaikka kirjoituksen 
perusteella jossa arvostellaan uskontoa, ei sen harjoittajia ja ilman mitään näyttöä mistään 
tapahtuneesta, ainoastaan silkoista olettamuksista syyttäjän puolelta. 
Sen lisäksi on uskonrauhan pykälää muutettu ja tuomio perustui tähän jälkeenpäin 
tehtyyn muutokseen taannehtivasti.
Kysymys on, miten tämä voi olla mahdollista demokratiassa? Retoorinen vastaus on 
että sen ei pitäisi olla mahdollista.
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Näinollen on mielenkiintoista saada tietä mitä Euroopan ihmisoikeustuomioistuin 
ajattelee asiasta koska sen tehtävänä on juuri tutkia yksilö vastaan valtion instanssit. ja voi 
toimia prejudikaattina Suomessakin tulevaisuudessa niin että vallan väärinkäyttö vähe-
nee.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:35 [ (937:941)]  </ref>
Kiitokset minultakin Juhani Mykkäselle, jonka kirjoitus asettaa asian johonkin suh-
teeseen sekä vallankäyttöön että poliittiseen järjestelmään. Vallanjaon teoriahan ei tee 
korkeimman oikeuden jäseniä vähemmän epätäydellisiksi ihmisiksi. Kyllä myös heidän 
ratkaisunsa kumpuavat juridiikan lisäksi muista lähteistä, kun ratkaistavana on tällainen 
tulkinnanvarainen asia.
Myös Mika Illmanin lausuma (lipsahdus?) antaa perusteita pitää KO:n ratkaisua 
eettisesti kiistanalaisena, vaikka siitä ei juridisesti voikaan valittaa. Itse tuomiota (pienet 
sakot) tärkeämpää on käynnistynyt kansalaiskeskustelu, joka toivottavasti johtaa KO:n 
käyttämän lainkohdan muuttamiseen. Uskonnolliset tunteet eivät tarvitse erityistä suoje-
lua, mutta vihapuheelle täytyy antaa tarkemmat määritelmät.
Sananvapauden täytyy sisältää oikeus kirjoittaa myös huonolla maulla ja typerästi. Sa-
nanvapauden ei kuitenkaan pidä sisältää oikeutta käydä sanallisesti toisen ihmisen kimp-
puun solvaamisen tarkoituksessa. Laki ei saa olla niin tulkinnanvarainen, että Halla-ahon 
saama tuomio on mahdollinen tulevaisuudessa.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:38 [ (1102:1106)]  </ref>
OPS pair 3 (Hirvisaari):  
“Are only neo-populists their brothers’ keepers?”
Delegitimizing public story: it’s the party’s fault
Vieläkö Soini yrittää selitellä risaa seulaansa jollain tavalla? Näitä ”yksittäistapauksia” 
ilmenee jo sen verran taajaan, että kyse ei voi olla vitsistä tai sattumasta, ellei koko puolue 
ole pelkkä vitsi.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:5 [ (104:104)]  </ref>
En vieläkään muuten edes ymmärrä miksi perussuomalaiset eivät irtisanoudu näistä 
kunnolla, hehän vetävät heitä vain koko ajan alaspäin ja vauhdilla.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:6 [ (124:124)]  </ref>
Hirvisaari otti heti perussuomalaisten poliitikkojen suosiman kiusaamiskortin käyt-
töön.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:8 [ (135:135)]  </ref>
Eikös se ole jo toinen tapaus parin viikon sisään kun on perussuomalainen lapa pys-
tyssä arkadianmäellä? 
Kohta on aika Soinin tai Ruohonen-Lernerin aika taas avautua julkisuudessa että 
meillä on sitten nollatoleranssi julkisuudessa tehtyihin natsitervehdyksiin. Lapa pystyyn 
sitten vasta kotona jos siltä tuntuu.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:13 [ (191:193)]  </ref>
Ei se mitään, Soini kyllä ymmärtää, median vika oikeastaan, jne. jne.
209
APPENDIX E
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:14 [ (203:203)]  </ref>
Niin, tämä mystinen S. Lehtohan tuon yhdistämisen teki. Media vain raportoi mitä 
hän on tehnyt. Kuitenkin tuolla sivullaan samassa yhteydessä tervehdyksensä kanssa 
kissankokoisin kirjaimin toitottaa Halla-Ahoa. Pitäisikö median vaieta?
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:15 [ (215:215)]  </ref>
Niin sitä pitää! Kyllä on James kivoja vieraita kutsunut eduskuntaan. Lehtoa sekopäis-
empää henkilöä ei ole kovin helppo löytääkkään. Pisteet myös kotiin välittömästä ajojahti 
-kommentista. Tuo mukavasti tämä persujen meininki mieleen Kreikan Kultaisen aamun-
koiton natsisekoilun. 
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:26 [ (363:363)]  </ref>
Nyt vellihousu-Soini esiin puskista jo esittämään kantansa tähän tempaukseen. Kohta 
saattaapi nimittäin tulla jo joku hakemaan, jos ei itse ymmärrä tulla.
Aika pitkään tätä meininkiä nyt katsellaan maltilla. Kyllä muu poppoo jaksaa olla 
perussuomalaisia kohtaan suvaitsevaisia. Hatun nosto toki sille.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:33 [ (472:474)]  </ref>
EU-parlamentissa perussuomalaisten edustaja kuuluu ”Vapaa ja demokraattinen 
Eurooppa” ryhmään, joka istuu täysistunnossa äärimmäisena oikealla. Suomen eduskun-
nassakin PersS-puoluen kansanedustajat pitäisi panna istumaan sinne minne ne oikeasti 
kuuluuvat: äärioikealle.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:36 [ (521:521)]  </ref>
Ei teitä persuja näköjään tarvitse erikseen leimata - te teette sen viikottain ihan itse. 
Mitä tulee noihin loppuihin roskapuheisiisi, niin ne ovat taas yksi esimerkki taktiikasta 
osoittaa sormella muualle kun pitäisi ottaa kantaa itse asiaan. Jotain rotia - mielikuvitus-
väittämien ja valheiden viljely ja toisten leimaaminen säälittävillä irvikuvilla on lapsellista 
- ottaisitte vastuutakin vaihteeksi, edes vähän.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:39 [ (568:568)]  </ref>
Eiköhän nämä perussuomalaisten tempaukset jo ala riittää. Ensin kyseenalaisessa 
Heteropride-tapahtumassa Perussuomalaisten Jani Viinikainen teki natsi-terveydeksen 
niinikään Eduskunnan kulmilla ja nyt tämä.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:44 [ (639:639)]  </ref>
Mitä yrität sanoa? Että Lehto halusi vain tervehtiä Eduskuntaa ilman mitään natsi-ta-
ka-ajatuksia ja nyt persuja taas oikeudettomasti lyödään sen takia?
No, jos uskoo persujen mantrat siitä, kuinka he eivät muka ole natsipuolue, tai että 
takinkääntömoottori Soini on rehellinen ja luotettava poliitikko, niin kai tämä menee 
sillä samalla nielaisulla. Mutta jos teidän uskonne on näin vahvaa, niin käyttäisitte sitä 
mielummin johonkin hyödylliseen. Vaikka vuorten siirtämiseen tai vetten päällä käve-
lyyn.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:47 [ (718:720)]  </ref>
On todella ikävää ja melkein pelottavaa huomata kuinka moni ihminen vain innostuu 
näistä perussuomalaisista tempauksista. Heille se on sitä ainoaa oikeaa toimintaa. 
Soini ja kumppanit saavat tehdä mitä tahansa ja tämä porukka kannustaa innoissaan.
Ymmärtämättömät ja muista kaikkeen syytä etsivät katkerat ihmiset ovat saaneet 
oman puolueen.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:48 [ (732:734)]  </ref>
210
THE TRUE COLORS OF FINNISH WELFARE NATIONALISM
Voisi olla aika seurata Kreikan esimerkkiä ja tehdä Perussuomalaisille se, mitä Kreik-
ka on tehnyt Kultaiselle aamunkoitolle. Muutama pahin ”pilailija” oikeuteen ja koko 
puolueen määritteleminen järjestäytyneeksi rikollisuudeksi. Pääsisi noistakin idiooteista.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:49 [ (744:744)]  </ref>
Eiköhän nyt ole sopiva hetki ottaa Halla-ahon europesti jäistä ja panna se roskiin. 
Suomella ei ole varaa siihen, että meitä edustaa sellaisen puolueen jäsen, jonka parlamen-
taarikot kutsuvat natsiystäviään eduskuntaan. 
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:51 [ (786:786)]  </ref>
Eiköhän koko kansalle ala käydä selväksi, minkä tyyppinen puolue PS oikeasti on. 
Ei kai ”yksittäistapauksia” voi loputtomiin tulla..? Halla-Aho, Hirvisaari, Hakkarainen, 
Eerola, Immonen jne. jne.
Ei savua ilman tulta, PS joukossa on valitettavasti useita edustajia, joiden mielipiteitä 
voi kuvata rasistiseksi. Ymmärtäisivät edes hävetä.
<ref>P 1: hirvisaari article.txt - 1:58 [ (912:914)]  </ref>
No kyllä yksi superhumortisti Suomen ”maahanmuuttokriittiseen” vitsipuolueeseen-
kin mahtuisi. Hänhän on itse sanonut olevansa vain ”maahanmuuttokriitikko”... ei siis 
rasisti tai fasisti. 
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:2 [ (21:21)]  </ref>
Sitähän se on ollut tosiaan tuo perussuomalaisten politiikka, huonoa huumoria, ei 
mitään muuta. Pipo ei ole kiristänyt edes humalassa rikollisjengin kerhotiloissa eikä mis-
sään muuallakaan. 
Onneksi kun euroopan talousahdinko alkaa parin vuoden sisällä helpottamaan tä-
mänkin puolueen populismille rakennettu pohja sulaa kokonaan pois. Muistoon jää vain 
kirkonhäpäisyvarkauksia, rukouskutsumölinöitä, populismia, natsihölmöilyjä ja seitse-
män miljoonan puoluetuilla ostettu kerrostalo-osake Helsingin keskustassa. Sitähän voi 
sitten vuokrata vaikka mille tutuksi tulleelle sakille.
Pahin skenaario on tietysti, että nämä pääsevät valtaan ja rampauttamaan koko suo-
men pysyvästi.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:6 [ (88:92)]  </ref>
Mitenkähän tuo persujen ”huumori” on aina natsiaiheista? Keksisivät välillä jotain 
muuta!
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:7 [ (105:105)]  </ref>
Mitenkähän tuo persujen ”huumori” on aina natsiaiheista? Keksisivät välillä jotain 
muuta! 
Veikkaisin että siksi, koska se uppoaa tiettyyn viiteryhmään. Aivan niinkuin rasis-
mikin. 
Hirvisaarihan oli myös kieltäytynyt erottamasta avustajaansa ällöttävien hihamerk-
kiajatusten vuoksi.
Ajatus (ei vielä toteutunut sellainen) Hirvisaaren erottamisesta syntyi haitanteosta 
puolueelle kokonaisuutena. Sellaista kuvaa ei tullut, että natsitervehdys sinällään olisi 
erottajien mukaan jollain tapaa ongelmallista. 
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:9 [ (132:137)]  </ref>
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Kukapa perussuomalainen poliitikko ei olisi kokenut joko täydellistä oikeusmurhaa 
tai silmitöntä ajojahtia viattoman huumorin vuoksi.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:16 [ (274:274)]  </ref>
Luultavasti Hirvisaarta ei erotetakkaan, tässä nyt on vaan menossa sellainen populis-
mirulianssi, että nyt muka tuli mitta täyteen. Muutaman viikon palkallinen loma tiedos-
sa. Aikaa kirjoitella blogiin samalla tutulla poljennolla.
Hirvisaari tuo perussuomalaisille paljon arvokkaita ääniä. Äänillä saa seitsemän mil-
joonan puoluetuet. Soini tietysti päättää milloin on enemmän haittaa kun hyötyä.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:17 [ (290:292)]  </ref>
Timo Soinista ei koskaan tiedä. Hän asettaa omilleen kaikenlaisia vaatimuksia, rajoja 
ja kynnyksiä, joilla ei sitten tosipaikan tullen ole mitään merkitystä, koska kaikki hänen 
puolueessaan määrittyy hänen itsensä kulloistenkin tulkintojen mukaan.
Sellaista demokratiaa. Yhden miehen puolue.
<ref>P 2: hirvisaari defense.txt - 2:19 [ (342:344)]  </ref>
Legitimizing public story: goes against neopopulist cause
   Hirvisaari se tekee hartiavoimin hommia uskottavuuden lisäämiseksi. Seppo Lehto?
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:3 [ (10:10)]  </ref>
    Eikös tämä Seppo Lehto ole sama mies, joka jo vuoden 2007 eduskuntavaalien alla 
teki kaikkensa estääkseen maahanmuuttokriitikoita pääsemästä eduskuntaan? Veikkaan, 
että hän on vihervasemmiston agentti. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:4 [ (43:43)]  </ref>
Hirvisaari on koonnut näistä pelleistä oman hovinsa. Hitler-naamari päässä natsit-
ervehdystä tehnyt ex-persukin kertoi ostaneensa naamarit Hirvisaaren järjestämiä juhlia 
varten. Seppo Lehto kävi jo aikaisemmin Hirvisaaren vieraana ja Hirvisaari mainosti 
vierailua kuvien kera Twitterissä.
    Seppo Lehto tekee omaa pientä myyräntyötään julkaisemalla sottablogeja. Vuo-
den 2007 vaaleissa niistä kärsi aina Teemu Lahtinen. Nyt sitten Halla-aho. Hirvisaari ei 
persuista puolueena tai yksittäisistä maahanmuuttokriittisten kärkinimistä mitenkään 
piittaa. Tärkeintä on koota ympärille sottahovi, jossa sitten kukin vuorollaan, myös Hir-
visaari itse, heittää paskaa persujen päälle.
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:5 [ (48:50)]  </ref>
    Mun mielestä Hirvisaari joutais Perussuomalaisten / Soinin puhutteluun ja hetkel-
liselle virkavapaalle eduskunnasta.
    Itse en pidä Persuja natseina, vaikkakin myönnän, että tällaistakin ääriajattelua 
löytyy joissakin puolueen yksilöjäsenissä. Joka puolueissa on omat ääriajattelijansa. Itse 
näen Perussuomalaiset ainoastaan isänmaallisena työväen puolueena, sotiemme veteraa-
nien hengessä.
    Hirvisaari kuitenkin luo väärää mielikuvaa puolueesta.   :facepalm:
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:6 [ (60:64)]  </ref>
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 Hirvisaari ja kuka tahansa joka kimpustaa tamperelaista sananvapauden marttyyria 
on täysin älykääpiö tai maksettu myyrä. Kumpi tahansa syy niin ulos perussuomalaisista 
heti!  :facepalm:
    Jos tuo pelle on ryssinyt sceneä 90 - luvun alusta asti niin eikö ole täysin selvää että 
myös sen kaikki kaverit toverit ovat älykääpiöitä tai maksettuja myyriä , mulle on vitun 
sama kumpi itse artisti on, työurasta päätellen aito prekaari ja siis kommarien vakaumuk-
sellinen myyrä.
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:7 [ (83:85)]  </ref>
 Juuri tälläinen idiotismi pilaa niiden keskustelut, jotka haluavat käydä asiallista 
dialogia. Paras tapa karkottaa myös äänestäjiä ja äänetäjiksi aikovia.
    Mikä pahinta, niin tälläinen saa kenet tahansa kukkahatun vaikuttamaan fik-
summalta. Sitten taas ihmetellään kun keskustelut jäävät keskusteluksi keskustelijoiden 
luonteesta.
    HS ja kaikki odottavat hattu ojossa näitä tapauksia, joita muistellaan aina kun 
maahanmuuttopolitiikkaa kritisoidaan. Sitten vielä näiden odotus palkitaan mitä ihmeel-
lisimmillä hölmöilyillä. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:11 [ (138:142)]  </ref>
 Miksi pitää ehdoin tahdoin antaa lyömäaseita lehdistölle. Kaikki julkisuus ei ole 
hyvää julkisuutta. En oo kyllä Hirvisaarta pitänyt minään aikoihin, mutta nyt tais vetää 
kyllä pohjat... Seppo Lehto :facepalm: 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:15 [ (166:166)]  </ref>
Mistään vahingosta tässä ei voi olla kyse. Lehdon kutsuminen oli varmasti harkittu 
juttu ja Hirvisaaren näkökulmasta aivan perusteltua toimintaa. Hirvisaari tarkastelee case 
Lehtoa sananvapauden näkökulmasta. Eduskuntatalossa hailaava seppo on hänen mieles-
tään oiva keskisormi ’mukasuvaitsevaiselle’ vihollisleirille. Se on myös hänen mielestään 
epäilemättä merkittävä kannanotto sananvapauden puolesta, jokainen eduskuntatalon 
portailla syyspäivään kajahtava Sieg Heil -edustaa hänelle parempaa maailmaa.
    Vaikea uskoa, että persuissa laajemmin jaettaisiin tätä katsantokantaa. En millään 
voi uskoa muiden kansanedustajien olevan yhtä puusilmäisiä ja fanaattisia. Uskon ja toi-
von, että tämä oli nyt Hirvisaaren viimeinen temppu persuna.
    Kiitos ja näkemiin.
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:18 [ (197:201)]  </ref>
En ole täydellinen ihminen, enkä sovellu kivien heittäjäksi, mutta uskon kuitenkin 
kahden vuoden aikana oppineeni olemaan tarjoilematta jatkuvasti helppoja.
    Siksi minua harmittaa niin tavattomasti tällainen. Kaikki tietävät, miten maailma 
reagoi, jos tekee x. On ihan sama, missä kulmassa käsi on, tai mikä on kyseisen käsiterve-
hdyksen alkuperä tai oikea nimi. Natsitervehdys on natsitervehdys, sellaiseksi se ymmär-
retään, eikä sillä edistetä yhtään mitään asiaa. Paskaa siitä kyllä roiskuu kaikkien lähellä 
seisovien päälle. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:19 [ (207:209)]  </ref>
 Nyt on ihan pakko kyllä sanoa, että mitä vittua Hirvisaaren päässä on liikkunut, kun 
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on kutsunut Sepin vieraakseen eduskuntaan.. ei helvetti sentään. Pitäisi kyllä ymmärtää 
ettei tuosta seuraa mitään hyvää. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:21 [ (228:228)]  </ref>
 Ei ju**lauta! Nyt hiljainenkin mies kyr****tyy.
    Siinä meillä on kaksi varsinaista vatipäätä.
    Hirvisaari kutsuu tampion eduskuntaan viittoilemaan ja sitten ihmettelee kun He-
sari käyttää tilaisuutensa hyväkseen ja iskee samantien 0-0 -tilanteesta lukemat kuuteen 
nollaan, jonka jälkeen peliaika päättyy.
    Ja Halla-ahokin saatiin kammettua tähän mukaan tuon blogin kautta.
    Piti vielä klikata Hesarin sivuille tämän takia mitä en ole tehnyt kuukausiin.
    Sattuu päähän, sattuu niin saa**nasti. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:22 [ (233:243)]  </ref>
 Jos kuva ei olisi hänen ottamansa, niin kiertelisikö hän tuolla tavalla? Minä ainakin 
sanoisin: ”en ottanut sitä.” Minusta kansanedustajalta tulee edellyttää jotain kunnioitusta 
eduskuntaa kohtaan. En tiedä paikkaa (ehkä Synagoogaa lukuun ottamatta), jossa natsi-
tervehdys sopisi huonommin.
    Riippumatta siitä, pitää itse natsismia coolina vai ei, poliitikolta voi edellyttää 
enemmän tilannetajua ja tekemiensä päätösten seurausten arviointia. Jos ei ymmärrä 
tällaisen seurauksia, niin miten voisi ymmärtää erilaisten lakien seurauksia?
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:25 [ (280:282)]  </ref>
Palvelee taatusti kukkahattujen ja virhestallarien etua. Taitaa olla Soinin paikka 
reagoida asiaan. JHA jo teki sen asiallisesti. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:26 [ (299:299)]  </ref>
Hyvä, käyttäkää sitä sananvapautta, perkele. Näillä eväin nousuun. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:28 [ (332:332)]  </ref>
    Herra james potkukelkka, ja muutama muukin pellepersu, näyttää tekevän kav-
ereidensa kanssa kaikkensa että persujen jytky sulaisi.
    Ja kyllähän se tällä menolla sulaa, mitään konkreettista ei olla saatu aikaan, kun-
han pelleillään, mokaillaan ja nostetaan isoa liksaa... 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:30 [ (399:400)]  </ref>
 Typerää tosiaan tehdä tälläisiä temppuja. Ylipäätään kannattaisi jättää trollit pois 
katsomosta, koska iso yleisö ei näe tälläisissä asioissa mitään vitsiä. Saati sitten että tuossa 
toimintatyylissä ylipäätään olisi mitään järkeä.
    Hyvin on saanut Hirvisaarikin olla puolueessa ja saanut hankittua mediatilaa. 
Vaikka edustaa aikamoista ”ääriajattelua”. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:34 [ (468:470)]  </ref>
  Maahanmuuttokritiikki ei ole mikään vitsi, jolla performanssitaiteilijat kuten Leh-
don Sepi ja Ron Paul voivat mielin määrin rahastaa ja pelleillä. Jos asioita oikeasti haluta-
an paremmalle tolalle, kuten oletan tällä foorumilla kirjoittelevien haluavan, tukea tulee 
osoittaa järkeville ja uskottaville tahoille, kuten tohtori Halla-aholle. Tällaisten, oman 
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ilmoituksesi mukaan itseäsikin hävettävien, tahojen minkään sortin tukeminen, fanit-
taminen tai muu vastaava ”vitsillä vaan” heiluttelu ei edesauta yhtään mitään paitsi sarven 
soturien asiaa. Ajattelisit joskus. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:36 [ (499:499)]  </ref>
 Kaiken huipuksi zeimssi olisi todennäköisesti mennyt läpi niin että heilahtaa kun 
olisi aivan älyttömimmät mölinät, hitlernaamiot ja hailailut pitänyt poissa julkisuudesta. 
Siis olisi mennyt PS listalta, joltain suami-isämmää listalta ei todellakaan mene eikä tule 
harmistus tästä ei. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:37 [ (509:509)]  </ref>
  Ja jos Hirvisaari on tarkoituksella jaellut paskaa ympäriinsä, niin varsinkin silloin 
olisi aika sanoa hyvästit. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:38 [ (516:516)]  </ref>
  Vähän nuorempien jotka eivät sotta-sepen juuria tunne kannattaa ehdottomasti 
lukea tuo juttu. Sepe on miinoittanut kämysceneä jumalauta jo neljännesvuosisadan hä-
päisten kaikkia niitä jotka ovat jotain tehneet ja laittaneet itseään likoon asian eteen!
    Jos joku ei tätä tajua niin pois vaan perussuomalaisista. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:39 [ (528:530)]  </ref>
    Saisi herra Soini sanoa Erkki Kaleville että olet loppukaudeksi erotettu Perus-
suomalaisista. Ja tietenkään et ole ehdolla ensi vaaleissa. Tilanne voi muuttua vain ja 
ainoastaan jos et enään sekoile, ja pystyt näyttämään että äly riittää asiallisten asioiden 
läpivientiin. Elikkä perussuomalaisissa jatkamisen ehdoksi se että pystyy itse nostamaan 
jonkun aidosti tärkeän asian tapetille, ja saamaan siihen muutosta. Eduskunta ei ole oikea 
paikka kylähullutteluun. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:40 [ (535:535)]  </ref>
  Vaurioiden minimoiseksi Hirvisaari pitäisi erottaa eduskuntaryhmästä loppukauden 
ajaksi ja sulkea hänet pois PS:n ehdokaslistoilla. Hirvisaaren hölmöilyt ovat aiheuttaneet 
vakavaa haittaa perussuomalaiset- puolueelle ja maahanmuuttokritiikille muutenkin. 
Arvatkaa, kuka jatkossa mediassa esitellään perussuomalaisen ja maahanmuuttokriitikon 
arkkityyppinä. Soini toimikoon tässä asiassa jämäkästi. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:41 [ (547:547)]  </ref>
    Sepi perseilee ja törttöilee aina, kaikki tietävät sen. Miksi kansanedustaja kutsuu 
sellaisen henkilön eduskuntaan?
    Tämähän on nyt vähän kuin sanoisit, että Suomen maahanmuuttopolitiikka ei ole 
syypää Suomen mamuongelmiin. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:44 [ (604:606)]  </ref>
 Hirvisaari Sepon sinne eduskuntaan toi ja James tietää hyvin, että Seppo roomalais-
tervehtii ihan missä vaan. Seppohan on hauska huumoriveikko ja mukava persoona, mutta 
voisi olla sekoittamatta perussuomalaisia millään tavalla huumoriinsa.
    Nyt jos koskaan olisi tilaisuus potkia Hirvisaari pihalle persuista. Tätä sekoilua on 
katsottu jo liian pitkään. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:45 [ (623:625)]  </ref>
  tietysti se on Herra Lehdon  vika että hän koittaa hiekoittaa mamukriittisten töitä,  
ja samoiten Erkki Kalevilta sen verta ajattelematon teko että äijä saa ettiä uuden puolueen 
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jossa perseillä. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:47 [ (700:700)]  </ref>
Pitäisi antaa vaikka ei olisi ottanutkaan kyseistä kuvaa. Hirvisaarelle pitäisi antaa 
mahdollisuus tulla takaisin vain ja ainoastaan sillä että näyttää kykynsä olla hyödyksi 
puolueelle. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:49 [ (732:732)]  </ref>
  James Hirvisaari on kykyjensä ylärajoilla toimiva henkilö, jonka ”kyvyt” eivät ole 
viimeaikoina ainakaan tuoneet Perussuomalaiselle puolueelle ns.positiivista näkyvyyttä.
    Kaikkia ei tarvitse miellyttää, mutta tällaisten irtopallojen antaminen vihervasem-
miston lekaksi on jo anteeksiantamatonta.
    James Hirvisaari Seppo Lehdon eduskuntavierailusta Facebook -profiilissaan: 
James Hirvisaari: Sepistä tulisi aivan LOISTAVA opas eduskuntaan!
    ...niin, mutta tuleeko James Hirvisaaresta aivan loistava toisen kauden kansanedu-
staja?
    Seppo Lehto on kuin Pekka Siitoin, hauska kylähullu ja tietynlainen pienenpiirin 
naurunaihe. Kumpikaan em.henkilöistä ei kuulu uskottavaan politiikan tekoon. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:51 [ (795:799)]  </ref>
    Hirvisaari voisi nyt perustaa ihan oman puolueen. Puoluetukia ei kai yksittäinen 
loikkari saa viedyksi mukanaan (?) mutta kai hän jotain kansliamäärärahoja saisi. Ilman 
perussuomalaisia hänen huomioarvonsa laskenee huomattavasti.
    Muutoin alkaa kyllästyttää nämä kohut niin paljon että toivoisin joka kylähulun 
maalaavan paikat täyteen hakaristejä ja heiluttelevan kättään, että noilta symboleilta 
katoaisi kaikki taianomaisuus. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:52 [ (821:823)]  </ref>
Vetää kyllä sanattomaksi.
    En tiedä mikä tässä on ideana tai taustalla, mutta tietynlaista harkintaa olisi voitu 
käyttää.
    Onko nyt sitten niin että, Hirvisaari kokee olevansa vain vastuussa kannattajilleen 
/ äänestäjilleen. Jos tilanne on tosiaan sellainen, niin jatkossakin on odotettavissa toimin-
taa, joka on vahingollista puolueeelle ja muille perussuomalaisille.
     Henkilökohtaisesti tulen tarkastelemaan mm. fb:n kaverilistaa ja tekemään sinne 
muutoksia.
    Tämä kortti on nyt nähty ja kevyeksi todettu. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:53 [ (828:835)]  </ref>
    Todella ikävää, että yksi ja sama henkilö jatkaa suoraan tai välillisesti tällaisten 
myyräntöiden tehtailua. Olen nyt täysin vakuuttunut, ettei Hirvisaarella ole aikomusta-
kaan muuttaa käytöstään. Hänellä on selvästi noussut kusi päähän ja kaikki, jotka kriti-
soivat hänen toimintaansa ovat ”punavihermädättäjiä”. Hän hakee nyt arvostusta ainoasta 
paikasta, josta voi sitä enää saada eli Lehdon kaltaisilta hurlumhei-veijareilta. Sieltä löytyy 
selkään taputtelijoita, jotka kiittävät Hirvisaarta hänen ”suoraselkäisyydestään” ja ”lah-
jomattomuudestaan”. Ainoa järkevä toimenpide hänen suhteen on eduskuntaryhmästä 
loppukaudeksi tai määräämättömäksi ajaksi erottaminen. 
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:54 [ (840:840)]  </ref>
 Hirvisaari vaikuttaa myöhäiskeski-ikäiseltä mieheltä, joka olisi omiaan neljäkym-
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mentä vuotta nuorempana lähimmän ostoskeskuksen kiljuskini -jengin isoimpana kundi-
na.
    Kuinka palvelee Perussuomalaista puoluetta tuoda tamperelainen ”kylähullu” 
miesliiveissään tekemään natsitervehdyksiä maan parlamenttiin?
    Toisaalta Pahkasika -lehti on Tampereelta, onko tässä vaihtoehtokulttuurin ilmen-
tymä?
    Tuskin.
    James Hirvisaari puolustaa oman tulkintansa mukaan sananvapautta, ja näkee sa-
laliittoja kaikkialla, ja kaikissa jotka arvostelevat hänen toimintaansa. Suuri osa ihmisistä 
näkee Hirvisaaren toiminassa vain harkintakyvyn ja tilannetajun puutetta, sekä huonoa 
käytöstä.
    Tämä ei varmastikkaan auta vaaliuurnilla?
<ref>P 4: hirvisaari HOMMA.txt - 4:57 [ (883:889)]  </ref>
OPS pair 4 (Halla-aho): “The system  
is certainly rigged – but for or against neo-populists?”
Delegitimizing public story: we must oppose racism
Mikä takia pykälät kansansyhmää kiihottamista varten pitäisi kumota? Emme me 
ihmiset ole niin hyviksi muuttuneet, etteivätkö kansanmurhat voisi taas toistua. Minusta 
naiivi ajatus...
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:15 [ (295:295)]  </ref>
Nyt vähän suhteellisuudentajua kehiin. Minkä ihmeen takia sananvapauden piirissä 
pitäisi olla uskontojen haukkuminen ja etnisiä ryhmiä vastaan kiihottaminen? 
Niissä Halla-ahon kyseenomaisissa kirjoituksissa luki mm. että somaleilla on joitakin 
erittäin kielteisiä geneettisiä erityispiirteitä. Tällaiset kirjoitukset eivät ole mitään raken-
tavaa kritiikkiä maahanmuuttopolitiikasta vana täyttä humpuukia.
Ne joiden mielestä KKO nyt kieltää esimerkiksi uskontojen piirissä ilmenevän pedo-
filian käsittelyn pitäisi pysähtyä vähäksi aikaa miettimään omia mielipiteitään. Kummasti 
esimerkiksi YLE ja HS ovat onnistuneet uutisoimaan ja analysoimaan lestadiolaisliikkeen 
pedofilia-asioita asiallisesti ja ketään loukkaamatta ja tuomioita saamatta. 
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:25 [ (583:587)]  </ref>
Tuossa lausunnossa onkin aivan oleellinen ero Halla-ahon kommentteihin. Siinähän 
kohdistetaan kritiikin kärki sinne, mihin sen kuuluu osoittaa eli radikaaleihin islamistei-
hin.
Halla-aho sen sijaan lähtee teksteissään yksittäistapauksista ja laajentaa ne muutamin 
tieteelliseltä näyttävin - mutta ainoastaan siis siltä näyttävin - sanankääntein koskemaan 
kokonaisia kansanryhmiä, kansallisuuksia ja koko valtaisaa uskontoa. Lisäksi hän pudet-
telee tekstinsä lomassa näistä kansanryhmisä erilaisia halventamiseen tähtääviä ilmauksia.
Kokonaisuus on samanlainen kuin mikä tahansa vihapropaganda sellaista mennei-
syydessä ja nykyäänkin harjoittavissa poliittisissa kulttuureissa. Tuomio on aiheellinen. 
Sananvapaus oikeusvaltiossa ei ole anarkiaa.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:27 [ (621:625)]  </ref>
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Oikea tuomio. Ei mennä takaisin toisen maailmansodan aikaisiin rotuoppeihin, 
eihän, Jussi. Suuri osa somalien ongelmista johtuu ennen kaikkea tiettyjen kantaväestön 
edustajien mustavalkoisista asenteista. Suurin osa täälläkin kommentoijista tuskin on 
ikinä edes tutustunut yhteenkään somaliin, ja asiantuntijatiedot tästä väestöryhmästä 
otetaan valikoivasti iltapäivälehtien lööpeistä. Kyllä hävettää olla suomalainen tänä 
päivänä.
<ref>P 5: halla-aho article.txt - 5:42 [ (862:862)]  </ref>
Eiköhän tämä Halla-ahon oikeuskäsittelykysymys ole kohta jo loppuunkaluttu ennen 
seuraavaa lain uhmaamista, jos KKO epäonnistuu tapakouluttajan tehtävässään?
Kuitenkin näin maallikkona väitän, että kansanryhmä ei ole suomalaiset mutta 
Suomessa asuvat somalit ovat, jonka toivoisi menevän rasismia viljelevän kansanryhmän 
tietoisuuteen.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:9 [ (173:175)] </ref>
Sitä paitsi: mitä jos Kalevan väite suomalaisten kännissätappamisgeeneistä olisi 
käsitellyt ruotsinsuomalaisia, ja se olisi esitetty ruotsalaisessa sanomalehdessä?
Suomen oikeus ei olisi silloinkaan käsitellyt.
Minustakin ilmiselvä vastaus toiseen kysymykseen lienee, että vähemmistö ja siis 
heikommassa olevat tarvitsee suojelua.
Lieneekö siinä mitään ihmeellistä.
Miksi esimerkiksi sosiaaliturva ja varansiirrot ovat olemassa?
Eikö se ole niitä varten jotka eivät ole pärjänneet yhtä hyvin kuin varakkaammat??
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:10 [ (190:199)]  </ref>
-En tiedä maallikon ”silmästä”, mutta kyllä kai sen vähintään 99% kansalaisista 
ymmärtää, että nämä lait on tehty vähemmistöjen suojaksi.
Asia on itsestään selvä, kun tutkitaan lainvalmistelun taustaa, ihmisoikeussopimuksia 
ym. Kansallisuudesta puhuttaessa ei mainita erikseen persuille selkokielellä, että ”tämä 
koskee vähemmistöjä”, kun kaikki muutkin kohdat ovat selväsanaisesti vähemmistöjä 
koskevia.
Ylipäätään naurettavaa vaatia, että esim 50 henkilön turvapaikanhakijan ryhmää saisi 
solvata samalla tavalla kuin suomalaisia. Enemmistön solvaamiskielto vaatisi 500 000 
sensoria ja tuhat oikeudenkäyntiä päivässä.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:11 [ (214:218)]  </ref>
KO otti huomioon mitä Halla-aho oli aikaisemmin sanonut eli mitä Halla-aho halusi 
tekstillään sanoa ei suoraan mitä tekstissä luki. Mielestäni oikea tulkinta eli mennään 
tekstin sisään ja katsotaan kuka sen kirjoittaa ja mitä sama kirjoittaja on aikaisemmin 
sanonut. Kontekstilla on merkitystä. Jos minä sanon somalialista jotakin on se eri asia 
kuin jos Katainen sen sanoo tai Halla-aho.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:13 [ (246:246)]  </ref>
Salama ei liity tähän mitenkään, mutta Hitlerin Saksa ja keskitysleirit liittyvät.- Kun 
siis tutkii hieman sitä taustaa, miksi näitä kiihottamispykäliä ja uskonrauhanrikkomispy-
käliä alettiin ottamaan käyttöön sodan jälkeen.
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<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:16 [ (312:312)]  </ref>
Mitäs jos maallikko pohtisi vaikka seuraavaa: Mikäli suomalainen arvioi kriittisesti 
suomalaista, osoittaen mielestään suomalisille ominaisia, epätoivottuja piirteitä, on vai-
kea nähdä kyseessä olevan kiihottamista kansanryhmää kohtaan, harva kiihottaa ketään 
itseään vastaan. Lähin termi voisi olla itsekritiikki. Näin myös, mikäli somali arvioi kriit-
tisesti somaleja. Sen sijaan mikäli suomalainen tekee näin somaleja kohtaan, tai vaihtoeh-
toisesti somali suomalaisia kohtaan, voi eräiden muiden ehtojen täyttyessä olla kyse myös 
kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan. 
Näin on KKO erittäin hyvin argumentoiden arvioinut tässä tapahtuneen. Mitään 
kaksoisstandardia ei tässä kyllä’ voi nähdä, ei oikein kovasti yrittäessäänkään.
On kovin hankala kuvitella, että KKO olisi suhtautunut tähän jotenkin kevyesti, tai 
tarkoitushakuisesti. Kun päätöksen ja sen perustelut lukee, on kovin vaikea olla yhtymät-
tä siihen, että päätös on lain- ja johdonmukainen. Jos joku on sitä mieltä, että se ei ole 
oikeudenmukainen, on kyseessä kokonaan eri asia. Tällaiseksi lainlaatija on tämän asian 
KKO:n viimeisen sanan mukaan laatinut ja se on ratkaisu, johon on tyytyminen. Perust-
ellustikin. 
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:18 [ (361:363)]  </ref>
Oh hoijaa. 
Suomalainen on enemmistö. Kaikki tästä poikkeavaa on vähemmistöä.
Siksi, koska enemmistöä on 99% kansasta ja 1 % vähemmistöä.
Keksikää jokin muu kiusaamisen kohde - vaikkapa vain alkoholismi, mutta aih, se on 
niin _yleistä_ ja melkein yksi piirre suomalaisissa - kaljan ihannoiminen - että harvemmin 
suomalainen tuntee, että häntä loukataan, sillä hän tietää, että maailmakin tietää, että 
suomalaiset juovat. Jos lähden tässä erottelemaan ketkä eivät juo alkoholia, niin siinä olisi 
yhdelle ihmiselle vähän vaikeuksia, koska mistä _erotan_ nyt ne alkoholia juovat? En 
mistään. En tiedä yhtikäs mistään kuka meistä suomalaisista juo ja kuka ei. 
Mutta annas olla kun ihoväriltään erilaista ruvetaan soimaamaan ja haukkumaan, 
että aivan kuin Suomessa ei olisi riittävästi jo rasismia, niin ei tämmöistä jaksa katsoa. 
Jopa me jotka emme juo alkoholia olemme turvassa alkoholismin syytökseltä, sillä 
enemmistö tietää, että enemmistö harvoin tarttuu puukkoon ja viinaan, mutta se, että 
vähemmistö, joka on muutenkin enemmistöstä poikkeavaa, lisätään vielä lisää ennak-
koluuloja kehiin viitaten heidän erilaisuuteen etnisesti, on raukkamaista rasismia.
Olen tyytyväinen KKO:n tuomioon, mutta olisi saanut antaa kovemman rangais-
tuksen. Suomea syydetään lepsuista rangaistuksista, että jos nyt sieltä Euroopan Ihmisoi-
keuden tuomareilta tulisi se kovempi rangaistus? Vaikkapa kovempi sakko € tai ehdoll-
inen? 
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:19 [ (376:388)]  </ref>
Partamooses ja monet muut tykkäävät sekoittaa sananvapauden siihen, ettei sanoista-
an tarvitsisi vastata. Sananvapaus tarkoittaa ennen kaikkea vapautta ennakkosensuurista. 
Kukaan ei ennalta sensuroinut Jussi Halla-Ahon blogimerkintää, hän sai kirjoittaa sen 
vapaasti ja tehdä itse valinnan sen julkaisemisesta.
Sananvapaus on tärkeä arvo. Yhtä tärkeä on oikeusvaltion periaate, ja yksilön vastuu 
omista teoistaan. Lainkohta kiihottamisesta kansanryhmää vastaan on nyt ajankohtais-
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empi ja tärkeämpi kuin koskaan aiemmin, kun vähemmistöryhmiä on otettu tähtäimeen 
korkeimmalla poliittisella tasolla. Kuten kolumnisti arvelee, enemmistöä ei tarvitse suo-
jella. Vähemmistöjä tarvitsee - enemmistöltä.
Sen sijaan laki uskonrauhan rikkomisesta lienee jo nähnyt relevanteimmat päivänsä.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:20 [ (401:405)]  </ref>
Jos on 100 ihmistä, 99 suomalaista ja 1 somali ja sanotaan, että suomalaisissa on 
juoppoja - on 1/99 mahdollisuus että solvataan tiettyä henkilöä. Mutta jos sanotaan, että 
somalit ovat varkaita, ei liene vaikea yksilöidä ketä tarkoitetaan. Siinä se pieni ero.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:23 [ (504:504)]  </ref>
Se mikä jää kuitenkin tässä huomaamatta on että Hallavuo käyttää hyväkseen 
blogikirjoituksessaan tätä Kalevan toimittajan tekemää virhettä. Hallavuo on hakemalla 
hakenut tällaista tekstiä. Kun se löytyi hän pääsi tekemään iskunsa: koska toimittaja on 
kiukuspäissään kirjoittanut ilkeästi omista heimoveljistään on oikeutettua kaikille esittää 
arveluja muista ihmisistä perustuen heidän edustamaansa kansanryhmään. 
Maallikkona olen sitä mieltä että ihmisen leimaaminen sen perusteella mihin kansan-
ryhmään hän kuulu on edelleenkin epäoikeudenmukaista.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:34 [ (919:921)]  </ref>
Kyllä laki on kaikille sama. Ei somalikaan saa kiihottaa kansanryhmää vastaan ja 
kansanryhmällä tarkoitetaan vähemmistöjä. Suomalainen ei taas saa Ruotsissa kiihottaa 
ruotsinsuomalaista kansanryhmää vastaan.
Luulisin että hommalaisillakin olisi eri ääni kellossa, jos he olisivat kokeneet itse ra-
sismia ja syrjintää, kuten monet suomalaiset ovat kokeneet Ruotsissa ainakin pahimpaan 
”En finne igen!”-aikaan.
Ei siitäkään niin kauaa ole kun Rasbiologiska Institutet piti suomalaisia suurimpana 
uhkana ruotsalaisen rodun puhtaudelle. Avioliitoista varoitettiin. ( suomalaisen kallo on 
ylhäältäpäin katsottuna pyöreä, kun se ruotsalaiselle on pitkulaisempi. ns pitkäkalloinen 
rotu-pyöreäkalloiset)
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:37 [ (1046:1049)]  </ref>
Jos suomalainen kirjoittaa suomalaisille leimaavastikin suomalaisista, kyseessä ei ole 
kansanryhmää vastaan kiihottaminen, vaan ryhmän sisäinen itsekritiikki. Jos suoma-
lainen kirjoittaa leimaavasti ulkomaalaisista suomalaisille, kyseessä ei voi olla ryhmän 
sisäinen itsekritiikki, mutta sen sijaan kyse voi olla kansanryhmää vastaan kiihottaminen. 
Tällä ei ole mitään tekemistä sen kanssa, kumpi ryhmä on enemmistö.
Jotta olisi olemassa kaksoisstandardi, pitäisi näyttää, että joku somali tai muu ulko-
maalainen on saanut kirjoittaa yhtä leimaavasti suomalaisista kuin Halla-aho on kirjoitta-
nut somaleista ilman tuomiota.
Vähän ihmetyttää, että Mykkäseltä ovat tällaiset perusasiat hukassa.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:41 [ (1155:1159)]  </ref>
Hyvä Juhani,
Olet ymmärtänyt Halla-ahon retoriikan totaalisen väärin. Kyseessä ei ole sarkasmi 
vaan raaka rasismi. Olet valinnut artikkeliisi Halla-ahon teksteistä yhden lauseen ja 
osoitat mielelläsi tuntevasi sen kontekstin KO:n jäseniä paremmin. Lukeneena ihmisenä 
tiedät varmasti myös sen, että Halla-aho on luonnehtinut someleja myös Afrikan sarven 
ihmissaastaksi. Maltan tuskin odottaa, miten seuraavassa kommentissasi osoitat tämän 
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luonnehdinnan leikillisen luonteen. 
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:42 [ (1209:1210)]  </ref>
Yhdenvertaisuus lain edessä ei tarkoita että tuomioiden tulee olla samanlaisia. Yh-
denvertaisuus on sitä että sekä ”somalialaiset että suomalaiset ”asetetaan samanvertaiseen 
asemaan. Myös Halla-Aho tietää sen erittäin hyvin. Hmmm. 
Asetetaanpa Halla-Aho ja auttavasti suomea puhuva Suomen kansalainen (somali) 
samasta rikoksesta lain eteen. Halla-Aho ymmärtää täysin mistä on kysymys: Somali - 
suomalainen ei. Jotta oikeus toimisi perustuslain ja oikeusvaltion periaatteiden mukaisesti 
ovat Halla -Ahon ja somali-suomalaisen oikeuskäsittely ”hiukan” eri asioita.
Perusteet siihen löytynevät lain tulkinnan ohjeista.
Halla-Ahon temput ovat pelkästään rasistista kikkailua.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:43 [ (1260:1263)]  </ref>
Niin, että mitä minä nyt sanon lapsille? Että rasistista vihapuhetta saa levittää, jos 
se on ”vain täky”? Että kiusata saa, jos sen tekee sarkastisesti? Vaikea näin maallikkona 
pysyä yleisen mielipiteen mukana, kun se kovenee (sekä maan pinnalta loittonee) sellaista 
vauhtia, että heikommat kyydistä putoaa...
Sen minä jo kerroinkin lapsille, että kansanryhmät koostuvat oikeista ihmisistä. 
Osaavat sitten vastata, kun opettaja kysyy. Sen ne jo tiesivätkin että oikeat ihmiset ovat 
lihaa ja verta, eivätkä nettiprovoa. Liittyisiköhän tuo päätös jotenkin siihen?
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:44 [ (1276:1278)]  </ref>
Oikeusistuin ei tuomitse ketään vaan sen asiana on antaa oikeussuojaa. Suojaa an-
netaan - ja pitää viran puolesta antaa - tietysti sellaiseen suojaan oikeuttavalle, joka on 
jäänyt, tai katsotaan jääneen, sitä paitsi. Koko asetelma aukeaa millaiselle maallikolle 
tahansa, kun selvitettään kulloisenkin oikeussuojan kohteet.
Uskonrauhakysymyksessä oikeussuojan kohde on ihmisten uskonnollisuus, ”hartaat 
tunteet”. Niitä - eli ”hartaita tunteita” - on jo vuosisadat katsottu hyväksi suojella tois-
aalta kansakunnan turvallisuutta luovan kulttuuriperinteen vahvistamiseksi, toisaalta 
yksityisen pienen ihmisen esim. pahoissa ongelmissaan Herraansa tukeutumisen antaman 
lohdun vuoksi. Ei suojan kohde ole mikään juutalais-kristillinen Jumala tahi esim. arabi-
kulttuurin Allah. Eivät he pienten ihmisten suojaa kaipaa; ajatus on absurdi ja melkoisen 
sopimatonkin.
Kiihottamispykälän yhteydessä oikeussuojan kohteena on historian todella karujen 
opetusten - ja myös esim. filos. Nietzschen ajattelun - antama tietoisuus ja kokemustieto 
siitä, että keskuudessamme on aina ihmisiä, joilla on taipumuksia etsiä kaunan ja vainon 
kohteita usein itseään heikommista, mm. vähemmistöistä. Taipumus yrittää alistaa ”säi-
lyttääkseen itse henkisen ryhtinsä”, kuten Nietzsche asian kuvaili. Näitä kohteita - joilla 
ei juuri koskaan ole mitään osaa eikä arpaa kohteeksi joutumisestaan ja, jotka valitettavan 
usein ovat naisia ja pieniä lapsia - pyritään suojelemaan. On kiellettyä julkisella esiinty-
misellä vahventaa, ”kiihottaa”, tällaisten vainoon taipuvaisten kielteisiä tuntoja, joiden 
piirin todellisen olemassaolon on siis historiamme opettanut.
<ref>P 6: halla-aho defense.txt - 6:48 [ (1422:1426)]  </ref>
Legitimizing public story: game is rigged against us
No, nyt ainakin tietää varmasti, että suomalaisista saa esittää tuon tapaisia väitteitä, 
mutta somaleista ei. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:1 [ (34:34)]  </ref>
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 Pitää kyllä ihmetellä miten KKO:lla meni noin kauan päätöksen tekemiseen. Kauan-
ko kului aikaa itse käsittelyn ja päätöksen välillä? En muista enää.
    Mutta aika jännä että tuota ei ole vielä muutettu asianomistajarikokseksi, eli että 
loukatun pitäisi itse vaatia korvausta jos havaitsee tulleensa loukatuksi.
    edit:
    Niin joo tässähän onkin vaalit tulossa sopivasti, niin sehän olikin hyvä syy että 
tämä poliittinen oikeudenkäynti saatiin valmiiksi. Nyt kun suomalaisista saa sanoa jotain 
mitä muista ihmisryhmistä ei saa, on kaksoismoraali oikein juridisesti vahvistettu. Lisäksi 
voidaan tästedes loputtomasti viitata siihen että mikä kauhea vihakirjoittelija Jussi on-
kaan. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:2 [ (42:47)]  </ref>
    Oikeuslaitos on vihervasemmiston hallussa ja se on avoimesti suomalaisvastainen. 
Uskontojen kritisoimisesta ja kaksoisstandardien paljastamisesta ei ole tapana rangaista 
länsimaisessa sivistysvaltiossa. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:10 [ (347:347)]  </ref>
    Täytyy nyt ruveta kasaamaan tältäkin palstalta kristinuskon pyhinä pitämiä asioita 
herjaavia kirjoituksia. Niitähän riittää. SDP:n edustajan eilisen lausunnon, että kaikki 
uskovaiset ovat mielisaita voisi kansallisesti julkaistava Uutispalvelu Uusi Suomi vaikkapa 
poistaa heti ja tehdä siitä myös itse rikosilmoituksen kyseistä SDP:n edustajaa ja itseään 
vastaan :) 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:11 [ (354:354)]  </ref>
    Aivan käsittämätön päätös. Tämä kiistatta osoittaa, että on olemassa kahdet stan-
dardit. KKO:n päätös on mielestäni merkittävä rikkomus tasa-arvoa kohtaan. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:12 [ (366:366)]  </ref>
    Korkeimman oikeuden tulisi nyt toimia loogisesti ja tuomita Islamin haditheja 
levittävät uskonrauhan rikkomisesta sekä sanomalehti Kaleva kiihottamisesta kansanryh-
mää vastaan.
    Valitettavasti korkein oikeus on lähtenyt epärehellisyyden tielle. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:13 [ (371:373)]  </ref>
 Suomessa on lainvastaista ainoastaan tietyn uskonnon rauhan rikkominen ja tiettyä 
kansanryhmää vastaan kiihottaminen.
    Vai oletko nähnyt viime aikoina paljonkin tuomioita kristinuskon uskonnonrau-
han rikkomisesta ja suomalaisia vastaan kiihottamisesta? 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:16 [ (526:528)]  </ref>
      Ei pidä paikkaansa. Odottelen syytettä halustani paskantaa kolehtihaaviin.
    Ei tuo tosiaan johda mihinkään kohuun, suntio vain siivoaa paskat pois ja joku 
mummo järkyttyy, jos näkee lehdestä lukea pienen präntin.
    Mutta paskannahan moskeijan portaille tai käy heittämässä siankyljys oviaukosta 
peremmälle moskeijatiloihin: silloin voit ylpeästi sanoa jo tehneesi jotain!!
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    Raamatun heittely tai kolehtihaaviin paskominen ei ole mitään, siksi sellainenkin 
hyytelö kuin Jari Tervo uskalsi Raamatun heittää. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:17 [ (540:547)]  </ref>
      Lakien rikkominen ei ole mitään sanavapautta.
    Noin sanoi myös inkvisitio Galileille. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:18 [ (554:557)]  </ref>
    Suomalaisia vastaan kiihottaminen (leimaamalla geneettisesti determinoiduiksi 
känniriehujiksi) ei kuitenkaan ole tuomittavaa vai? Ainakaan mitään seuraamuksia Hal-
la-ahon parodioimasta alkuperäisestä tekstistä ei tullut. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:19 [ (567:567)]  </ref>
   Kuka tekee rikosilmoituksen Kalevan alkuperäisestä pääkirjoituksesta? KKO on 
selvästi eri linjoilla kuin JSN, eli ei ole väliä mitä osaa ”vihapuhekirjoituksesta” kirjoitta-
ja itse pitää totena, jos siinä väitetään että kansanryhmällä on jokin ”halveksuttava piirre”.
    Näin ollen Kalevan (ilmeisesti tyypillisesti nimettömäksi jäänyt nimettömiä 
nettikirjoituksia vastustavaan valtamediaan kuuluva pääkirjoitustoimittaja, koska 
nimeä en ole missään nähnyt ja kirjoitus itse on poistettu Kalevan sivuilta) suomalaisiin 
suuntautuneesta vihapuheesta pitää siis oikeuslaitoksen myös rangaista sakolla, jotta 
maassa kansalaiset olisivat perustuslain 6 § 1 mom. mukaisesti yhdenvertaisia lain edessä. 
Oikeastaan sakkoa ankarampaa rangaistusta puoltaa moinen vihapuhe laajalevikkisessä 
tiedostusvälineessä verrattuna kunnallispoliitikon yksityiseen henkilökohtaiseen blogiin. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:21 [ (708:710)]  </ref>
Oletko nähnyt paljonkin viime aikoina suomalaista kansanryhmää kohtaan kriteerit 
täyttävää kiihotusta tai laissa tuomittava kiristinuskon uskonrauhan rikkomista? Ja jos 
olet nähnyt, niin onko mainituista tapauksista nostettu syyte? 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:27 [ (804:804)]  </ref>
 Et ilmeisesti ole lukenut Halla-ahon alkuperäistä kirjoitusta, sillä siellähän se esi-
merkki on. Jussin kirjoitus oli nimenomaan vastaus samantyyliseen, suomalaisista tehtyyn 
kirjoitukseen. Sama mikä on sallittua sanoa suomalaisista on kiellettyä sanoa somaleista. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:28 [ (881:881)]  </ref>
Tämä koko juttuhan lähti Kalevan pääkirjoituksesta, jossa samoja sanoja käyttäen 
herjattiin suomalaisia. Kaleva tai pääkirjoittaja ei saanut syytettä eikä tietenkään tuomio-
ta. JHa näki tämän kaksoisstandardin olemassaolon, ja päätti näyttää sen toteen. Tänään 
korkein oikeus todisti hänen olevan oikeassa. Suomalaisesta saa mainita ominaisuuksia 
joita ei vähemmistöstä saa. Terveisin 50 päiväsakkoa senkin ajatusrikollinen. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:29 [ (892:892)]  </ref>
   Halla-aho viittasi kirjoituksessaan (http://halla-aho.com/scripta/muutama_taky_
illmanin_mikalle.html) juuri sellaisiin tapauksiin, jotka eivät olleet johtaneet mihinkään 
seurauksiin: katso esim. Kalevan pääkirjoituksen sanamuotoa, ja huomaat, että Halla-aho 
on pyrkinyt nimenomaan osoittamaan asiassa vallitsevan kaksoisstandardin. Tätä kak-
soisstandardia hän kritisoi, ja Suomen vasemmistolaisesti politisoitunut ”oikeuslaitos” on 
nyt vahvistanut tuon kaksoisstandardin olemassaolon. 
<ref>P 7: halla-aho HOMMA.txt - 7:30 [ (902:902)]  </ref>
